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Abstract  
This thesis aims to facilitate an understanding of some of the critical 
debates in public relations theory and practice. It joins others in 
contributing to a shift from a functional systems-based public relations 
paradigm to one where public relations is transparently seen as playing a 
role in shaping democracy in a global society. 
The research analyses NATO’s communication operations in the Kosovo 
Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, examining the case 
from a number of different perspectives. The thesis contributes to the body 
of knowledge of public relations practices and how, in this case, they were 
used to inform and persuade publics of the moral cause of a bombing 
mission to achieve specific strategic organisational and communication 
goals. Further, it contextualises the case of NATO as an organisation facing 
a crisis in legitimacy following the end of the Cold War. It demonstrates 
how the Kosovo Campaign provided a vehicle to transform NATO’s 
identity while retaining military capabilities, to make the organisation 
relevant to the global demands of the 21st century. In this way, NATO could 
claim a “unique self” and maintain its credibility and relevance. 
The thesis argues that NATO’s public relations campaign was successful in 
maintaining both credibility and popular support for a 78-day bombing 
campaign within the 19 nations of the Alliance. The campaign allowed 
NATO to claim that it was the only organisation that could provide 
 ii 
security and stability, as well as be the main bulwark of the defence of 
Western values in a rapidly globalising and changing world. Moreover, by 
framing the Kosovo air campaign as a humanitarian intervention, NATO 
was not only able to legitimise its actions but transform its military might 
with an acceptable human face in order to achieve its broader ideological 
goals in Europe. 
This thesis demonstrates how military interventions on behalf of powerful 
interests can be legitimised if the appropriate public relations framework 
is used and acceptable communication strategies employed. It suggests 
how citizens of democratic countries can be led to support decision-makers 
who present themselves as acting altruistically even when their actions 
may be self-interested. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Locating the study 
This thesis takes the unusual approach of using recent theories in public 
relations and organisational communication to underpin an extended 
examination of legitimacy issues surrounding NATO’s (North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation) intervention in Kosovo. It uses the disciplines to 
appreciate NATO’s legitimacy management challenges and, to a lesser 
extent, it uses the Kosovo case to explore the relevance of those disciplines 
to an understanding of international crises and strategy. 
Support for this unusual approach can be found in NATO spokesman, Dr. 
Jamie Shea’s description of his work leading up to, and during, the 78-day 
period of the Kosovo Campaign as the “ultimate public relations challenge” 
(Walser, 2000, p. 34). The thesis situates NATO’s challenge as being to 
establish its continuing relevance to a post-Cold War world. It argues that 
although the organisation had adapted to take account of the changing 
political environment following the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO 
still needed to provide a rationale for its continuing survival that included 
retaining military capabilities. As a result, NATO undertook a major public 
relations and public information effort to persuade publics of the 
legitimacy and validity of the Kosovo intervention and, through that 
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intervention, the relevance of the organisation to the new geopolitical 
environment.  
The thesis explores the ultimate public relations challenge through a 
critical analysis of NATO’s public discourses about the Kosovo Campaign. 
By examining the communication strategies and tactics of NATO in this 
context, it makes a contribution to new theorisation in public relations by 
contextualising them in a recent case that illuminates contentious debates 
around central issues in the field (L'Etang, 2005; L'Etang & Pieczka, 2006; 
McKie, 2001; McKie & Munshi, 2007, forthcoming; Moloney, 2006). The 
fundamental issue of organisational legitimacy for NATO expands the 
usefulness of the case study in theorising the complexities of achieving and 
maintaining legitimacy for a supranational organisation.  
A case in point 
NATO’s Kosovo Campaign offers an interesting vehicle to study the role of 
public relations in global issues, especially in terms of neglected issues of 
power. The campaign serves to highlight how power relations work in a 
global context and to illustrate how legitimacy issues connect military 
campaigns with moral imperatives. The thesis will argue that the latter 
connections operate in similar fashion to the processes whereby corporate 
identities link with corporate social responsibilities. The approaches 
enable a wider critical examination of how a public relations campaign can 
confirm organisational legitimacy even in the extreme conditions of 
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conflict. At the same time, the Kosovo Campaign sheds light on how 
recently instituted organisational changes can become embedded as a 
matter of natural course in the organisation’s identity and image. 
At this early stage in locating the study, for the sake of declaring personal 
factors impacting on the study, I put on record that my own particular 
interest in the developments and conflicts of the Balkan peninsular also 
contributed to the choice of the Kosovo Campaign as an object of study. 
Moreover, that personal interest also influenced me to analyse the case in a 
particular way and to follow a particular conceptual structure. As Stake 
(2005) points out: “In private and personal ways, ideas are structured, 
highlighted, subordinated, connected, embedded in contexts, embedded 
with illustration, and laced with favour and doubt” (p. 455). Therefore, I 
recognise that there is a “natural selection” of events, issues and concerns 
that are then subjected to my own personal interpretations. As a 
counterbalance, however, the thesis is also shaped methodologically by 
critical discourse analysis, which offers a structured means of analysis that 
lays open its choice of data, theoretical approach and assumptions. Critical 
discourse analysis enables the uncovering of different perspectives about 
the way discourses are constructed and the way various meanings may be 
construed. 
Another reason for the selection of this particular campaign is that the 
military conflict foregrounds the blurring of the line between public 
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relations and propaganda. Demarcation disputes about where, and if, that 
line can be drawn have recently re-emerged in public relations. Since what 
Moloney (2006) calls “the Grunigian paradigm” (p. x) was established in 
public relations academic literature and teaching, the term “propaganda” 
has had very limited consideration within the field’s agenda. That 
paradigm, which was crucial in establishing a clear demarcation between 
public relations and propaganda, has been the subject of critical debate in 
recent years. Specific critiques include Brown’s (2006) questioning of the 
division’s historical warrant and St. John III’s (2006) revisiting of Ivy 
Lee’s 1913-1914 railroad campaign to make the case for “ethical 
propaganda within a democracy” (p. 221), and more general criticisms 
include Roper (2005b), L’Etang (2005; 2006a), McKie and Munshi (2007, 
forthcoming) and Weaver, Motion and Roper (2006). 
Moloney (2006) has carried the propaganda-public relations dispute to the 
core of the Grunigian paradigm by contending that “public relations is not 
the search for communicative symmetries, but instead the search for 
communicative advantages that strengthens the interests of those it 
services” (p. x). His view contradicts the Grunig public relations excellence 
model of two-way symmetry in public relations (Grunig, 2001, 1992; 
Grunig & Grunig, 1992; Grunig & Hunt, 1984) and Moloney (2006), 
instead of differentiating the two terms, categorises public relations as 
“weak propaganda” (p. 165). Moloney’s categorisation is gathering 
increasing support (Brown, 2006; Mackey, 2007) and has assisted in 
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moving public relations beyond the Grunig models and contributed to a 
break in the established paradigm. Examination of the Kosovo Campaign 
helps illuminate these debates because such issues emerge more forcefully 
during war and conflict where partiality on matters of life and death make 
charges of – the other side – using propaganda more evident. 
Context and content 
This thesis also contributes to research that stresses the importance of 
examining public relations practices in terms of the context in which they 
occur. Contemporary culture has a past but public relations seems to live 
in an “eternal” present, that is, in the constant (re)definition of the concept 
in terms of the needs of the clients and organisations that use public 
relations (Cropp & Pincus, 2001). In countering this trend, the thesis 
attempts to show that increased understanding is possible when the 
practice is analysed over time.  
These deeper historical contexts have not fared well in public relations. 
McKie (2001) has also suggested that their absence has been compounded 
by an accompanying insularity that restricts the exchanges between public 
relations and a variety of other disciplines such as media, political science 
and international relations. The thesis also contributes to public relations 
research by countering this insularity through mobilising a variety of 
discourses to extend the field of public relations enquiry and range of 
intellectual inputs. More specifically, it supports and builds on L’Etang’s 
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(2006b) suggestion that public relations and international relations share 
common ground, particularly in terms of “ethical and political issues 
which arise from a number of their practitioners servicing large and 
powerful collectivities” (p. 382). Accordingly, the research makes some 
forays into political philosophy especially when the duties and obligations 
of these supranational organisations are discussed in terms of their 
relationships with publics.  
When governments or politically-oriented supranational organisations 
communicate with their publics for particular persuasive purposes, they 
are often considered to be engaging in propaganda. By colonising public 
relations into the realm of politics, these bodies are attempting to make 
their propaganda seem less like propaganda and more respectable and, at 
same time, aiming to make themselves more respectable. 
In this thesis the NATO spokesman, Dr. Jamie Shea, is a central actor in 
the Kosovo case. His reference to “the ultimate public relations challenge” 
put NATO’s communication practices firmly within more of a peacetime 
frame in the dissemination of information and was more concerned with 
the persuasion of publics to support a legitimate intervention for 
humanitarian purposes. There are many examples drawn from the press 
briefings in which Shea refers to the other side’s propaganda (Serbia, 
President Milošević) as opposed to the truth and the facts that NATO tells 
in support of what is actually occurring in the theatre of war. It is possible 
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to suggest, therefore, that Shea was willing to own up to public relations 
activities so as to carefully avoid any charge of NATO indulging in 
propaganda.  
Openly personal and political: Playing the bricoleur, producing 
the bricolage 
In qualitative research practices, Denzin and Lincoln (2000a) discuss the 
term bricoleur which may be translated as “a maker of quilts” (p. 4). The 
anthropologist, Claude Lévi-Strauss understood it to mean “a kind of 
professional do-it-yourself person” (Levi-Strauss, 1966, p. 17). I 
understand the term to mean that the researcher draws together threads 
and, using a variety of tools, produces a particular interpretation of an 
event, an organisation or indeed a society or culture. The “interpretive 
bricoleur then produces a bricolage – that is a pieced-together set of 
representations that are fitted to the specifics of a complex situation” 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2000a, p. 4).  
My own academic and life history influences my sympathy with the Lévi-
Straussian perspective. This arose through my earlier research as an 
anthropologist doing ethnographic fieldwork for a Masters thesis in pre-
revolutionary Ethiopia in 1973 (Schoenberger, 1975). That situation forced 
me to reflect upon the implications of international politics, the politics of 
hunger and the power of hegemonic ideologies underpinning corrupt 
systems. I also witnessed the violent overthrow of these systems and the 
establishment of other corrupt systems to replace them. Thus, my 
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personal worldview is significantly influenced by issues of power and 
dominance, inequality and injustice and my intellectual allegiances have 
been influenced by anthropology, and especially revisionist anthropology. 
At the time of carrying out my ethnographic fieldwork, the dominant 
paradigm within anthropological theory was to provide functional 
descriptive ethnographies of pre-industrial societies which contributed to 
the knowledge of diverse cultures and societies. More recent research 
theories provide more complex accounts. In contemporary theory, in 
writing up the material from ethnographic research, the author of the 
bricolage is seen to be piecing together a set of representations to reveal a 
complex situation. Moving beyond functionalism and objective 
description, as Denzin and Lincoln (2000b), in their authoritative 
Handbook of Qualitative Research observe: “The interpretive bricoleur 
understands that research is an interactive process shaped by his or her 
personal history, biography, gender, social class, race, and ethnicity, and 
by those of the people in the setting” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000a, p. 6).  
My personal perspective is closely associated with my own heritage and life 
experience. My father and my husband were both survivors of the 
Holocaust in Europe. This makes me painfully aware of the effects of 
injustice, discrimination and war, and in particular, the uses of 
propaganda to justify and legitimate regimes and to convince citizens that 
particular actions are justified. Beyond this, my husband’s experiences as a 
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young child hiding from the Nazis in the partisan-held region of 
Yugoslavia have forced me to confront my own biases in this research 
project. I declare this here because, as Fairclough (1989) points out, it is 
important to “acknowledge these influences, rather than affecting a 
spurious neutrality” (p. 5). 
Given that these biases exist, it is important for the researcher to 
acknowledge them and align their research accordingly. For this study, 
critical theory provides the means whereby these biases can be 
acknowledged and harnessed for the greater good of human society. Deetz 
(2005) comments that he suspects “everyone coming to critical theory has 
some degree of anger at social injustice and some love of the potential in 
human sociality” (p. 90). The result is that critical theory is as much a way 
of living as a theory. In public relations, L’Etang (2005) agrees that it is 
critical theory that “encourages us to be self-aware and transparent in the 
way we think, write and teach” (p. 522). I hope that this autobiographical 
account will serve to alert the reader to possible biases in interpretation 
and take them into account.  
Kosovo: A “hinge” in history 
As an organisation at the centre of European security, NATO needed 
Kosovo possibly more than Kosovo needed NATO. Many predicted NATO’s 
demise as an organisation after the end of the Cold War and expected its 
replacement by a looser grouping of nations better suited to the new 
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environment (Duffield, 1994-5). This thesis tracks how NATO persisted 
and changed its raison d’être in line with the changing political 
environment.  
The thesis argues that NATO’s intervention in Kosovo provided a “hinge” 
in history. The intervention changed the way people thought about war 
and also changed the way that wars were fought. Furthermore, it was a war 
fought without a United Nations mandate. It was the first war to be 
initiated and concluded by the use of air power alone and it was initiated 
ostensibly for protecting human rights. As a result, NATO also had to wage 
an important public relations campaign to persuade people that in spite of 
the fact that international legal processes were ignored, this was a just war 
fought for the right reasons. 
Public relations was used to inform key publics and also to ensure military 
goals could be met. As part of its contribution to being a “hinge” in history, 
this war was not fought for territory but for the dissemination of Western 
democratic values. Through the intervention, Western Europeans could 
demonstrate these values to the people who were still part of the 
transitional economies of Eastern Europe. It was an exhibition of how 
things “might” look in the future. 
The Kosovo situation also presents an excellent case to look at one of the 
primary questions facing a globalised public today: “how do we come to 
believe what we believe?” Perceptions of global issues are many and 
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varied but are generally formed from social practices that are prevalent 
within society. They tend to be reinforced by the dominant coalition, of 
which public relations is an integral part (Berger, 2005). Large 
organisations and, in this case, a huge supranational organisation, need 
people to believe that their actions are valid and justified. This belief 
maintains their legitimacy in their own eyes as well as those of 
international publics. They also need to maintain their standing and 
validity amongst other organisations of similar stature, as well as those 
nations that contribute financially to their existence.  
The Kosovo Campaign is a complex tapestry of interwoven threads. It 
provides the opportunity to examine a specific example of social and 
political change to extrapolate the findings to provide insight into how we 
come to believe what we believe about our globalised world. Such beliefs 
reflect evolving changes in our value systems. They impact on what we 
would like to believe about how political events occur and help shape 
worldviews that are also in transition. The Kosovo Campaign also provides 
insight into how national governments and supranational alliances 
cooperate, and conflict, in the shaping of a new world order. 
Public relations as practice 
Beyond questions of knowledge and politics, this research offers one 
response to L’Etang’s (2005) call for more critical case studies to supply 
multiple perspectives on our globalising world and to supply a “broader 
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understanding of public relations as a practice” (p. 523). This case study 
particularly lends itself to a critical approach because NATO is a 
supranational organisation which is politically based. It is a complex 
organisation concerned with power relations as opposed to the more 
functional operations of commercially-based corporations. In this case, 
public relations practice is transparently playing a role in shaping 
democracy in a globalised world. By taking a critical approach, this project 
goes some me in examining the socio-political issues at the turn of the 
millennium. It draws on multidisciplinary material to go beyond 
describing the discourse structures by seeking to explain them in terms of 
the way they confirm and reproduce, as well as legitimate or challenge, the 
systems of power and dominance in society (van Dijk, 2001). 
Many studies in public relations are still concerned with providing ballast 
to Grunig and Hunt’s (1984) four models of public relations and Grunig’s 
(1992) promotion of excellence in public relations. However, this study 
does not revisit the tensions between functionalist and critical perspectives 
in public relations, but rather takes L’Etang’s (2005) advice that critical 
work has no need of justification or even to make “formulaic 
acknowledgement” (p. 523) of earlier functional work.  
By taking a critical approach, this thesis does not seek to dismiss or attack 
the functionalist perspective (Grunig, 2006), but rather uses it to enhance 
and broaden understanding of the field of public relations. Critical 
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research enables and enhances this understanding by identifying 
dominant power relations and examining the dominant narratives present 
in the case. It questions how public relations is used to legitimise and 
maintain the organisation’s position in society (Gower, 2006) as well as its 
role in democratic society.  
This project takes up the challenge of analysing the Kosovo Campaign in 
terms of the public relations strategies and tactics and how they were used 
in maintaining public confidence and acquiescence to offensive action. 
One major question that arises in this analysis is how propaganda and 
public relations often fall within the same definition and yet, being accused 
of using propaganda is somehow so much worse than doing public 
relations work. Moloney (2006) argues that “the most important question 
about modern public relations … is how it relates to democracy” (p. 5). For 
public relations to have a beneficial effect on democracy’s three main 
institutions, politics, markets and media, there must be “communicative 
equality in public debate” and “citizens and consumers, organisations and 
groups should develop more vigilant ‘radar’ in order to detect PR 
messages” (Moloney, 2006, p. 6). This is very much in line with 
Fairclough’s (1992) argument for critical discourse analysis to be taught in 
schools to empower students to understand the ideological constructs of 
public relations discourses. 
In addition, this thesis explores Moloney’s (2006) idea of “PR-as-weak-
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propaganda” (p. 14) in relation to NATO’s public information efforts 
during the Kosovo Campaign. It considers how NATO seeks to advance its 
own organisational interests in the eyes of its diverse publics and notes 
how journalists, covering the campaign from NATO headquarters in 
Brussels, were a ready target public to be “colonised” (Moloney, 2006, p. 
151) by the public relations efforts. In particular, it analyses how the media 
played a significant role in reporting press conferences and press releases 
verbatim rather than acting, with rare exceptions, as a fourth estate 
questioning the truths of the powerful.  
This thesis also supports arguments for the centrality of framing in public 
relations and provides original research of a particular case. It draws 
heavily from Hallahan’s (1999) general framework for examining the 
strategic creation of public relations messages. More specifically, it draws 
from his suggestion that framing theory provides an additional means of 
understanding “the underlying psychological processes that people use to 
examine information, to make judgments, and to draw inferences about 
the world around them” (Hallahan, 1999, p. 206). This public relations- 
centred approach fits extremely well into the critical discourse analysis 
method, which also pays attention to the mental models already held by 
publics receiving specific messages (van Dijk, 2001).  
The thesis augments Hallahan by taking up L’Etang’s (2006b) notion of 
public relations as diplomacy and combining it with her earlier proposal 
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that public relations should be considered “in tandem with international 
relations” (L'Etang, 1996, p. 34). L’Etang’s contributions to the way public 
relations can be used as a means of developing and strengthening relations 
between collectivities, such as multinational organisations and/or nations, 
are elaborated here through the specifics of the NATO campaign. 
By also drawing on Cheney and Christensen’s (2001a) work on 
organisational identity (and the linkages between internal and external 
communication), the thesis provides evidence for the way that public 
relations was used to construct one specific “unique self” for NATO after 
the Cold War. In doing so, it adds to the body of knowledge by providing a 
case study of a supranational organisation using public relations to not 
only manage its identity and legitimacy, but also to enhance this legitimacy 
when it is considered to be endangered. Because organisational legitimacy 
is most in danger during crises, the thesis provides evidence of how NATO 
dealt with three specific crises during the conflict with a critique of crisis 
communication techniques. 
Thesis structure 
The thesis is structured around one key question: How does NATO 
legitimise itself as a viable organisation for the 21st century? In attempting 
to answer that question, it looks at how NATO constructed a public 
relations campaign for action in Kosovo to support the maintenance of its 
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organisational legitimacy and to handle ongoing crises that arose during 
the campaign. 
Such considerations of legitimacy are of course indebted to Habermas’ 
(1975) theory of legitimation and its understanding of how the legitimacy 
of an organisation is maintained. Habermas theorises how selective 
worldviews and beliefs are reinforced for publics so they will continue to 
support and accept that an organisation is working in their best interests, 
and in line with their deeply held democratic values. This research also 
seeks to make an original contribution to the field of organisational 
legitimacy through its critical analysis of discourses located within a 
specific organisation, in a socio-cultural and political context and during a 
particularly complex period. This case, and its data, has not, to the best of 
my knowledge, been considered in this depth, and in this way, anywhere 
else, and certainly not from a public relations perspective.  
Legitimacy also implies a means of justification for actions. The thesis uses 
critical discourse analysis to demonstrate how language is used to sustain 
the hegemony of the NATO Alliance. In the process, it provides a grounded 
illustration of how the discursive turn in public relations provides “a 
means of understanding the significance of the public relations 
contribution to the formation of hegemonic power, constructions of 
knowledge, truth, and the public interest” (Weaver et al., 2006, p. 21).  
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In support of my contention of the centrality of context, my second 
chapter, “Establishing contexts: NATO and the idea of Europe”, establishes 
the relevant historical and political background with a particular focus on 
NATO and its role in post-Cold War Europe. In addition, chapter two 
provides the historical context of the lead-up to the Kosovo Campaign as 
an essential framework for issues that arise in later chapters. 
After chapter two has set out that broad background over an historical 
time span, chapter three “Emerging choices and opportunities”, brings in 
later developments and further outlines the more recent context in which 
the NATO discourses are presented. 
The following chapters, four to six, involve a shift in focus away from 
background and on to approaches, methods and theories. The first of 
these, chapter four “Mapping the field (1): Organisational legitimacy 
through multiple discourses”, reviews literature relevant to organisational 
legitimacy and offers a provisional mapping of theoretical perspectives 
informing the analyses to follow in later chapters. 
Chapter five, “Mapping the field (2): Public relations and discourse”, 
provides the second of this trilogy of chapters. It similarly focuses on 
theoretical matters through an examination of the relationship between 
public relations and propaganda as well as the role of public relations in 
political communication and international relations and a review of the 
literature theorising crisis management and crisis communication. All of 
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these are connected to NATO’s communication strategies during the 78 
days of the conflict. 
Finally, chapter six’s “Implementing the project: Methods and materials” 
concludes the approaches section with an account of the main 
methodologies deployed in the thesis and a discussion of data collection 
and selection.  
The next five chapters form the substantive analytical chapters providing 
the empirical evidence. Chapter seven, focuses on NATO’s strategic public 
relations efforts in transforming and legitimising its organisational 
identity. Chapter eight discusses how NATO discursively positions itself in 
terms of the international community and the demand for humanitarian 
aid as a consequence of the bombing campaign. Chapter nine provides the 
geopolitical context for the case study and uses critical discourse analysis 
to help reveal the wider discursive practices shaping NATO’s public 
relations strategy. It draws on literature and evidence of current 
perceptions and stereotypes of the western collective understanding of the 
Balkans region and how NATO uses these understandings in constructing 
the “other”.  
Chapter ten follows by taking up the theme of the “ultimate public 
relations challenge” and examines the public relations practices used by 
NATO in the Kosovo Campaign. The chapter presents the public relations 
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and information challenges that faced NATO in its bid to inform, persuade 
and rally public opinion to support its actions. 
Chapter eleven looks at the framing practices in NATO’s strategy of 
legitimising its offensive war by framing it as humanitarian intervention. It 
discusses the development of the new discourse domain of military 
humanitarianism. This framing aimed to persuade publics of the 
virtuousness of a bombing campaign for humanitarian ideals and, by doing 
so, reposition NATO from a purely defensive organisation to an offensive 
military force that could gain widespread acceptance for deployment to 
other regions of the globe.  
Chapter twelve focuses specifically on the strategies for dealing with crisis 
communication. The chapter analyses three crises of collateral damage as 
representative of how civilian deaths as a result of the bombing were 
communicated and how NATO avoided widespread condemnation for its 
actions.  
Finally, the thesis ends with “Afterword: Conclusions and new directions”. 
This section draws the diverse threads of the thesis together and indicates 
new directions for research in public relations and organisational 
legitimacy of supranational organisations.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Establishing contexts: NATO and the idea of 
Europe after Yugoslavia 
This chapter aims to set out a broad background and to establish a 
contextual framework. It begins with a description of the nature of NATO 
as an organisation and the organisation’s role in defending Europe. It then 
moves forward in time to discuss more recent events that influenced the 
intervention of NATO in the Balkans. These are designed in accordance 
with the analytical framework of critical discourse analysis to established 
key features of the socio-cultural and political context in which the Kosovo 
conflict occurred. In delineating the relevant background, the chapter 
draws on the historical discourses about the region. It evaluates these as 
both descriptive and evaluative, with the latter carrying implications of 
ideological or political bias that contributes to the apportionment of blame 
and responsibility (van Dijk, 1994).  
However, since the focus of this thesis is on the communication strategies 
used by NATO in its bid to (re)establish organisational legitimacy, the 
chapter itself is biased towards aspects that impact on those strategies. 
Accordingly, it begins with an overview of the history of NATO and, 
particularly, how the organisation carved out a strategic role for itself in 
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the Balkans and offered a justification for that role. 
NATO’s raison d’être 
Five Western European countries, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, signed the Brussels Treaty in March 
1948 as a response to their concerns of the ideological, political and 
military threats posed by the Soviet Union. This was augmented by 
negotiations with the United States and Canada to form a single North 
Atlantic Alliance “based on security guarantees and mutual commitments 
between Europe and North America” (NATO, 2001, p. 29) resulting in the 
signing of the Treaty of Washington in April 1949.  
The essential purpose of the Alliance was to defend the security and 
freedom of the members by “political and military means” (NATO, 2001, p. 
30) in accordance with the principles of the United Nations. This meant 
that NATO’s role was to provide a military bloc to counteract any potential 
threat from the Soviet Union. In effect, NATO was the defensive 
mechanism put in place in Western Europe to counteract any real or 
perceived threat from the East.  
As a well-established and recognised organisation, NATO was closely tied 
to the issue of the balance of power between the two main ideological blocs 
represented by the two major superpowers, the United States and the 
U.S.S.R. between 1949 and 1989. Furthermore, the security of North 
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America was permanently linked to the security of Europe through this 
alliance. The 12 founding members of NATO were joined by Greece and 
Turkey in 1952, Germany in 1955, Spain in 982 and the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland in 1999.  
NATO’s raison d’être was simple: “to maintain sufficient military 
capabilities to defend its members against any form of aggression by the 
Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact” (NATO, 2004, p. 3). With the 
changing geopolitical circumstances, NATO sought a means of 
maintaining, and trying to extend, its position. The former suggested a re-
emphasis on its ongoing importance to the defence of the “free” world in 
Europe; the latter implied a search for new opportunities to exert its 
influence beyond European borders. 
The NATO organisation was structured so that member countries could 
coordinate their defence policies, as well as provide the basic 
infrastructure and facilities for military forces to operate. The organisation 
also provided a means of coordinating joint training programmes. The 
military aspect of the organisation was underpinned by a significant 
civilian and military structure that provided administrative, budgetary and 
planning staffs.  
During the period of the Cold War, NATO provided an efficient 
infrastructure in the West to coordinate military and political activities. 
These formed a counterweight to the activities of the Warsaw Pact 
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countries of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe. NATO could also claim that 
it had a significant role in reducing tensions between East and West, 
including agreements on the deployment of nuclear missiles in the region 
(NATO, 2001).  
At the end of the Cold War, NATO developed a new “Strategic Concept” 
(NATO, 1991). This shifted its primary focus from defence and deterrence 
to a more fluid concept of managing issues of instability both within, and 
external to, its formal boundaries. Walt (2000) catches the circular logic of 
this new concept in that, “We are told that NATO is needed in order to 
handle low-level security problems like Bosnia or Kosovo, but we are also 
told that intervention in these regions is necessary in order to demonstrate 
that NATO is still needed” (p. 16). NATO was obviously concerned about 
its relevance within the newly emerging European Union and was 
attempting to find a way to carve out a new role for itself in an expanding 
theatre of operations.  
McCalla (1996) points out that most studies of alliances tend to conclude 
that they will not last when there is no external threat to unite them. NATO 
averted this fate by enhancing the functions it was prepared to carry out, 
broadening its membership, updating its structures (Duffield, 1994-5; 
McCalla, 1996; Wallander, 2000) and perhaps, most notably, taking on the 
role of intervention in ethnic conflicts and the supply of peace keeping 
forces (MacFarlane, 2000). The new Strategic Concept, developed in 1991, 
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paved the way for more involvement in European developments. 
The break-up of Yugoslavia and foreign intervention in the 
Balkans 
The end of Soviet Communism brought dramatic political change to all of 
Eastern Europe. One country after another declared their independence 
from communist ideologies to which they had been attached for close to 
half a century. The countries surrounding Yugoslavia – Hungary, Romania 
and Bulgaria – all overthrew their Communist-led governments and 
engaged in a process of finding some form of democratic political system. 
The governments of Western Europe and the United States welcomed the 
changes as they watched the break-up of the Warsaw Pact and the demise 
of countries politically committed to communist ideology.  
For Yugoslavia, the transition was both more painful and more difficult. As 
a federation of republics, unity was dependent on economic well-being. 
For those republics that believed they were better off than the others, it 
seemed to be a simple step in the new Europe to secede from the 
federation. However, they were still dependent on receiving recognition 
from their closest neighbours in Europe in order to gain independence and 
be recognised as new nation states. Bitter rivalry and old hatreds were 
rehashed, rejuvenated and reconstituted between the different ethnic 
groups and different religious orientations that had lived quite peaceably 
together since 1945.  
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Blagojevic (1999) refers to the development of rivalry and ethnic hatreds as 
a series of old and new narratives. She identified four main themes: 
victimisation – that we are the victims in this conflict; hierarchies of 
victims – we are bigger victims than you; justification for taking revenge 
against neighbours and friends of other ethnicities – we are getting back at 
you because of what you did to us in the past; and preventative aggression 
– if we don’t do it to you first, you will do it to us first. These narratives of 
conflict soon move to actual fighting. 
Outside of the region, these same narratives were picked up by Western 
commentators to explain what was happening in the Balkan region. Some 
characterised the stories as lethal forms of nationalism (Glenny, 1999a; 
Hagen, 1999; Judah, 2000). Others argued that the West had very clear 
economic aims for Yugoslavia and actively encouraged the break-up of the 
federation and Parenti (2000), for example, judged that “the motive 
behind intervention was not NATO’s newfound humanitarianism but a 
desire to put Yugoslavia – along with every other country – under the 
suzerainty of free-market globalization” (p. 2). This kind of perspective 
was first formulated three years earlier by Michel Chossudovsky (1997) 
who noticed its absence in the mainstream discourses of the time: 
[T]he strategic interests of Germany and the US in laying the 
groundwork for the disintegration of Yugoslavia go 
unmentioned, as does the role of external creditors and  
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international financial institutions. … But through their 
domination of the global financial system, the Western powers, 
in pursuit of national and collective strategic interests, helped 
bring the Yugoslav economy to its knees and stirred its 
simmering ethnic and social conflicts. (p. 375) 
Chossudovsky (1997) is referring to Germany’s immediate recognition of 
the new nations of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, both of which had been 
part of the earlier Austro-Hungarian Empire and had also joined the Axis 
powers in World War II. Following this recognition, most of the Western 
European nations followed suit, thus paving the way for the next round of 
secession wars in the region.  
The role of the international financial institutions in the break-up of 
Yugoslavia has been subsumed by the more widely accepted explanation 
that it was the ethnic rivalries of the population of Yugoslavia that caused 
such intense fighting. Ethnic rivalries may indeed have had huge influence, 
but this does not explain the fact that for more than 50 years previously, 
the peoples of Yugoslavia had lived closely together and inter-married. 
During the 1980s, as economic indebtedness and inflation increased in 
Yugoslavia, the governments of the different republics borrowed heavily. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) required structural economic 
reform in return for the loans, demanding the dismantling of the welfare 
state, increasing foreign debt, and the well-known “shock therapy” that 
began in Yugoslavia in 1990. Government revenue was diverted from 
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transfer payments to the republics and provinces to repay foreign debt 
(Chossudovsky, 1997). 
The United States, under the Reagan Administration in 1984, also played a 
role in the implosion of Yugoslavia. A “secret sensitive” document on 
“United States Policy towards Yugoslavia” was issued as US National 
Security Decision Directive 133. Declassified in 1990, the document called 
for “quiet revolution” to rid Eastern Europe of its Communist governments 
and to integrate them into a market-oriented economy (Chossudovsky, 
1997; Parenti, 2000).  
These economic interventions during the 1980s precipitated increased 
poverty amongst parts of the population and encouraged the emergence of 
ethnic nationalisms, especially in the more wealthy republics of Croatia 
and Slovenia. As a result, the common response amongst the various 
populations was to look for scapegoats. Such scapegoats were readily 
identified as the “other” – the others who were members of a different 
ethnic group – neighbours, friends or even members of the same family.  
NATO carves out a role in the Balkans 
It was under these conditions that NATO made a first foray into active 
operations in Bosnia, formerly a part of Yugoslavia. Despite reluctance on 
the part of NATO to become involved in what was essentially a United 
Nations (UN) action (NATO, 2004), it was increasingly called on to 
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provide military support for the UN forces in the implementation of UN 
Security Council resolutions. The first NATO air campaign was conducted 
against Bosnian Serb forces in Operation Deliberate Force in 1995, under a 
UN mandate. This campaign lasted 12 days and “helped shift the balance 
of power between the parties on the ground” (NATO Public Diplomacy 
Division, 2005b).  
The shifting of the balance of power on the ground from the Bosnian Serbs 
to the Bosnian Muslims paved the way for the Dayton Accords in 1995, 
bringing the civil war to an end. As a consequence, NATO found further 
employment through deploying the Implementation Force (IFOR), which 
was subsequently replaced by the Stabilisation Force (SFOR). As a result of 
these actions, NATO was learning to adapt organisational and operating 
procedures “to become an extremely effective peacekeeper, building up 
invaluable experience in IFOR and SFOR for missions elsewhere in the 
former Yugoslavia and the world” (NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 
2005b, p. 5). 
Drawing on its experiences in Bosnia, NATO began to see a significant role 
for itself in managing the problems of ethnic conflicts and international 
interventions. It was admirably placed to supply military support for UN 
resolutions, especially on humanitarian grounds. International 
intervention in the war in Bosnia was extensive at both the official and 
humanitarian levels. Kaldor (1999) makes a distinction between the two – 
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the former being involved with political talks and missions and the latter 
being a new form of humanitarian intervention that had a military face. 
The ineffectiveness of UN troops who had been sent to Bosnia to protect 
the civilian population “were hamstrung because their masters were so 
fearful of being dragged into a conventional war” (Kaldor, 1999, p. 59), 
thus preventing them from carrying out humanitarian operations. From 
the organisation’s subsequent evolution, it seems clear that NATO saw the 
opportunities for extending its operations to deal with these types of 
situations.  
NATO had set a course for involvement in the Balkans through its 
deployment of troops in Bosnia and its engagement with the Dayton 
Accords afforded it a significant place in the negotiation of future 
developments in the region. However, there was a considerable amount of 
ground to cover before NATO again employed military force in Yugoslavia. 
Representing the Balkans 
When faced with the myriad of diverse views and understandings of the 
area designated as “The Balkans”, the researcher must be prepared to be 
pulled first one way, then another, as new dimensions are revealed 
through research. As more and more dimensions appear, the complex 
nature of the history of the region becomes a virtual tapestry of 
intertwining threads. 
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The Balkans are, at one and the same time, an imagined community, a 
geographical location and a metaphor widely used to suggest and describe 
the division of an area “into smaller mutually hostile states” (Oxford 
University Press, 1998). Also, the Balkans hold a sense of mystery. 
Standing as they do at the crossroads of East and West, they suggest a 
fundamental “otherness” of the societies that are neither one nor the other. 
The symbolism and meanings embedded in the cultures of the various 
ethnic groups make it both more difficult, and more interesting, to unravel 
the complexities of relations within the region. 
Although it is situated close to the heart of the European continent, the 
Balkans as an entity (reaching from northern Greece through Macedonia 
and Albania in the west, to Bulgaria and Romania in the east, as well as all 
the nations that comprised the former Yugoslavia) has always been 
somewhat “beyond the pale” when trying to understand or explain aspects 
of life and history in the region. Many historians, travellers, raconteurs 
and journalists have written extensively on their observations of this part 
of the world (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1993; 
Crampton, 2002; Durham, 1905; Glenny, 1999a, 1999b; Hammond, 2005, 
2004; Holbrooke, 1998; Ignatieff, 2000; Judah, 2000; Malcolm, 1998; 
Owen, 1995; Prentice, 2000; West, 1968). They have often found it 
difficult to avoid taking a position on the inter-ethnic rivalries which seem 
to be so much a part of actually being there. As David Owen, former British 
Foreign Secretary and founder of the British Social Democratic Party 
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stated: “Nothing is simple in the Balkans. History pervades everything and 
the complexities confound even the most careful study” (1995, p. 1).  
Furthermore, with the spontaneous outbreaks of hostilities between the 
former republics making up the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at the end 
of the Cold War, many Western democratic nations in Europe rationalised 
that it was the ancient animosities between the peoples of the region 
stretching back centuries that had caused these renewed hostilities 
(Chandler, 2000; Daalder & O'Hanlon, 2000; Glenny, 1999a; 
Goldsworthy, 2002; Judah, 2000; Kaplan, 1993; Malcolm, 1998). 
For many observers, as noted above, the wars for the break-up of 
Yugoslavia appeared to have their foundations in the ancient inter-ethnic 
enmities between the different religious populations of the area. This 
interpretation is by no means accepted by all (see, for instance, Allcock, 
2000). There was little religious tension or discrimination in Yugoslavia in 
the post-World War II era and, “an individual born after the Second World 
War could live the whole of his or her life without experiencing ethnic or 
religious discrimination or prejudice. This was especially true in urban 
settings, of which Sarajevo was a prime example” (Blagojevic, 1999, para. 
6). It is this aspect that is probably the most surprising in the wars of 
secession in Yugoslavia that followed the fall of the Soviet bloc.  
For many in Yugoslavia, as well as expatriate Yugoslavs, the sudden 
reversion to ethnic and religious rivalries was a shock. They started a 
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series of events that lurched out of control and brought the country to a 
near state of anarchy. However, for many writers, the day that Yugoslavia 
began to crack was the day that Marshal Tito died. 
For the 35 years of Tito’s rule in Yugoslavia, the countries of Western 
Europe had accommodated Yugoslavia as the bridge between East and 
West, not entirely in the Eastern bloc, but certainly not in the Western 
bloc. Tito managed to maintain a fairly neutral, if not slightly pro-Western, 
position in the Cold War (Glenny, 1999a). Tito had ruled Yugoslavia from 
the end of World War II and had been at the helm of a strong Communist 
power structure that maintained unity amongst the various republics that 
made up Yugoslavia. When Tito died in 1980 at the age of 87, many 
predicted the imminent demise of Yugoslavia but the conditions at that 
time were very different from those in 1990.  
In 1980, there was little interest either from the Soviet Union or the United 
States. Nor did the nascent European Union appear concerned about 
destabilising or changing the situation in Yugoslavia. For each of these 
power blocs, the status quo was the most viable option. Although the 
economic situation in Yugoslavia deteriorated significantly during the 
1980s, the country was still able to function as a political entity. The 
power-sharing model of government, in which senior positions were 
rotated every year to prevent the accumulation of power in the hands of 
any one republic or any one politician, was successful for five years 
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following Tito’s death (Glenny, 1999a). 
The Communist parties in power in each of the republic constituencies 
were dominated by conservatives who were not particularly concerned 
with the developing situation of confusion and corruption, a direct result 
of the economic recession. However, as the number of political and 
economic crises within the country began to grow, the political legacy left 
by Tito was incapable of adapting to the new situation.  
Slobodan Milošević and the road to NATO intervention in 
Kosovo 
Slobodan Milošević became the central figure featuring in the wars that 
accompanied the break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Many, although 
Allcock (2000) argues that the process was far more complex, attribute 
these wars to a rise in nationalist feeling in Serbia, fuelled by rhetoric and 
nationalist sentiments. It is, however, now generally accepted that 
Milošević was an opportunist who used nationalistic sentiments at every 
opportunity “as a suitable instrument for the seizure of state power rather 
than as a matter of conviction” (Allcock, 2000, p. 429) to advance his 
control of power.  
One critical point in the appropriation of nationalism for specific ends 
occurred on 24 April 1987. At that time, Milošević was sent by then 
Serbian Communist Party Chief, Stambolić, to listen to the grievances of 
the Kosovo Serbs. This was a ploy to prevent their coming to Belgrade to 
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demonstrate against the government in Serbia. In the Kosovo capital of 
Pristina angry Serb demonstrators were throwing stones and fighting 
against the police. The policemen were mainly ethnic Albanian and as 
Milošević appeared, he said: “No-one should dare to beat you!” (Judah, 
2000, p. 53). As Allcock (2000) observes in a footnote, this statement: 
has possibly become the most misreported statement in the 
history of the Yugoslav conflict. As an off-the-cuff remark 
delivered by a worried man under pressure to an immediate 
circle of the crowd encircling him, and incidentally caught on 
tape by a press team, it has been elevated to the status of a 
demagogic clarion call inserted into a “speech” intended to 
mobilise the masses. This is not to deny that Milošević was 
quick enough on his feet to take advantage of the fact that 
Dusan Mitevic, the head of RTV Beograd, then saw fit to 
broadcast this fortuitous snippet whenever the opportunity 
presented itself. (p. 429) 
Milošević, who saw himself as the replacement of Tito, was an ambitious 
leader. By manipulating genuine grievances and demonstrators, Milošević 
was able to drive through an agenda that put him firmly in the role of 
leader of the Serbs. Assuming the position of President in May 1989, 
Milošević made the most of the Kosovo situation in order to consolidate 
his power. In effect, he used the deteriorating position of the Serbs in 
Kosovo to rally support for his nationalistic agenda. He was very aware of 
those situations that could be manipulated for different purposes. Judah 
(2000) notes that: 
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Milošević chopped and changed his policies to suit himself. If he 
could not dominate the whole of the old Yugoslavia, then he 
would carve out a Greater Serbia. When that did not work he 
opted to play the peacemaker, because that suited his needs at 
the time. (p. 59)  
Judah’s (2000) analysis presents that the issues confronting Kosovo as 
simply a microcosm of the wider problems and issues facing the different 
ethnic communities within the old federation of Yugoslav republics. Each 
of the republics went through its own experiences of severing ties with the 
central government. Moreover, since Kosovo was never a republic, the 
issues facing the region were even more complex. 
Although the Yugoslav civil wars are not the main focus of this thesis, they 
need to be covered because they played a significant part in shaping the 
context in which NATO increased involvement, and finally intervened in 
Kosovo. Throughout the 1990s, President Milošević was identified as the 
villain who perpetrated the misery of the people in the former Yugoslavia. 
Thus, it is important to gain some perspective on how Milošević was able 
to maintain his power base.  
When he became President of Yugoslavia in 1989, one of Milošević’s first 
acts was to withdraw regional autonomy from both Kosovo and Vojivodina 
(in the north). It was hoped that this would satisfy the nationalistic 
feelings of the Serbs in these provinces. The imposition of new laws and 
decrees allowed for central control of the provinces from Belgrade. 
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In Kosovo, one of the laws and decrees passed during this period 
addressed the issue of land ownership, making it illegal for Albanians to 
buy land from Serbs. For the Serbs, it was seen as an encouragement for 
them to remain in the province and even encourage those who had earlier 
migrated to Serbia to return to Kosovo. In education, the Serbian 
curriculum was reintroduced into schools, thereby changing the emphasis 
in history, geography, music and language (Judah, 2000). The outrage felt 
by the ethnic Albanian population was widespread, though this did not 
result in a violent uprising. Instead, for the first time in the history of the 
Balkans, passive resistance gained some traction under the leadership of 
Ibrahim Rugova.  
Kosovo after Bosnia 
At the heart of all the wars in Yugoslavia was the fundamental struggle 
between peoples to control the same land. In Croatia, it was the control of 
the Serb enclaves in Vukovar and Krajina. In Bosnia, it was the control of 
areas populated by Muslims, Croats and Serbs such as Sarajevo, 
Srebrinića, Tuzla and Mostar. It was about who, or more accurately, which 
religious group would wield power over the other. This had indeed become 
a religious issue rising out of the suppression of religion under communist 
rule for 45 years. Muslims, Catholics and Orthodox Christians were 
fighting for power over each other.  
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Most of the facts presented in this section, and those following, are drawn 
from Tim Judah’s (2000) extensive research on Kosovo. His work draws 
together a formidable reference list of historical documents, early research 
papers, travel diaries, organisational reports, census figures, eyewitness 
reports and interviews.  
In the early 1990s, Kosovo did not present any concern for Western 
Europe or for the United States. There was no suggestion that it might be 
considered a republic or that it should have the right to self-determination. 
Little attention was paid to Kosovo internationally since far more urgent 
attention was required in Croatia and Bosnia. Furthermore, with the 
ethnic Albanian policies of passive resistance to Serb rule, there was not 
much for the foreign press to report (Judah, 2000).  
However, the United States maintained its vigilant watch over Yugoslavia, 
issuing a “Christmas Warning” on 24 December 1992. The acting Secretary 
of State, Lawrence Eagleburger, a former US ambassador to Belgrade, sent 
a cable from President Bush to President Milošević: “In the event of 
conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the US will be prepared to 
employ military force against Serbians in Kosovo and in Serbia proper” 
(cited in Judah, 2000, pp. 73-74). This appears to have been a “one-off” 
threat from the United States. It may have been because Eagleberger 
himself had specific interests in making the threat, or simply as an on-
going part of American foreign policy of the day, in which the threat of 
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force was a common occurrence. (Other comparable instances included 
Granada, Panama and Iraq, whereas only months previously, the United 
States had been forced to withdraw from Somalia.) 
The Dayton Accords, negotiated by United States envoy Richard 
Holbrooke, were the outcome of an agreement between Serbs, Muslims 
and Croats in Bosnia Herzegovina. They had a profound effect on the way 
Western envoys viewed the leaders of the Balkan region. Policy makers in 
Washington relied on the lessons learned in Bosnia about Milošević’s 
reactions and responses (Redd, 2005). They believed they knew exactly 
how to deal with people in the Balkans, because it was the concerted NATO 
bombing campaign against the Bosnian Serbs that had brought their 
leaders to the negotiating table at Dayton (Clark, 2001).  
As a consequence, NATO’s manner in dealing with the Yugoslav President, 
Slobodan Milošević was framed very much in terms of these experiences. 
General Wesley Clark records in his memoirs that:  
throughout the process of negotiation, I had learned the region 
and its personalities, the acute sensitivity to military power, the 
self-interest and corruption of some of the leaders. Above all, I 
recognized that fundamentally, quarrels in the region were not 
really about age old religious differences but rather the result of 
many unscrupulous and manipulative leaders seeking their own 
power and wealth at the expense of ordinary people in their 
countries. (Clark, 2001, p. 68) 
Chapter 2: Establishing contexts  
 
39 
This suggests that NATO leaders believed that they could use their military 
power against President Milošević again, this time to achieve their goals in 
Kosovo.  
The Dayton Accords were made up of compromises to end the war in 
Bosnia and were never intended to be an encompassing agreement on all 
the issues facing the region. Kosovo was not on the agenda and there had 
been no reason to put it there since the question of secession of the 
province from Serbia did not arise. The Accords confirmed that the 
international community would not recognise any change in Yugoslavia’s 
borders (Vickers, 2000) thus demonstrating that any Kosovar Albanian 
attempts to regain autonomy and self-determination through passive 
resistance had little or no impact on the West.  
Having begun to establish the importance of the context to understanding 
the Kosovo intervention in this chapter, I use the next chapter to further 
develop the socio-cultural and political picture of international relations in 
the region and the lead-up to NATO’s intervention. It examines the 
political processes at work and provides a chronological account of the 
developing crisis.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Emerging choices and opportunities 
In further delineating the context in which the NATO discourses are 
presented, this chapter provides an overview of the political manoeuvrings 
and diplomatic efforts made prior to the actual Kosovo intervention. It 
examines them as ways of finding opportunities to begin a campaign to 
settle the emerging ethnic hostilities in Kosovo. As Satterwhite (2002) 
points out, the West appeared to be faced with a stark choice: intervene 
militarily and do something about the developing ethnic tensions in 
Kosovo; or do nothing and allow the mass displacement of Kosovar 
Albanians into neighbouring countries. The question was sharpened 
politically because the displacement may even have been to the very heart 
of Europe. 
The rise of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 
At least until as late as November 1997, few observers believed that there 
was an imminent threat of major change in Kosovo. Furthermore, few 
people in Belgrade paid much attention to activities there. There appeared 
to be little urgency in dealing with any issues emanating from Kosovo, 
since the Serbs themselves had enough internal problems dealing with a 
strict regime of international economic sanctions and a rising tide of 
nationalism (Sells, 2000). There were few international journalists 
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reporting from Kosovo and “no all-important dead bodies on television to 
galvanise Western opinion” (Judah, 2000, p. 119).  
However, in Kosovo there was ongoing political activity. A small force of 
fighters – some 150 men, according to sources cited in Judah (2000) – 
was active in fomenting support for a popular uprising against the Serbs. 
The leaders of this small group, which became the Kosovo Liberation 
Army, knew that Western governments, or the United Nations, were 
unlikely to consider Kosovo as an international issue unless something was 
done to bring it to world attention. 
 The KLA began a campaign to persuade ethnic Albanians that there was 
an alternative to passive resistance. They provided some military training 
and sourced small arms from various places outside Kosovo, in particular 
from neighbouring Albania, with whom the Kosovar Albanians shared a 
language and culture. Following the collapse of the financial structure in 
Albania in the spring of 1997, central control of that country was replaced 
by anarchy. Kalachnikov guns were sold by looters for $10 per gun in the 
street (Todorova, 2000). Even then, as weapons became available and 
were being offered to the people of Kosovo, few Kosovar Albanians 
accepted guns from the KLA. There was still no general acceptance of the 
idea of a general uprising, since Bosnia was still fresh in everyone’s mind 
(Judah, 2000). 
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However, incidents of harassment, incitement and human rights abuses 
perpetrated by Kosovo Serbs on ethnic Albanians were becoming more 
common, thus undermining Ibrahim Rugova’s policy of passive resistance. 
In Serbia itself, Slobodan Milošević and his Socialist Party were also facing 
growing opposition in local elections. Milošević managed to maintain 
control of local councils by interference in the election process (Judah, 
2000) but, in November 1996, hundreds of thousands of outraged Serbs 
demonstrated against Milošević every day for 88 days until he finally 
capitulated and allowed the opposition to take power in the areas where 
they had been successful in the elections. 
At the same time, in Montenegro – the other republic in the Yugoslav 
federation – support for the pro-Milošević party was wearing thin and 
Montenegro was threatening to secede from the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. If this were to happen, Milošević would no longer have a job, 
since Yugoslavia would no longer exist. Milošević maintained his hold on 
power, not through any particularly clever manoeuvring, but rather 
because the opposition squabbled so much amongst themselves that he 
was able to emerge once more as the only leader. During this period of 
time, discussions on the future of Kosovo were put on hold, or rather, 
shelved completely. 
By the beginning of 1998, the KLA was gaining some traction amongst the 
local population in Kosovo. Television satellite broadcasts from Tirana in 
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Albania were utilised to begin attacks on Rugova and his failed policy of 
passive resistance. In the mainly ethnic Albanian area of Kosovo’s Dreniča 
Valley, the KLA was exerting more control. The main protagonists, 
through their contacts and networks in Western Europe, began a public 
relations campaign to gain publicity and favourable public opinion for 
their cause. Judah (2000) refers to a meeting between a BBC 
correspondent, who had just returned from Belgrade, and the three KLA 
leaders in Switzerland. They told him that they intended to launch an 
armed insurrection. The correspondent, Paul Wood, “did not file the story. 
‘What could I tell the BBC,’ he says, ‘that I met three Albanians in a café in 
Switzerland who told me they were about to start a war?’” (p. 135). In spite 
of this, the KLA was able to mobilise enough foreign journalists to cover 
developing events in Kosovo.  
This campaign produced the results the KLA had been hoping for – to 
bring foreign correspondents and diplomats into the region to report on 
their activities. Funerals became a useful means of achieving publicity 
objectives. Funerals were filmed for the Albanian satellite broadcasts, at 
which uniformed KLA members would make dramatic speeches against 
the Serbs and thereby rally support for the fight for Kosovo. Television was 
a major weapon in transforming public opinion in Kosovo from support 
for Rugova’s passive resistance to growing support for armed insurrection 
(Judah, 2000). KLA attacks on Serbian police and on ethnic Albanians 
believed to be collaborating with the authorities increased dramatically, 
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thus rallying support for an armed struggle.  
The events in Kosovo began to make some impact on foreign diplomats. 
The United States sent their special envoy, Robert Gelbard, to Pristina, the 
capital of Kosovo in February 1998. On 23 February he made the 
statement: “We condemn very strongly terrorist actions in Kosovo. The 
UCK [KLA] is without any questions, a terrorist group” (cited in Judah, 
2000, p. 138). For the Serbs, this message was clear. If the United States 
viewed the KLA as a terrorist group the same way as they did, then it was 
their duty to wipe it out. Attacks and counter-attacks continued 
throughout 1998, with the KLA and the Serbian police fighting it out in the 
villages and towns of Kosovo. The armed struggle had begun in Kosovo 
and foreign diplomats seemed mesmerised by the shock of what was 
happening. It seemed that conflict in Yugoslavia was, once again, spiralling 
out of control. 
Violence and the international response 
As the violence and fighting escalated in Kosovo, the Western media drew 
on the theme of violence as an integral part of the definition of the term 
“Balkan”. Allcock (2000) suggests that there are two quite contradictory 
interpretations of the nature and role of violence in Balkan society. On the 
one hand, violence is considered to be a normal and natural part of the 
social order of the societies that make up the Balkans. On the other hand, 
Europeans are aghast that such violence can be occurring in modern 
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European society because of “our tendency to approach Balkan societies 
through the screen of images that has been erected over the centuries, 
which emphasises their otherness, we embrace facts about them which we 
hide from ourselves when these also apply to our own society” (Allcock, 
2000, p. 383).  
But, as Allcock continues, the attitude that was developing in Western 
countries was that the upsurge of violence in Yugoslavia was aberrant and 
that something had to be done about it. Although there were numerous 
other internal conflicts during the 1990s, such as Chechnya in Russia and 
in Algeria in North Africa, in these instances there were no international 
calls for intervention. Chechnya was seen as a Russian problem, Algeria as 
an Arab problem, but Yugoslavia, located as it is “on the doorstep of 
Europe”, galvanised European capitals. Ethnic Albanians were now 
becoming an immigration issue for many countries in Europe. 
During the 1990s, hundreds of thousands of Albanians had left Kosovo and 
headed for the large cities of Western Europe. Whether for economic 
reasons or for “fear of persecution” in Kosovo, many Kosovo Albanians, 
and Albanians from Albania claiming to be from Kosovo, arrived in 
Germany, Italy and Britain, as well as in other European countries, 
claiming to be asylum seekers.  
With the upsurge in fighting between the KLA and Serb police in late May 
and June 1998, Western leaders believed that it was becoming 
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imperative that they should be seen to be doing something (Halperin, 
2000; Solana, 2000). In June of that year, NATO defence ministers met in 
Brussels to identify the options available to them thus maintaining the 
momentum of their involvement in the region in line with NATO’s 
Strategic Concept. In an operation named Determined Falcon, 80 NATO 
planes flew over the airspace of Macedonia and Albania, which “proved 
nothing more than the fact that NATO had planes in the region which 
could fly very fast” (Judah, 2000, p. 166). By now, the situation in Kosovo 
was becoming part of the daily diet for foreign journalists in the region. 
Although the Serbs still maintained a measure of control over the entire 
area of Kosovo, evidence was growing that tens of thousands of civilians 
had been displaced by the fighting. It was this evidence, brought by 
television into the homes of Western mass audiences that turned what the 
Serbs had believed to be a successful return of control, into a disaster. 
Although there had been few casualties in the overall offensive, pictures of 
displaced families on television and the burgeoning population of Kosovo 
Albanian émigrés in Western capitals resonated with Western Europeans, 
creating a groundswell of public opinion that “something must be done”.  
Following a series of provocative attacks by the KLA on Serb areas of 
Kosovo in July, the Serbs attacked the predominantly KLA controlled 
Dreniča region, driving the population into the surrounding hills. Along 
with the population, the KLA also melted into the hills. This operation was 
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pivotal to the way Western diplomats perceived the situation. The KLA was 
very loosely structured and had no designated leader. Having been 
somewhat diffident about contacts with the KLA to this point, Western 
diplomats were now actively searching for someone to talk to.  
With Ibrahim Rugova no longer considered a legitimate representative of 
the people of Kosovo and, with no one person coming forward as the 
leader of the “terrorist” organisation, most exchanges with Kosovo 
Albanians seemed to be concerned with one attacking the other, rather 
than looking for a common negotiating position to sort out the issues. This 
made it easy for the Serbs to claim that they welcomed negotiations but 
they had no one to talk to (Judah, 2000).  
International diplomacy and personality clashes 
American and British diplomats were the ones leading the diplomacy to 
find a solution to the problems in Kosovo. Richard Holbrooke had been 
President Clinton’s main negotiator in the talks to end the war in Bosnia. 
He believed that he knew the Serbs well enough to know how they were 
likely to react. In order to forge this earlier agreement, Holbrooke had 
called on NATO to back it up with some 60,000 NATO troops. NATO 
members, however, had become more diffident about the use of ground 
troops in Bosnia. They had already experienced the horrors of Srebrenića 
and other UN so-called safe areas. One of the major problems for NATO 
ministers was that America had no troops on the ground (unlike the 
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European members) and American pilots, flying NATO warplanes, were 
attacking the Serbs from 30,000 feet (Halberstam, 2001). The Americans 
were keen to show their involvement in the region without endangering 
their troops. 
This threatened to cause a rift between the Europeans and the Americans 
but Holbrooke maintained that the Serbs “had not been punished enough. 
They needed more bombs before they would take him seriously at the 
negotiating table. ‘Give us bombs for peace,’ he demanded” (Judah, 2000, 
pp. 121-122). In this case, the bombing did bring the Bosnian Serbs to the 
negotiating table, together with President Milošević. 
Following the success of Dayton, there was a lot of argument about the 
timing of the US-led NATO bombing. One side argued that if they had 
bombed the Serbs earlier, the war would have ended earlier; the other side 
argued that it was not the bombing that brought the Serbs to the 
conference table but rather that all sides in the conflict were exhausted and 
the Serbs had agreed to the principles of the agreement before the 
bombing began. As Judah (2000) explains, “these arguments … came to 
shape the way Western policy-makers looked at the question of how to 
deal with the Serbs when Kosovo became an issue” (p. 123).  
Following the Dayton Accords, Holbrooke left the State Department to 
become a private consultant. Madeleine Albright was now Secretary of 
State and she appointed Robert Gelbard as her special envoy to the 
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region. It was Gelbard who made the famous statement that the United 
States viewed the KLA as a terrorist group in February 1998. Aware that he 
had angered many prominent Albanian politicians in Kosovo, he 
attempted to retrieve the situation by taking a hard line with Milošević, by 
“shouting at him and telling him what to do” (Judah, 2000, p. 144). This 
simply resulted in Milošević ignoring Gelbard. 
 At the same time, Ibrahim Rugova approached Madeleine Albright and 
requested that she appoint Richard Holbrooke to lead the negotiations on 
Kosovo. Albright wanted to retain control but was finally persuaded to 
appoint Holbrooke, following personal interventions by Deputy Secretary 
of State, Strobe Talbott and Sandy Berger, National Security Advisor to 
President Clinton. However, as far as the American President was 
concerned, he relied “almost exclusively on the advice of Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright’s information and opinions concerning policy options 
in Kosovo” (Redd, 2005, p. 140). At that time, the President was more 
engaged with his personal issues in the unfolding Clinton-Lewinsky sex 
scandal.  
United States Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright was a central figure in 
the decision-making process to activate the bombing missions. She was the 
driving force that brought about the decision to start bombing. There were 
other diplomats who engaged with Milošević on different occasions to try 
to persuade him to reduce the violence that was becoming increasingly 
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brutal in Kosovo. NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana and SACEUR, 
General Wesley Clark, Ambassador Holbrooke and British Foreign 
Minister Robin Cook all had major roles in negotiating with Milošević 
(Albright, 2003; Clark, 2001; Holbrooke, 1998; Solana, 1999c).  
It is difficult to evaluate how these personal accounts and animosities 
contributed to the deterioration of relations between the Western 
countries and Yugoslavia. However, it is possible to extrapolate that there 
was some impact from these interpersonal relationships since NATO’s 
early justifications for launching the Kosovo Campaign were pointedly 
targeted at Milošević personally. He seemed to embody all the frustrations 
that the Western nations encountered and, as a consequence, became the 
target for the 78-day bombing campaign along with hundreds of thousands 
of people in Serbia proper and in Kosovo in particular. 
Count-down to bombing 
In the summer of 1998, the Serb offensive to regain control of the Dreniča 
region had reached its height but they had few resources to “occupy” the 
area. The KLA moved in behind them and retook control (Judah, 2000; 
Kostovicova, 2000). For the KLA, the Serb offensive was useful because it 
demonstrated that Serbs and Albanians were unlikely to ever live 
peacefully together again in Kosovo. It also set up the framework for the 
KLA’s claim for an independent ethnic Albanian state.  
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Apart from the growing number of fighters in the KLA, no one had 
envisaged independence for Kosovo (Judah, 2000). Diplomats had 
foreseen some kind of Dayton agreement for Kosovo, in which Kosovo 
would become a republic of Yugoslavia, with built-in guarantees for the 
protection of the Serbian population. However, both the Serbs and the 
Albanians rejected this. Furthermore, there was a growing expectation in 
Washington that intervention was the answer to the developing situation 
in Kosovo. Joksimovich (1999) recounts the chronology of events leading 
up to the plans for intervention. He makes specific reference to a paper 
written in August 1998 by Senate policy analyst, James Jatras, in which 
Jatras noted that the Clinton administration was simply waiting for an 
appropriate event that would make intervention necessary. 
However, major questions arose from issuing such threats: air strikes may 
encourage a KLA assault on the Serbs; the Serbs may force the Kosovo 
Albanians out of Kosovo in large numbers; the legality of the use of force; 
what role would the UN Security Council play; and how would the 
Russians and Chinese react to such a UN resolution? An estimation of the 
situation was carried out by the Foreign Office in London and it was 
decided that there was no case for intervention since the number of 
casualties of the Serb summer offensive was minimal, even though the 
numbers of displaced persons were huge (Judah, 2000). 
But Richard Holbrooke was not convinced of this and, noting a line in a 
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Milošević-Yeltsin statement that Belgrade-accredited diplomats were 
allowed freedom of movement to monitor the situation (Independent 
International Commission on Kosovo, 2000), he invented the Kosovo 
Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM). This was, in effect, a sop to the 
Russians to let them feel that they had a part in the international 
negotiations (Clark, 2001; Joksimovich, 1999). 
Observers on the ground multiplied significantly following the Russian 
agreement to this mission and became the core of the international 
presence in Kosovo. However, KDOM had no powers; it could simply 
observe and report and they quickly earned themselves the nickname of 
the Kondoms (Judah, 2000, p. 177). Now, foreign involvement in the 
internal affairs of Yugoslavia was cemented. There was no way out without 
some loss of face. Western governments would not be able to face public 
condemnation when television showed refugees freezing to death over the 
winter because they had not been able to return to their homes to take 
shelter.  
Difficulties in decision-making 
The realisation that action was needed resulted in a joint statement from 
President Clinton and President Yeltsin, which called for a halt to the 
violence in the province. This was followed by a statement by the NATO 
Secretary-General, Javier Solana, that NATO had completed its plans for 
the use of military force. These plans had been put in place in 1998 and 
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military exercises took place in September 1998. In the same month, the 
UN Security Council passed Resolution 1199, calling on Serbs and 
Albanians to stop the fighting and start talking. On September 24, NATO 
defence ministers approved issuing the Activation Warning for air strikes. 
Tim Judah (2000) described what he called one of the most important 
meetings that took place about Kosovo on October 8, 1998, in London. The 
participants included the foreign ministers of Britain, France, Germany 
and Russia, the US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, Richard 
Holbrooke and representatives from various European Union nations. The 
results of that meeting were that the Russians would veto a UN Security 
Council resolution that authorised the use of force. However, if NATO was 
to bomb Yugoslavia, they would do nothing about it. Albright was 
convinced that NATO had the “legitimacy to stop a catastrophe” (Judah, 
2000, p. 184) and applied strong pressure on European governments to 
participate. 
With British and French agreement, NATO ministers approved the plan 
for the bombing campaign. Armed with this approval, Richard Holbrooke 
was once again dispatched to Belgrade to confront Milošević with the 
threat of bombing. They concluded an agreement on October 12, whereby 
Serbian military and police would be withdrawn and negotiations with the 
Albanians would begin. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) and NATO would provide observers to monitor the 
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agreement. NATO would carry out air surveillance of the area and the 
OSCE would provide monitors on the ground.  
The issue of foreign armed troops on the ground to be “peace keepers” was 
never part of the agreement. It was only later, when events changed the 
situation on the ground that this issue was raised. Holbrooke was 
specifically instructed not to push for foreign troops in Yugoslavia: 
President Clinton, now facing impeachment because of sexual 
misdemeanours with Monica Lewinsky, the former White 
House intern, found it impossible to concentrate on his job and 
did not want to contemplate having to send US troops into any 
possible danger. Mid-term congressional elections were also 
forthcoming, and talk of US troops going to Kosovo was simply 
a vote loser. (Judah, 2000, p. 188) 
This reticence on the part of President Clinton continued throughout the 
Kosovo Campaign, much to the chagrin of General Clark, the Supreme 
Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR). NATO had made contingency 
plans for the eventuality that there would be a need for ground troops and 
had begun increasing its forces in the neighbouring republic of Macedonia 
(Clark, 2001). 
Since the Holbrooke-Milošević agreement was simply that – an agreement 
between the US-led NATO Alliance and Slobodan Milošević as President of 
Yugoslavia – the KLA was not party to it. They had been completely 
discarded as a party to any talks and, as such, were not bound by the terms 
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of the agreement. As a consequence, when the Serbs withdrew their forces 
from areas in Kosovo, the KLA simply moved in to take their place. In 
order to avoid being bombed, the Serbs maintained their side of the 
agreement. This allowed the KLA to regroup and strengthen its 
membership. For them, the agreement had come at an auspicious 
moment: “They were hard pressed and were holed up in the hills; now the 
agreement gave them a reprieve, time to reorganise and rearm and, as they 
told anyone who cared to listen, time to prepare for their spring offensive” 
(Judah, 2000, p. 189).  
The plot thickens … 
Holbrooke’s Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) was headed by a veteran 
American “diplomat”, William Walker. He had previously served as 
American ambassador to El Salvador, at a time when internal civil strife 
was raging in the Central American states of El Salvador and Nicaragua. 
More recently, he had been part of the United Nations Transitional 
Administration in eastern Slovonia (in Bosnia), which included the Serb 
enclave of Kraijina, the area from which the Serbs of Croatia had been 
driven. To the Serbs in Belgrade, this suggested some strong connections 
with the CIA (Judah, 2000) and they were highly suspicious of American 
motivations.  
The KVM began their work and made reports on activities in Kosovo. Then 
UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, reported that the KLA had increased 
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attacks on Serbian military and police in Kosovo and had occupied many 
of the outposts that the Serbians had been required to evacuate as part of 
the Holbrooke-Milošević agreement. There was little evidence that Serbs 
and Albanians would use the agreement to settle on terms for peace in the 
province. Instead, the personnel of verification missions were dragged into 
hostage and ceasefire negotiations. 
The situation on the ground deteriorated rapidly during December 1998 
and January 1999 and each attack by either side drew retaliation from the 
other. The attacks became less random and more planned and, in an 
ambush on January 8, the KLA killed three Serbian policemen and then 
another policeman two days later. At the same time, the Serb army was 
moving back into Kosovo in large numbers (Independent International 
Commission on Kosovo, 2000) and deploying along the Albanian and 
Macedonian borders against a possible NATO ground attack. 
On January 15, 1999, the village of Račak was at the centre of fierce 
fighting. On January 16, evidence was found of “arbitrary detentions, 
extra-judicial killings, and mutilation of unarmed civilians” (Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 2000, p. 354). The head of the 
KVM, William Walker, arrived in Račak on January 19 and immediately 
claimed that the Serbs were responsible for another atrocity. It was 
reported that 45 civilians were massacred in the village.  
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However, not all members of the KVM were convinced that Walker’s 
judgement was correct. Gabriel Keller, a French diplomat who had been 
appointed to the KVM, believed that Walker had condemned the Serbs 
with no concrete evidence to support his claims – only what he had been 
told by Albanian villagers: 
Suspicions were raised that at least one group of dead men 
might not have been civilians or that they might have been 
killed in the fighting and that the KLA had moved their bodies 
to make it look as though they had been executed there. Some 
sources believe that Walker rushed to condemn the authorities 
because he wanted to provoke a showdown. There is, however, 
no hard evidence to support any of these theories. (Judah, 
2000, p. 194) 
Walker’s report condemned the massacre and called on the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) to investigate the incident. The 
Račak massacre had become the turning point in the role of the foreign 
observers. The authorities in Belgrade ordered Walker out of the country, 
claiming that he had supported the KLA’s faked massacre scene. At the 
same time, the Serbian authorities also refused entry to the Chief 
Prosecutor of the ICTY (Independent International Commission on 
Kosovo, 2000) to investigate the situation.  
A fresh round of urgent diplomacy took place in Washington, Paris and 
London and, as a result, the Contact Group (US, UK, France, Germany, 
Italy and Russia) summoned the Serbs and Albanians to talk peace at a 
chateau in Rambouillet, south of Paris. NATO tried unsuccessfully to be 
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included in these talks (Clark, 2001) and was concerned that the 
organisation’s credibility was at risk, especially since the NATO Council 
had given the Secretary-General full authority to activate air strikes against 
targets within Yugoslavia. 
Since Račak is cited as the pivotal point for the conference at Rambouillet, 
it should be noted at this point that, following the bombing campaign, 
serious doubts were raised concerning the veracity of the massacre reports. 
An article published in the Forensic Science International Journal on 
February 15, 2001, reported that scientists from the Finnish EU Forensic 
Experts Team (EU-FET), having carried out autopsies on 40 of the bodies 
found at Račak, could “not establish that the victims were civilians, that 
they were from Račak or even that they had been killed there” (Georgian & 
Neslen, 2001). 
There is no doubt that Račak played a crucial role in the build-up to 
bombing. It provided the reason for NATO to activate its strike orders. It 
was also useful to convince some of the more reluctant members of NATO 
that something had to be done. Furthermore, it became the prime motive 
to begin the bombing. James Rubin, spokesman for the State Department 
at the time, recalls: 
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The Albanians may not have been our models of enlightenment, 
but Milošević was most definitely the personification of evil. 
How could we make our allies see it this way? Milošević soon 
gave us the answer. On Saturday, January 15 1999, Albright 
awoke to the news on the radio that Albanians had been 
massacred at a town called Rajak [sic]. When international 
inspectors quickly confirmed that Serb forces were responsible, 
a window opened for a decisive shift in western capitals. (Rubin, 
2000) 
This shift in the thinking in Western capitals provided more impetus for 
imposing an agreement on the two sides at Rambouillet.  
Rambouillet: Sign or be bombed  
The die was cast with Račak. NATO’s activation orders were in place and 
the final terms of the settlement were presented. A political document, 
known as the Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in 
Kosovo, was drawn up by the Contact Group and brought to the 
negotiating table at Rambouillet.  
The only issue that needed to be formalised was who would represent the 
ethnic Albanians. Many of the members of a hastily constituted 
representative team had never met each other before, some hated each 
other and others were deadly enemies. Still, as Judah (2000) points out, it 
was “a veritable ‘Who’s Who’ of the most important Kosovar politicians of 
the last decade” (p. 200). The delegation included Ibrahim Rugova and 
others from the government-in-exile; Hasim Thaci and Xhavit Haliti, 
founders of the KLA; and three noted Albanian journalists who wielded 
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enormous influence within the province. They elected Thaci as the formal 
leader of the delegation to the conference while, at the same time, 
demanding that all decisions should be arrived at by consensus. On the 
other side, various members of the Serbian political elite attended the 
conference on behalf of the Serbs, though there was no one with any real 
decision-making power. Milošević himself refused to attend.  
The initial talks took place from 6 – 23 February 1999. As far as the hosts 
of the talks were concerned, they believed that most of the work for an 
agreement had been completed. United States Secretary of State, 
Madeleine Albright, had persuaded President Clinton’s senior advisors to 
accept her plan that included the requirement that President Milošević 
accept NATO forces in Kosovo. This was ratified by President Clinton, thus 
allowing Albright to assert “her greatest influence over the foreign-policy-
making process” (Redd, 2005, p. 143). 
The two sides had agreed on the essentials of the Rambouillet agreement – 
namely, that substantive autonomy would be returned to the Kosovo 
region and the Yugoslav government would respect the political, cultural, 
religious and linguistic freedoms of the ethnic Albanian people; and, 
following free elections, the province would have self-government 
(Ramonet, 1999). However, when it came time to sign, neither side would 
do so. The ethnic Albanian delegation would sign for nothing less than 
complete independence.  
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Although the document granted Kosovo a limited degree of autonomy 
within Serbia, it had never been envisaged by any of the interested parties 
(apart from the Albanians) that Kosovo would become independent. The 
document continued to recognise the “sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” (Chapter 1, Article 2). The Yugoslav 
delegation raised no objection to the political aspects of the agreement, but 
would not accept the deployment of NATO forces in Kosovo. This was, in 
effect, a zone of occupation over the whole of Yugoslavia with “free and 
unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the Federal 
Republic” (Appendix B, Article 8) and full immunity for NATO forces from 
Yugoslav law (Articles 6, 7). It was the stalling point for the Yugoslav 
delegation. The agreement called for a de facto NATO occupation force 
within the sovereign territory of Yugoslavia. 
The Kosovar Albanian delegation also blankly refused to sign anything that 
guaranteed less than full independence, causing some consternation at 
Rambouillet, particularly amongst the US delegation. Secretary of State, 
Madeleine Albright, led the negotiations. Her spokesman, James Rubin, in 
a reflection after the war, stated: “NATO’s war against Slobodan Milošević 
and the Belgrade regime had become a very personal war for Albright – 
and for me” (Rubin, 2000). He suggests that Albright was very concerned 
about taking her place in history and being in a position to “shape events, 
to author history in Washington rather than defend policy at the UN. And 
author history she did. Albright was so central to NATO’s decision to 
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confront the Milošević regime over Kosovo that it was often called 
‘Madeleine’s war’” (Rubin, 2000).  
The sticking point for the Albanians was the reference to independence. 
Even for Albright, Kosovo was clearly part of Yugoslavia. She was 
concerned that if the Albanians did not sign the agreement, NATO’s hands 
would be tied and the activation orders could not be implemented. Rubin 
was dispatched to persuade Thaci that he was the key to the solution and 
that he must sign if Kosovo was ever the get any kind of independence. If 
they did not sign, they would be left to the mercies of the Serb military and 
paramilitaries. 
On the other side, the Serbs were urged to sign or be bombed. There were 
no further negotiations. As Redd (2005) points out: “It was apparent that 
NATO felt that further concessions to the Serbs were unnecessary because 
after a few nights of air strikes, Milošević would capitulate” (p. 143). For 
the Serbs, this was not a new experience and, once again, history had set a 
precedent. In 1941, Hitler ordered the Serbs to sign a pact with him or be 
bombed. The Austro-Hungarian Empire had also given the Serbs just such 
an ultimatum in 1914, prior to the outbreak of World War I (Talbot, 2000). 
Each time, the Serbs had refused to sign.  
The talks in Rambouillet were postponed to give the parties the 
opportunity to receive directions from their respective advisors. It was 
agreed that a second round of talks would be reconvened in Paris on 
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March 15. During the period from February 23 until March 15, there was a 
great deal of diplomatic activity in the region, with Albright despatching 
Senator Bob Dole to encourage the Albanians to sign. As March 15 
approached, there were positive signs that the Albanians would sign, after 
receiving new guarantees from the United States that, after three years, a 
referendum would be held to ascertain the will of the people concerning 
the final status of Kosovo (de la Gorce, 1999).  
On the other hand, the matters of concern to the Yugoslav government 
remained unchanged. The articles providing for the presence of NATO 
forces in Kosovo, supervision of the judiciary and the police by NATO, the 
implementation of military provisions and the dispute settlement process 
all remained in the document. The Yugoslav government was presented 
with the ultimatum – sign the agreement or the bombing will begin. As de 
la Gorce (1999) points out: “Could anyone have believed Belgrade would 
sign a settlement that turned Kosovo into a protectorate of the Atlantic 
military alliance? In these circumstances the negotiations were bound to 
fail. The road to war was open” (p. 3).  
Summing up 
The purpose of this chapter was to introduce the reader to the complexity 
of the situation in the Balkan region and to highlight the main issues that 
have been posited as the reasons for NATO instigating an offensive 
bombing campaign against the sovereign nation of Yugoslavia. On the 
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one hand, there are those who argue that it was the “lethal nationalisms of 
the Balkans” (Glenny, 1999a; Hagen, 1999) as the underlying cause of the 
break-up of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the decade of the 
1990s. Others argue (Chossudovsky, 1997; Parenti, 2000; Talbot, 2000) 
that it was foreign intervention and the desire of the West to advance the 
cause of economic globalisation throughout the former Eastern bloc that 
contributed to the tragic wars in the area.  
This thesis takes the view that it was also shaped by larger political and 
economic circumstances. The admired and respected leader of post-World 
War II Yugoslavia, Marshal Tito, had left no succession plan and a legacy 
that his beneficiaries found hard to live up to. The decade of the 1980s was 
the era when pro-market neo-liberalism was the main focus of Western 
economic ideologies and Yugoslavia had few alternatives other than to 
borrow money from Western financial institutions.  
With the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, 
Yugoslavia was left in limbo. Its more affluent constituent republics were 
encouraged to follow Western European market practices and rid 
themselves of the socialist ideals that had been so much a part of their 
economies for more than 50 years. As wages were reduced through 
inflation and the burden of foreign debt, increasing impoverishment of the 
population brought about the resurgence of ethnic nationalisms and the 
search for scapegoats – a common response in Europe to economic 
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difficulties. The history of the region reinforced the aggressive turn 
towards nationalism of the various ethnic groups but, as Allcock (2000) 
argues, “too frequently the relationship between past and future is seen 
either in terms of the entrapment of the present in the past or as the 
rediscovery of the past in the present” (p. 414).  
The dismemberment of Yugoslavia was not an isolated event, something 
that came out of the blue and required some type of explanation. The 
events were firmly grounded in the crisis of socialism that characterised 
this period of time and is still unresolved today in many of the former 
Eastern bloc countries. The response of the West to these events provided 
much of the road map for the wars of secession in Yugoslavia. 
For most casual observers of the events, the explanation of the re-
emergence of ancient rivalries appeared to be sufficient. The wars in 
Yugoslavia, coming as they did at the end of a long ideological battle 
between Western democracy and Eastern communism/socialism, were 
played out within a framework of different religious affiliations. The issue 
of economic meltdown took a back seat to the drama of resurgent 
nationalisms. After all, it is much easier to understand issues of 
ethnic/religious difference and much more complicated to work through 
economic ideologies. 
Furthermore, the personalities involved in negotiating the future of 
Yugoslavia represented a new direction in global politics. In the United 
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States, President Bill Clinton pitched involvement in Kosovo as being in 
America’s national interests and a moral imperative (Clinton, 1999). There 
was also some concern expressed about the credibility of NATO and the 
fact that it had been threatening air strikes for some time and nothing had 
come of the threats. In the UK, Prime Minister Tony Blair’s New Labour 
government talked of an “ethical foreign policy” (Wheeler & Dunne, 2004) 
that emphasised human rights, values and morality in foreign policy.  
For this thesis, the most important element was that for NATO, the time 
had come to prove itself to be a decisive organisation, which could carry 
out its missions in line with its Strategic Concept. Air bombardment and 
planning for the possible deployment of ground forces into the Balkans 
would not only provide the organisation with credibility, it would also 
deter further questioning of its existence. Redd (2005) cites a report from 
the New York Times (Sciolino & Bronner, 1999) that United States 
Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, challenged NATO defence ministers 
to “embrace a new role for the alliance, asking if NATO could not gather 
support for a threat against Milošević under these circumstances, what was 
the point of the alliance?” (p. 141). 
The events in Kosovo provided NATO with an opportunity to establish a 
new role for itself with the blessings of the United States, the United 
Kingdom and other leading European powers. It was also a means for 
NATO to deflect further questioning of its existence and its credibility as 
Chapter 3: Emerging choices 
 
67 
an organisation. The events in Kosovo enabled NATO to extend its 
influence over a much wider area.  
This background provides the socio-cultural and political contexts for the 
analysis of NATO’s strategic communication efforts. It points to the 
importance of the public relations effort to maintain not only the 
credibility of the organisation but also to strengthen its identity as part of 
its overall transformation. The next chapter delves into current, relevant 
public relations literature to provide theoretical perspectives for the 
analysis of the NATO discourses that follow. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Mapping the field (1): Organisational legitimacy 
through multiple discourses 
This chapter reviews relevant literature on organisational legitimacy and 
draws on multiple discourses to map the underlying theoretical 
perspectives of the analysis chapters to follow. It uses a critical lens to 
focus on the communication practices of NATO and how language 
(discourse) is used to produce particular understandings and knowledge 
(or worldviews) that “fit” with the established order. The theory and 
methodology of critical discourse analysis is used as “ a kind of 
microscope” (Chilton, 2004, p. 205) to understand the particular 
communication practices of NATO during the Kosovo Campaign so as to 
reveal how these may obscure or distort reality in the interests of powerful 
stakeholders. 
In terms of organisations, critical theory concentrates on “demonstrating 
and critiquing forms of domination, asymmetry, and distorted 
communication through showing how reality can become obscured and 
misrecognized” (Deetz, 2005, p. 94). Building on Deetz’ insight, the thesis 
aims to reveal sites of contestation and locate how powerful interests may 
skew understandings of reality.  
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This chapter groups the literature into sections in order to provide a logical 
flow for the basis of the analysis chapters that follow. In the first instance, 
it discusses organisational legitimacy, drawing on Habermas’ (1975) 
legitimation theory as a theoretical framework for the analysis of NATO’s 
public relations campaign during the Kosovo conflict. Political theory and 
the issues of humanitarian intervention and values-centred discourse from 
political science also have some relevance to the context in which this 
thesis is located. They are used to provide a basis for understanding how 
supranational organisations, like NATO, operate within the democratic 
system. 
Secondly, the chapter examines some of the current debates in 
contemporary public relations literature, in particular organisational 
identity and issues management. These central concepts within public 
relations practice help in understanding how NATO operates as a 
legitimate organisation during a remarkable period in its history. The 
concept of framing and its application within public relations is also 
developed.  
Legitimation  
Central to the understanding of how NATO was able to construct a credible 
and eventually successful public relations campaign is the concept of 
legitimation as put forward by Jurgen Habermas (1975; 1996). 
Legitimation is at the core of the issues associated with NATO’s 
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involvement in Kosovo and Yugoslavia, particularly because NATO is an 
alliance of 19 democratic states with a specific purpose. As such, it 
conforms to an organisational system inherent in representative 
democracies, which requires decision-making processes to be considered 
legitimate and hence acceptable by citizens as being in their interests.  
Legitimation refers to the process by which decisions are made “largely 
independently of specific motives of the citizens” but which “elicit 
generalized motives – that is diffuse mass loyalty – but avoids 
participation” (Habermas, 1975, p. 36). This decision-making process is 
underpinned by the “citizen’s conviction that he could be discursively 
convinced in case of doubt” (Habermas, 1975, p. 43). This preparing of a 
readiness to consent forms a vital part of the complex social systems of 
democratic states. 
With the increasing complexity of modern society and the advance of 
Western capitalism on a global scale, the simple political unity of the 
nation state has been transcended by international economic and security 
considerations. In concert, these threaten the autonomy of the nation state 
to make decisions on behalf of their citizens. This autonomy may be taken 
over by organisations, like NATO, thus extending the powers of nation 
states to the supranational organisation. In effect, there is a dis-
empowerment of the state itself when it gives over some of its authority to 
the organisation of which it is a member by conceding to consensus rather 
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than retaining the right to unilateral action.  
In these cases, Habermas (2001) suggests that legitimation gaps “open up 
as competencies and jurisdictions are shifted from the national to the 
supranational level” (p. 71). He goes on to say that “these new forms of 
international cooperation lack the degree of legitimation even remotely 
approaching the requirements for procedures institutionalized via nation-
states” (Habermas, 2001, p.71). Furthermore, legitimation, in Habermas’ 
terms, is then further weakened when considering the role of 
communication professionals in the construction of the specific discourses 
designed to persuade publics of the legitimacy of decisions. Roper (2001; 
2005a) observes that it is usually the job of public relations professionals 
to provide the weightiest arguments and the most persuasive discourses on 
behalf of their clients.  
Organisational legitimacy 
Hybels (1995) claims that the definitions of both legitimacy and 
legitimation are abstract and indefinite and can only be made more 
concrete when applied to specific situations. The abstraction comes from 
legitimacy being bestowed on an organisation when it behaves in line with 
current social norms and values (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). When 
legitimacy is sought by multi-national organisations across national 
borders, the issue is, then, to whose current social norms and values the 
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organisation adheres? 
Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) maintain that legitimacy is always a difficult 
concept because it is a social judgement delivered by the organisation’s 
publics. Since large, complex organisations have a diverse range of 
constituents, there are often conflicting values and expectations on which 
to base legitimacy. Furthermore, they may suffer from: “ambiguities and 
inconsistencies in their transmission – in the laws and traditions that 
ratify values, the editorializing of the media, and the pressure campaigns 
of interest groups” (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990, p. 177). Because of this, there 
is the possibility that an organisation may “protest too much” thus 
undermining its own search for legitimacy. 
In their work on multinational enterprises (MNEs), Kostova and Zaheer 
(1999) claim an organisation’s legitimacy is dependent on the legitimating 
environment in which it operates. In the current study of NATO, the 
legitimating environment would necessarily be the member states of the 
Alliance and other liberal democratic states that may be drawn in under 
the title of the “international community”.  
Drawing on Metzler’s (2001) premise that organisational legitimacy is at 
the core of most public relations activities, the thesis posits the view that it 
is the organisation’s response to issues in the operating environment that 
receives the most public scrutiny. This scrutiny may bring into dispute an 
organisation’s continued survival or, on the other hand, it may reinforce 
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not only its right to exist, but extend jurisdiction to supplementary 
activities.  
The search for legitimacy 
Suchman (1995) identifies two important dimensions to an organisation’s 
search for legitimacy: “(a) the distinction between pursuing continuity and 
pursuing credibility and (b) the distinction between seeking passive 
support and seeking active support” (p. 574). In the first case, the 
continuity of the organisation is about its stability and the fact that its 
publics understand its need to exist. This makes it credible and worthy of 
support. An organisation’s persistence is a “given” in the sense that it is 
embedded in society, reflects societal values and receives resources 
because it is considered proper and desirable. 
The distinction between requiring passive support or active support is an 
interesting one, in that the organisation may have passive support for 
many years just by virtue of its continued existence. Organisational 
legitimacy is acknowledged or has “cognitive taken-for-grantedness”, in 
contrast to the time when the organisation actively seeks support for its 
actions through “evaluative approval” (Suchman, 1995, p. 575).  
Sjursen (2004) discusses this concept of organisational persistence in 
relation to NATO and suggests that many researchers in international 
relations took a constructivist approach that stated that NATO was “never 
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only a military alliance held together by a sense of a common external 
threat; rather it was and is a community of liberal democratic values and 
norms” (p. 687). As I will argue, the need to shift the emphasis of the 
image and the identity of the organisation is central to the way that NATO 
pursues its organisational legitimacy. 
Moral legitimacy 
According to Suchman’s (1995) review of the literature on organisational 
legitimacy, there are three broad categories of legitimacy: pragmatic, 
moral and cognitive. All three are based on “a generalized perception or 
assumption that organisational activities are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 577). Pragmatic legitimacy is 
based on the self-interest of the organisation and as such, it communicates 
with its publics in order to maintain its status. Cognitive legitimacy is 
accorded to the organisation by the perception and acceptance of publics 
that it is necessary for the organisation to exist. 
In order to achieve cognitive legitimacy the process of achieving moral 
legitimacy (Suchman, 1995) for the organisation is important. Moral 
legitimacy requires a positive endorsement of both the organisation and its 
activities. It is dependent “on judgments about whether the activity is ‘the 
right thing to do’” (Suchman, 1995, p. 579). This moral judgement is more 
assumed than tested. It is talked about persuasively and lies at the heart 
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of NATO’s public relations campaign strategy for legitimation of its 
intervention in Kosovo.  
The moral aspect of organisational legitimacy is also aligned with Massey’s 
(2004) reasoning that “when legitimacy is defined as congruence with the 
values of society in which an organization is embedded, then the role of 
organizational communication is to achieve that congruence” (p. 236). 
Furthermore, the way an organisation communicates itself in terms of a 
worldview is closely tied to its identity (Cheney & Christensen, 2001a). 
This, then, allows the organisation to claim some distinctiveness in what it 
does, by creating its distinctive profile in the society in which it is 
embedded.  
If there is no congruence between the organisation’s current identity and 
its desired identity, the discursive process of articulation may help to bring 
the two concepts closer together (Roper, 2005a). This process allows two 
disparate ideas or concepts to be brought together to form a new unified 
discourse (Hall, 1986; Moffitt, 1994; Slack, 1996). This new discourse, the 
organisation hopes, will be acceptable to the appropriate publics and in 
line with social norms and thus confer legitimacy (Habermas, 1975; 
Rahaman, Lawrence, & Roper, 2003).  
Issues management 
An organisation’s legitimacy is not only dependent on its relevance and 
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place in the present day world. Legitimacy can also be tied to the many 
diverse ways that the organisation relates to changing environments and 
how it sees these as changing in the future (Cheney & Christensen, 2001a). 
For NATO, an organisation that constantly needed to adapt to changing 
political and security environments, issues management was essential. 
Although issues management has essentially been seen as a defensive 
activity for corporations (Heath, 1997), it can also be conceptualised as a 
means of supporting, maintaining and expanding power and control for 
large supranational organisations. That is one of the aspects considered in 
this thesis in relation to NATO. 
Chase (1982) defined issues management as: “the capacity to understand, 
mobilize, coordinate, and direct all strategic and policy planning functions, 
and all public affairs/public relations skills, toward achievement of one 
objective: meaningful participation in creation of public policy that affects 
personal and institutional destiny” (p. 1). Heath (2005a) and others have 
since developed the definition further to encompass an understanding of 
issues management being “systematic and proactive” (Heath, 2005a, p. 
461) as a means of responding to criticism or change.  
Heath (2005b) identifies four central functions of engaging in issues 
management: planning that takes public policy trends into account; 
communicating issues from both the defensive and offensive positions; 
ensuring that the organisation is meeting and even exceeding the 
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expectations of stakeholders; and constantly monitoring the environment 
for any potential difficult issues. Each of these functions was important for 
NATO to consider as it began its transformation from a purely defensive 
military organisation to one that was engaging in a myriad of new 
activities. The new organisational activities, together with the expansion of 
its membership, required the organisation to consider the views of its 
changing publics and to try to reduce any fall-out that may threaten the 
ongoing viability of the organisation.  
For complex organisations like NATO, the need to engage society through 
strategic communication (Cheney & Christensen, 2001a; Heath, 1997) has 
grown in importance, especially since they are dependent on the ongoing 
support of a diverse number of publics. Furthermore, by their very nature, 
complex organisations are required to maintain legitimacy and recognition 
in order to carry out their functions. This need for legitimacy is grounded 
in the interactions and democratic values of the organisation (Schlesinger, 
1999; Sudbery, 2003). The way the organisation is perceived is also bound 
by its performance in the eyes of its publics. Sjursen (2004) suggests that 
such organisations are problematic to conceptualise in terms of a specific 
identity since they “lack a democratic mandate, but also because there is 
no cosmopolitan law to which it can refer for justification” (p. 688). This 
concern for a democratic mandate raises further issues for complex 
organisations in terms of the way they communicate their identity with 
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their many and, usually diverse, publics.  
It is through identifying and managing issues in the operating 
environment that organisations are able to defend their legitimacy and 
attempt to deflect or avoid disputes that may question it. Given that 
complex supranational organisations establish their legitimacy through 
their membership or alliance, it behoves them to maintain this legitimacy 
by responding to developing issues in both a timely and socially 
appropriate manner. Zyglidopoulos (2003) claims that organisations gain 
or lose their legitimacy and reputation according to the way they respond 
or fail to respond to societal expectations in a changing environment.  
Organisational identity and image as an issue 
Organisational identity is central in the ongoing claims to legitimacy, 
especially for organisations that have been well established, supported and 
recognised in the past (Allen & Caillouet, 1994). However, maintaining this 
legitimacy requires flexibility in the face of changing circumstances and 
ongoing organisational change.  
In their seminal article on organisational identity, Cheney and Christensen 
(2001a) argue that the organisation today is required to maintain a 
consistency in messages and in purpose, for without “such consistency, the 
organization of today will have difficulties sustaining and confirming a 
coherent sense of ‘self’ necessary to maintain credibility and legitimacy in 
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and outside the organization” (Cheney & Christensen, 2001a, p. 232). The 
issue of identity then becomes a central issue for communication to both 
internal and external publics – how the organisation sees itself, what it 
wants to become, or to be.  
But the image of the organisation remains contested terrain. Moffitt 
(2001) suggests that an organisation can construct its image in a particular 
way, but essentially, the image of the organisation is determined by the 
receiver. There are many different ways that images are formed by 
audiences. They can include organisational, cultural, historical and 
personal concepts and these may be positive, negative, indifferent or 
partial.  
It is important for the organisation to recognise that there are multiple 
factors beyond the control of the organisation that contribute to its image. 
Moffitt’s (1994; 2001; 2005) work on corporate image focuses on the way 
individuals forms an image of the organisation and then draw conclusions. 
It is important for the public relations professional to consider how to 
“target all these potentially ever changing images within each individual 
and across all the individuals in a population” (Moffitt, 2001, p. 353) 
[italics in original].  
From the perspective of this thesis, the identity that NATO wanted to 
convey to its multiple publics had two key features. Firstly, it not only had 
to conform to democratic values, but secondly, had to be seen to be 
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working towards extending these values, which were common across the 
publics of the multiple cultures to which member states belonged. By 
projecting this identity, NATO could claim organisational legitimacy and 
credibility. Furthermore, since NATO’s raison d’être had changed in the 
previous decade, the need to update its image was central to the case for 
continuing support from multiple publics. 
The legitimacy gap 
In consideration of the fact that organisations operate in an ever-changing 
environment, the communication of an organisation’s identity and image 
may lack coherence at any point in time. In reference to business 
organisations, Sethi (1979) points out the likelihood of a gap between the 
actual performance of a business and how society expects that business to 
act or behave. This can also be transferred to political and international 
situations when the behaviours and actions of governments and/or 
supranational institutions do not conform to the expectations of the 
publics, thus developing a legitimacy gap.  
Sethi (1979) identifies four strategies for narrowing this gap. Three of these 
concern communication strategies: changing the perceptions of publics 
(image), through education and information; manipulating symbols of 
performance (identity); and attempting to change society’s expectations to 
make them more in line with the company/organisation’s performance. It 
is only if these three strategies fail to close the legitimacy gap that the 
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company/organisation would need to reconsider what it is actually doing 
and change its own performance in line with society’s expectations in order 
to bridge it.  
This thesis is concerned with how the legitimacy gap between NATO’s 
previous identity as a defensive military organisation is reconfigured to be 
a humanitarian organisation, which is more engaged in the protection and 
defence of human rights. It looks at how the process of discursive 
articulation is used to bring the embedded or current identity closer to the 
desired one. By intervening in a sovereign state because of alleged human 
rights violations, NATO needed to prove that not only its actions were 
legitimate but also that the change in purpose and focus of the 
organisation be considered legitimate in the eyes of its publics.  
This thesis follows Sjursen’s (2004) constructivist approach that NATO 
was “a community of liberal democratic values and norms” (p. 687) rather 
than simply an “alliance held together by an external threat” (p. 687). This 
enables the positioning of the concepts of values, humanitarian 
intervention and human rights as central to NATO’s legitimation process. 
Furthermore, since organisational legitimacy is bestowed on an 
organisation by its publics, their espoused values must resonate with these 
publics.  
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Values, human rights and humanitarian intervention  
In the post-national federations of member states like NATO, legitimate 
solutions to complex issues often draw on a particular framework of values 
and morality. This poses difficulties since both terms are not easy to define 
and we are faced with the questions: Whose values? Whose morality? 
A value is defined as “the judgement of perceived attributes and of paths to 
goals, normally associated with an attitude” (O'Sullivan, Hartley, 
Saunders, Montogmery, & Fiske, 1994, p. 328). Included in this definition 
is the idea of a moral value, which takes on a subjunctive form – 
something that “ought to” or “should” be. So, when something is stated as 
being the “right thing to do” or, that it is a “moral duty”, it becomes clear 
that the strength of this framework provides a robust and persuasive 
argument for “selling” a policy or action to appropriate publics (Roper, 
2001).  
Traditionally, intervention into the affairs of sovereign states would breach 
international law and UN charters. Such intervention contravenes the 
international understanding of the concept of sovereignty. This concept is 
based on the principle that nation states retain the right to govern within 
their designated, internationally-recognised, territorial borders and that 
there is no other authority above the state beyond those borders (Reus-
Smit, 2001). It is this conception that is considered mutually exclusive to 
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the concept of human rights.  
In Habermas’ (2001) Remarks on legitimation through human rights 
essay, the concept of power draws recognition from the “legitimacy claim 
of law” (p. 113). This makes it necessary for power to be not only accepted, 
but also deserved and therefore, justification must include claims “to 
worthiness of recognition” (Habermas, 2001, p. 114). For Habermas 
(2001), human rights are “Janus-faced, looking simultaneously toward 
morality and the law” (p. 118) and this creates a tension between “the 
universal meaning of human rights and the local conditions of their 
realization” (p. 118).  
Elsewhere, Habermas (1998) also writes that the interventions by UN 
peacekeepers and other international organisations since 1989, are slowly 
transforming international law into cosmopolitan law and can be seen as 
reactions to a changed world situation. With political changes taking place 
in the transition from sovereign nation states to the cosmopolitan order, 
Habermas (2001) finds it difficult to decide where the danger actually lies: 
in “the disappearing world of sovereign subjects of international law” or in 
“the ambiguous mish-mash of supranational institutions and conferences, 
which can grant a dubious legitimation but which depend as always on the 
good will of powerful states and alliances” (p. 119). Moreover, Habermas 
(2001) acknowledges that the discourse of human rights is “plagued by the 
fundamental doubt about whether the form of legitimation that has arisen 
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in the West can also hold up as plausible with the frameworks of other 
cultures” (p. 119). 
His reflections raise further questions about how human rights discourses 
are used (or misused) in the process of legitimisation of actions. As can be 
seen in situations surrounding issues, such as Muslim women’s veils and 
cartoons of the prophet in a number of Western European countries, this 
can arise in unique form when they concern with pluralistic societies that 
struggle with the differences of tradition and culture between the majority 
and minority groups. 
Where human rights are being abused within a sovereign state, the 
international community cannot legitimately step in without breaching its 
own definitions and conventions. However, Rues-Smit (2001) argues that 
within the concept of sovereignty, it is implicit that a state is only 
legitimate if that state protects the fundamental human rights of its 
peoples and thus maintains its legitimacy and rights to sovereignty. He 
goes on to suggest that it is human rights that underlie the justification for 
the foundation for sovereignty of the state. 
Such an argument moves the interpretation of international law into new 
territory that Habermas (1999) also explores. He explains, in his critique of 
the intervention in Kosovo, that the intervention has the “tacit 
authorization of the international community (despite the lack of a UN 
mandate)” (Habermas, 1999, p. 308). It is quite clear that, in Habermas’ 
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view, intervention contradicts established norms. Nevertheless, he 
suggests that validity comes from an ideal society in which the world’s 
citizens have considered and debated a significant change to the 
established norms. NATO’s intervention in Kosovo could be conceived as 
the beginning of such a debate within the international community by 
emphasising values, morality and social norms. 
Dealing with issues of human rights in terms of the concept of sovereignty 
raises some strong arguments for and against the use of humanitarian 
intervention. The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
was an important step in securing the preservation of human rights 
following World War II and the atrocities perpetrated by Nazi Germany. 
This declaration is only given substance by individual nations through 
respect for their populations and by avoiding any gross violations of 
human rights. However, intervention in conflicts within states creates 
completely different problems that were never included in the UN Charter.  
Issues of sovereignty and human rights are very closely aligned in the 
international legal arguments, especially when consideration is given to 
the legitimacy of sovereign states and the behaviour of their rulers in 
regard to allegations of human rights violations. The principle of 
sovereignty grants supreme authority within territorial borders and denies 
any other attempted authority outside those borders. As such, it is a 
binding principle in the current international political order (Reus-Smit, 
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2001). However, the principle of sovereignty is now being challenged in 
line with the principles of legitimation that call for the recognition of 
sovereignty in terms of governments that have maintained legitimate 
sovereignty from serving their people (Annan, 2000).  
This concept of political legitimacy as the relationship between a nation 
state and its people is a central idea in humanitarian intervention. As 
Walzer (1980) states: “A state is legitimate or not, depending upon the ‘fit’ 
of government and community, that is, the degree to which the 
government actually represents the political life of its people” (p. 211). 
Humanitarian intervention is claimed as the means whereby nations may 
intervene in the sovereign affairs of another nation. However, any 
intervention is dependent on the way in which the offending nation is 
understood or seen from a particular perspective. This becomes a 
particularly salient point in the discussion concerning the intervention of 
Western European powers in the affairs of Yugoslavia, since the region 
itself falls between the West and the East. 
Culture and the construction of public relations discourses 
In this particular case study of the public relations practices and strategic 
communication of NATO during the Kosovo Campaign, NATO is 
confronted with constructing discourses about cultures with which its 
publics have little familiarity. Sriramesh (2002) notes that cultural 
dimensions have an impact on public relations practices and, as such, it 
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is important to explore the many dimensions of culture. McKie (2001) 
similarly rues the insularity of public relations and the fact that deeper 
contexts are not more developed in public relations research.  
This thesis delves deeper into cultural contexts to provide a fuller 
understanding of the way meanings have been constructed to pursue 
certain ends (including allowing the organisation to claim further 
legitimacy for organisational change). This approach is also in accord with 
the analytical framework of critical discourse analysis that is used in this 
thesis.  
Chilton (2004) argues that globalisation has brought about major changes 
in the complexity of political interactions. The freer movement of money, 
people and goods has been accompanied by changes in language and 
discourse. Wars, terrorism and military interventions are “the most salient 
aspect of globalisation” (Chilton, 2004, p. 137) in political communication. 
It is the conceptualisation of the geopolitical space in which these events 
occur that provides context for the events. Furthermore, Chilton (2004) 
notes that the changing political environment at the beginning of the 21st 
century stresses “the language of self-legitimisation” and requires that new 
situations be explained to multiple audiences. He adds: “Most difficult to 
pin down, and perhaps most important, are the changing presumptions 
and establishing of new contexts” (Chilton, 2004, p. 137). 
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In a situation like the intervention in Kosovo, there was a problem of 
explaining the context, the place of military action and the culture of the 
people involved. Many in the West had never heard of Kosovo and, if they 
had, were not particularly interested in it. The ignorance meant that a 
communication intervention required a setting of the scene and references 
to the region and the people in it. Chilton’s (2004) analysis of President 
Clinton’s address to the nation demonstrates the three main topics of the 
President’s speech: “the representation of the location of a particular 
territory (Kosovo) in subjective geopolitical space, the representation of 
potential dangers to the self (the United States), and the representation of 
frightening and morally outrageous acts perpetrated by the enemy” 
(Chilton, 2004, p. 153). This representation provided a particular 
framework for forming a picture of the occurrences in Kosovo. 
Constructing the “other” 
The representations of Kosovo, Yugoslavia and the Balkans have been the 
subject of many books and articles. In particular they have been concerned 
with the perception of the Balkans by Western audiences and the 
relationship to the European “other”. Much of the literature associated 
with the construction of the “other” has been based on Edward Said’s 
(1978) seminal work, Orientalism, which contends that Orientalism 
denotes “the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient – dealing 
with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, 
by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short . . . a Western style for 
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dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient” (Said, 
1978, p. 3).  
Todorova (1997) claims that Said did not pay “enough attention to the 
essentialization (or, rather, the self-essentialization) of the West as the 
hegemonic pair in the dichotomy” (p. 10). Carrier (1992) approached this 
problem when he suggested that Westerners define not only the Orient in 
terms of the West, but also that these same “others” also define themselves 
in terms of the West. The West, therefore, is the standard of measure by 
which all others are defined and furthermore,  
Orientalist descriptions are produced by means of the 
juxtaposition of two opposed, essentialized entities, the West 
and (for lack of better terms) the Other or the Alien. Each is 
understood in reified, essentialist terms, and each is defined by 
its difference from the other element of the opposed pair. 
(Carrier, 1992, p. 196) 
More recent work has extended Said’s work to encompass the politico-
economic relationship of an imperialist West to a submissive East (Bakic-
Hayden & Hayden, 1992) that is concerned with the exploitation of 
economic resources, and to international public relations that is 
“structured-dominance” in favour of Western practitioners (McKie & 
Munshi, 2007, forthcoming).  
Although Said’s work has been influential in many disciplines, some 
Balkan scholars claim that Balkanism is a subject in its own right. 
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Todorova (1997) argues that it is not a sub-genre of Orientalism. In 
addition, as Fleming (2000) notes, the history of the Balkans is very 
different to the Orient that Said examines, and the external influences on 
the political development of the region have been quite different to those 
of the Orient. There is also the propensity to lump the diversity of the 
Balkans into one category, as if the cultures of the people of Romania/ 
Bulgaria/Croatia etc. are interchangeable with the peoples of Greece/ 
Albania/Montenegro, as if they formed one particular entity or type (see, 
for instance, Fleming, 2000; Wolff, 1994). It would be more appropriate to 
look at the way in which the two historical empires – the Catholic 
Habsburg (Austro-Hungarian) Empire and the Moslem Ottomans “shaped 
different Balkan territories in different ways” (Fleming, 2000, p. 1223). 
For the Balkans, sitting as they do on the edges of Europe and of the 
Orient, with a political history bound by the Austro-Hungarian and 
Ottoman Empires, a clear distinction of oriental or occidental 
categorisation is irrelevant. What is relevant are the perceptions associated 
with the Balkans terminology and how this is mediated through text to 
achieve certain goals. By “othering” the peoples of the Balkans, prejudice 
can be rationalised by referencing the characteristics of the people of the 
region and thereby marginalising them from the European identity. 
However, Allcock (2000) argues: 
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To insist on their marginality with respect to the European 
centre does not place them in a world apart from or beyond us. 
If they are marginal, it should not be forgotten that it is within 
our own margin that they are to be found. They will remain 
unintelligible, therefore, only for as long as we persist in the 
attempt to define ‘them’ and ‘us’, avoid the imperative of 
encompassing both ‘them’ and us’ within a common figuration 
and neglect to include them within our understanding of the 
global character of the world in which we are all situated. (pp. 
25-26) 
Allcock’s (2000) argument is to understand the Balkans as part of the 
exercise of understanding ourselves and our own society. He usefully 
focuses on the commonalities that exist in all cultures, stresses that there 
is nothing more or less rational or civilised in other societies and 
establishes that the job of understanding what is happening in the Balkans 
is to understand “the processes within which we ourselves are implicated, 
and to confront our own problems merely reflected back to us in a mirror” 
(Allcock, 2000, p. 6).  
This process of constructing ourselves and others through discourse is 
discussed in depth in chapter nine, which analyses how NATO constructed 
the “other” and how binary oppositions, metaphor and personification are 
used within the NATO discourses. The use of binary oppositions as an 
analytic category comes from structuralism where meanings are generated 
by a two-term system (O'Sullivan et al., 1994). and is also a common 
analytical tool in media studies, especially in news structures.  
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Through the strategic construction of messages and meanings, 
organisations attempt to influence key publics (Trujillo & Toth, 1987) 
about their actions and performance in order to maintain both their 
identity and legitimacy. One of the strategies for constructing messages 
and meanings relevant to this project is the way that NATO could frame its 
messages in line with already existing mental models and stereotypes of 
the region. This provided the context for the delivery of other, more 
pertinent, messages and meanings. The Balkans as a region as well as a 
concept, is imbued with social and cultural meanings that resonate far 
beyond the specifics presented in this thesis, and therefore provide the 
context for other aspects of analysis.  
Public relations, framing and discourse  
There are many different ways of constructing messages – through 
argumentation, advocacy, persuasion, dialectics, storytelling, and so on. 
However, this thesis follows Hallahan’s (1999) view that framing theory 
provides “a useful umbrella for examining what actually occurs in public 
relations” (p. 206). There is a connection between framing theory and the 
underlying psychological processes that are used for absorbing and 
interpreting information and forming opinions. This fits comfortably with 
van Dijk’s (2001) concept of mental models, which refer to the generally 
implicit socio-cultural knowledge that people accumulate during their 
lifetime Controlling mental models can be a way of achieving dominance. 
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When discourse is analysed critically, the locus of power is revealed.  
Van Dijk(2001) suggests some of the ways that power and dominance play 
a part in mind control: that people tend to accept messages that 
encompass beliefs, knowledge and opinions and come from credible 
sources; when people are obliged to accept knowledge from institutional 
sources such as educational institutions or employment situations; when 
there are no alternative sources or discourses providing alternative points 
of view; or the individual may not have the knowledge that allows them to 
challenge the information given. In these cases, van Dijk (2001) states that 
“given a specific context, certain means and forms of discourse have more 
influence on people’s minds than others, as the very notion of ‘persuasion’ 
and a tradition of 2000 years of rhetoric may show” (p. 357).  
Entman (1993) attempts to clarify how frames actually become “embedded 
within and make themselves manifest in a text, or, how framing influences 
thinking” (p. 51). He defines the essential elements of frames as selection 
and salience, which then define problems, diagnose causes, make moral 
judgements and suggest remedies (Entman, 1993, p. 52). For him, and for 
this thesis, frames work by highlighting particular pieces of information by 
making them more “noticeable, meaningful, or memorable” (Entman, 
1993, p. 53) and thus managing to associate them with a belief system that 
exists in the mind of the receiver.  
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It is through this clear association with mental models that frames can be 
most successful: “Texts can make bits of information more salient by 
placement or repetition, or by associating them with culturally familiar 
symbols” (Entman, 1993, p. 53). However, Entman (1993), in line with 
Moffitt’s (1994; 2001) work on the interpretive power of the receiver, 
warns that just as frames may be detected by researchers or by close 
readings of the text, there is no insurance that the intended meanings will, 
in fact, influence the audience’s thinking.  
In communication, frames may make certain aspects of a reality more 
defined while managing to downplay other elements. This allows for the 
emergence of a dominant intended meaning by making sure the framing of 
the situation is “heavily supported by the text and is congruent with the 
most common audience schemata” (Entman, 1993, p. 55).  
Framing provides a particular context for constructing discourses, and 
public relations is concerned with constructing particular social realities, 
or ways of knowing and understanding particular phenomena (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1966). Hallahan (1999) points out that because public relations 
is concerned with such constructions, pejorative terms such as “image 
makers” or “spin doctors” are often used against public relations 
practitioners, but “ because defining reality is the very essence of 
communication, constructionists would argue that the process is neither 
inherently good or bad” (p. 207). From this perspective, the role of framing 
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in public relations is vital because it shapes the ways that people see and 
understand the world. Hallahan (1999) describes it as a “window or 
portrait frame” which provides boundaries for the subject matter and 
draws attention to the key elements. “Thus, framing involves processes of 
inclusion and exclusion as well as emphasis” (p. 207) [italics in original]. 
This has both implications and applications for public relations because 
the decisions made concerning the framing strategies are the most 
important for the ongoing communication efforts of an organisation. 
For Goffman (1974), a frame provided the context for people to “locate, 
perceive, identify and label” (Goffman, 1974, p. 21, as cited in Hallahan, 
1999) information. This means that a frame organises information in a 
particular way and imposes some sort of order on social reality. This social 
reality is the way the everyday world is perceived. Perceptions are 
processed in terms of how the experiences of reality are sorted into 
categories and processes, thus allowing the individual to make sense of the 
world in which s/he lives (Berger & Luckmann, 1966).  
Hallahan’s (1999) typology of seven models of framing include: the 
framing of attributes, which involves creating positive associations with 
particular beliefs and values; the framing of choices, a model for risk 
situations where people are required to make choices between options; the 
framing of actions, a means of accentuating particular behaviours and 
actions in a desired way; the framing of issues, which concerns the 
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acceptance or denial of responsibility particularly within the context of 
crisis management; and the framing of news, which is particularly 
important from a public relations perspective in that so much of media 
content is supplied by the public relations industry. In news, the publicists 
promote particular themes and characteristics for newsworthiness 
(Hallahan, 1999) in order to increase the likelihood that the item will be 
published as news. 
These frames are particularly applicable to public relations and can also be 
used in combination with other frames as the packaging of the situation 
requires. They may also be used simultaneously at multiple levels. Framing 
for media consumption is particularly salient in the context of this study as 
a useful paradigm to examine the strategic creation of messages because 
the primary audience for the daily news conferences and briefings were 
international news and defence correspondents.  
Tuchman (1978) uses the metaphor of news as a “window on the world” (p. 
1) and describes the view from the window as being dependent on where 
one happens to be standing, how clear or opaque the glass is, and whether 
the window is large or small. Furthermore, news is also a means of making 
information available and is the “ally of legitimated organizations” 
(Tuchman, 1978, p. 4). The legitimacy of organisations requires the 
support of publics, and news is an extremely effective means of attempting 
to reach these publics and disseminate particular points of view.  
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While these must be borne in mind when evaluating the effectiveness of 
campaigns and messages, they have not been part of this thesis for the 
practical difficulties of running focus groups or individual interviews with 
appropriate respondents. Instead, the focus rests on the strategic process 
of constructing and framing the messages at the source and their 
subsequent dissemination to the news organisations, rather than on the 
actual consumption and understanding of the messages by, and of, the 
news organisations.  
The following chapter takes up the theme of public relations and discourse 
through a discussion of how they relate to propaganda, diplomacy, 
international relations, and crisis communication strategies. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Mapping the field (2): Public relations and 
discourse 
This chapter continues the theoretical aspects of chapter four but focuses 
them around a range of public relations-specific issues: the possible 
demarcation of public relations and propaganda; the role of public 
relations in political communication and international relations and the 
relevance of crisis communication and crisis management. The chapter 
seeks to contribute to all three areas, especially the crisis concerns that 
were central in NATO’s communication strategies during the 78 days of 
the conflict.  
Public relations, propaganda and discourse 
For many scholars, the line between propaganda and public relations is 
impermeable, and others it is very fine, or even non-existent. In some 
cases the two are absolutely separate and, in others, the two concepts are 
labelled interchangeably, depending on the context of the discussion. One 
major theorist of propaganda, Philip Taylor (2003), defines propaganda 
as:  
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the deliberate attempt to persuade people to think and behave 
in a desired way. … the conscious, methodical and planned 
decisions to employ techniques of persuasion designed to 
achieve specific goals that are intended to benefit those 
organizing the process. (p. 6) [italics in original]. 
Taylor (2003) further concludes that public relations is essentially “a nicer 
way of labelling it [propaganda]” (p. 6). Other theorists of propaganda 
similarly claim the key to identifying a particular discourse as propaganda 
is to determine the intention behind it and what it is trying to achieve. 
Jowett and O’Donnell (1992) provide a definition of propaganda as being 
“the deliberate and systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate 
cognitions, and direct behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the 
desired intent of the propagandist” (p.4), which is close to Taylor’s 
definition.  
 However, Walton (1997) argues that by simply using the word 
propaganda, it immediately “suggests that the message referred to is 
intentionally manipulative and deceptive” (p. 384). As a consequence, he 
continues, to describing any discourse as propaganda immediately puts the 
arguments presented in an extremely negative light and suggests that any 
evidence produced is unreliable. Walton (1997), however, also concedes 
that: propaganda might be seen in a more positive light; and that there is 
nothing inherently negative or bad in propaganda, which could be viewed 
as “an organized and methodical type of discourse that is recognizable as 
such” and should be evaluated in the way argumentation is used “in 
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relation to the goals appropriate for such a use of arguments” (p. 386). 
That concession aligns with both Jowett and O’Donnell and Taylor’s 
(2003) argument that it is the intent that “distinguishes propaganda from 
all other processes of persuasion” (p. 7). 
The debate over the use of the terms propaganda, public relations or public 
diplomacy to refer to particular types of messages have become a feature of 
the world in which we all live, in the media as well as in the academy. What 
is important to understand is why the messages are being formulated the 
way they are, how they are being used and to what purposes they are put. 
It is this point that Weaver, Motion and Roper (2006) take up when they 
discuss the role of public relations communication:  
public relations communication can be understood as the 
strategic attempt to control the agenda of public discussion and 
the terms in which discussion takes place. In these terms, public 
relations practitioners are complicit in the attempt to gain, and 
maintain, social, political, and/or economic power for the 
organizations that they represent. They do this by asserting the 
“common sense” truth value of what they stand for and 
communicate. (Weaver et al., 2006, p. 17) 
This strategy of controlling the agenda of public debate can be connected 
with the maintenance of power. This can be done by appealing to the 
public as judge of the organisation according to perceptions of the 
organisation’s trustworthiness and whether it is worthy of support 
(Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). This, in turn, raises questions of legitimacy 
when an organisation behaves in a way that is aligned with the public’s 
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perceptions of that organisation (Nasi, Nasi, Phillips, & Zyglidopoulos, 
1997) and questions of delegitimation when it does not. 
True colours? War, propaganda and public relations 
Discourses during conflict and war are commonly categorised as 
propaganda, since the intention (Taylor, 2003) behind any such discourse 
is to persuade citizens that the government is defending their way of life, 
their values and their national interest. But, because of the pejorative 
connotations associated with the word, propaganda, any other term is 
usually preferable. This thesis provides support for Miller’s (2004) 
contention that many of the communication methods used by 
contemporary governments and political elites have been learned from the 
public relations industry and the private sector.  
Since the public relations industry is essentially one that operates “behind 
the scenes”, it is often difficult to reveal its internal workings and these 
difficulties are compounded during war and conflict situations where 
external and internal censorship is introduced or intensified. This does not 
vary from propaganda to public relations. Sophisticated and complex 
discourse constructions often hide attempts to shape public opinion. 
Nevertheless, without getting behind the scenes, the functions of a public 
relations campaign can often be deduced from particular cases. At the 
time, there appear to be clear links between public relations strategies, 
goal, objectives and key messages and targeted at influential publics. 
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Such connections often find retrospective confirmation in the memoirs by, 
or books about, the communicators involved. (see chapter 12, for 
examples).  
Jowett and O’Donnell (1992) colour code propaganda into white, black or 
grey according to the source and accuracy of the information. White 
propaganda is credible information from an accredited source whereas 
black propaganda is creatively deceitful and includes lies and fabrications. 
Grey propaganda is somewhere in-between, where the source may or may 
not be identified and the accuracy of the information is uncertain. For 
Moloney (2006), public relations falls into the category of white 
propaganda or, in other words, weak propaganda. Intention is still the key 
and, in liberal and market-oriented societies, it is public relations 
practitioners who produce messages for their publics in order to 
manipulate them to comply with “ideas, values and policies that economic 
and political elites (some elected) have favoured” (Moloney, 2006, p. 41).  
Is it useful to try to draw a line between propaganda and public relations? 
Will that line progress and inform our analyses of information and 
communication processes? L’Etang’s (2006a) view is that there is a great 
deal of room for different interpretations and “the discussion about the 
relationship between public relations and propaganda has shifted from 
complex methodological debate to becoming embedded in ideological 
difference (p. 28). Accordingly, she goes beyond Walton’s (1997) notion of 
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propaganda as potentially neutral to conclude that the very “discussion 
about propaganda is not so much about method but has itself become 
propagandised” (p. 28). In effect, whether propaganda is positive or 
negative depends to an extent on how the speaker or writer, sees it. So, for 
one person, certain discourses can be identified as propaganda without 
negative connotations, and another, the mere label propaganda discredits 
the message and the messenger.  
One of the most influential pioneers of public relations was Edward 
Bernays, who has been characterised as “a farsighted architect of modern 
propaganda techniques” (Ewen, 1996, p. 3) and who also wrote a book 
entitled Propaganda (Bernays, 1928). In merging the two, Bernays 
(Bernays, 1952) coined the term “the engineering of consent” to illustrate 
the unbreakable link between public relations and public sentiment. “Any 
person or organization depends ultimately on public approval and is 
therefore faced with the problem of engineering the public’s consent to a 
program or goal” (p. 159). Such public approval is required to sustain the 
legitimacy of an organisation and such propaganda is required to keep a 
nation’s citizens onside during a war. 
It was Bernays’ work, based on the behavioural and social sciences that 
introduced the two-way asymmetrical model of public relations – 
practitioners sought information from the public through research, as well 
as disseminating information to the public. Theories of propaganda, 
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persuasion and the “engineering of consent” informed this model of public 
relations. In J. E. Grunig and L. A. Grunig’s (1992) later formulation: “The 
secret of successful manipulation was in understanding the motivations of 
people and in using research to identify the messages most likely to 
produce the attitudes and behaviours desired by an organization” (p. 288).  
Much of Bernays’ training took place in the Committee for Public 
Information (CPI). The CPI was the American propaganda machine of the 
First World War, which packaged, advertised and sold the war to the 
public and provided the basis for the strategies and practices of public 
relations in the United States. In fact, the CPI provided the model by which 
marketing strategies for subsequent wars, to the present, were shaped 
(Ewen, 1996). Ewen (1996) believes that for Bernays, “public relations was 
about fashioning and projecting credible renditions of reality itself” (p. 6) 
and that the practitioner’s job was to influence and direct public attitudes. 
Certainly, for Bernays, public relations was a vehicle for reconciling 
popular government with private economic interests, with public approval 
being essential for the success of any programme or goal (Bernays, 1952, 
cited in Lacey & Llewellyn, 1995, p. 48). In terms of international politics 
and, in particular, international conflict, public relations formed an 
essential part of the overall strategy. In the early 1920s, Bernays wrote that 
“governments act upon the principle that it is not sufficient to govern their 
own citizens well and to assure the people that they are acting 
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wholeheartedly in their belief. They understand the public opinion of the 
entire world is important to their welfare” (Bernays, 1923, cited in McNair, 
1996, p. 42). 
It is the approach to public relations and the philosophical assumptions 
that underlie the practices, which differ widely for scholars and 
practitioners: “Some see the purpose of public relations as manipulation. 
Others see it as the dissemination of information, resolution of conflict, or 
promotion of understanding” (J.E. Grunig, 1992, p. 6). The role of the 
public relations practitioner has grown in importance since the beginning 
of the 20th century as governments recognised the need to secure the 
consent of the public in pursuing foreign as well as domestic policies. It 
has become the job of the public relations professional to build consent 
and, therefore, “as the producer and disseminator of symbols which can 
contribute to the building of unity and consent around governmental 
policy, the public relations worker is of course, a propagandist” (McNair, 
1996, p. 43).  
Moloney (2006) focuses on public relations as “competitive 
communication for its principal’s advantage” (p. 167) and, as such, it is 
very strongly aligned with the concept of propaganda. Suggesting that the 
word propaganda has been “exiled under a regime of vocabulary 
apartheid” (Moloney, 2006, p. 166), he claims that public relations has, 
instead, become the byword for those communicative acts which are 
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“persuasive, self-advantaging [and] often mass-mediated” (p. 166). In 
liberal democracies, where human rights, public debate and free elections 
are championed, Moloney reasons, there is no place for propaganda.  
However, it is in the arena of warfare and conflict that the term 
propaganda is most frequently used for the management of public opinion. 
Whereas in previous conflicts with similarities to Kosovo (the Falklands 
and first Gulf War), governments were able to control the dissemination of 
information through access restrictions to the war zone, the Kosovo 
conflict introduced new dimensions to the way in which information was 
revealed and relayed. Indeed, technological advances at the end of the 
century were so evident in the campaign in Kosovo that some have claimed 
it as the Internet war (see, for instance, Gocic, 2000; Horvath, 1999; 
Husic, 1999; P. M. Taylor, 2000b). It is beyond the scope of this project to 
develop a discussion of the “Web War” (P. M. Taylor, 2000b), but it is 
important to note that Yugoslavia was able to mobilise some support 
through this medium. At the beginning of the bombing campaign, websites 
were constructed quickly and underwent ongoing development as the 
conflict progressed.  
In spite of a decade of war and sanctions, Yugoslavia was a developed 
European country with a good communications infrastructure supporting 
both global television and Internet access. Many of the population were 
literate in English (Husic, 1999) enabling them to communicate in 
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discussions on email lists, listservs and chat rooms. They provided 
alternative views about the conflict and email correspondence between 
people in Yugoslavia and friends and relatives living abroad was a major 
means of communicating the reality of war for the Serbs. The war on the 
Internet took a literal turn early on in the conflict when supporters of 
Yugoslavia “effectively shut down the official NATO website with a denial 
of service attacks, pinging the site repeatedly to tie up access” (Stratfor, 
1999). The vast array of technological advances, the nature of the societies 
involved in the conflict and the immediacy of requirements for 
information, all contributed to how the conflict was presented and 
perceived.  
Public relations as diplomacy and international relations 
Diplomacy and public relations are linked together in many ways, 
particularly when it comes to international relations. Signitzer and 
Coombs (1992) identified theoretical similarities between public relations 
and public diplomacy. In particular, they identified the way in which 
diplomacy has moved from its more traditional format of diplomacy 
between individual representatives of government to showing more 
concern with “winning hearts and minds” of publics. Furthermore, 
traditional diplomacy, in moving beyond inter-governmental 
representation, is expanded into public diplomacy when “governments, 
private individuals and groups influence directly or indirectly those public 
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attitudes and opinions which bear directly on another government’s 
foreign policy decisions” (Signitzer & Coombs, 1992, p. 138).  
L’Etang (2006b) also suggests there is common ground for public relations 
and international relations because of similar theoretical and philosophical 
frameworks. It is at the functional level that these two disciplines interact 
– representational (rhetoric, oratory, advocacy); dialogic (negotiation and 
peacemaking); and advisory (counselling) (L'Etang, 2006b, p. 374). When 
it comes to corporations or international organisations, the similarity in 
the work of diplomats and public relations practitioners becomes clear. 
Both of them manage public opinion: “Both parties have interpretative and 
presentational roles and both attempt to manage communication about 
issues. … [They] conduct much of their business via the media and are 
media-trained to provide appropriate ‘sound-bites’ on the issues of the 
day” (L'Etang, 2006b, p. 375).  
For Grunig (1993), the important aspect of public relations within 
international affairs is that it should be ethical and symmetrical, that is, it 
should benefit mutual understanding and help “to build relationships 
among organizations and publics and to develop policies that are 
responsible to those publics” (p. 158). Grunig saw the value of practising 
public relations within the public diplomacy framework only when such 
practice was symmetrical and ethical, taking the dialogic aspect of 
symmetrical public relations as being paramount and thereby making it a 
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moral communication process. 
L’Etang (2006b) notes a certain dissonance in this approach to public 
relations and diplomacy since public relations attempts to explain political 
action. Governments and organisations use public relations for 
maintaining their reputation and credibility and gaining a communicative 
advantage for themselves. They become the main contributors to the 
debates on particular issues and, as such, influence public opinion. This 
suggests that there is an asymmetrical perspective when governments 
and/or international organisations carry out such activities. Furthermore, 
the contribution to the debate may be in the form of lobbying for a 
particular viewpoint, or simply as a means of maintaining credibility as an 
organisation.  
L’Etang (2006b) looks to Wight’s (1994) framework in diplomacy to 
identify the theoretical relationship with public relations. Wight (1994) 
identified three main approaches to the underlying assumptions and 
diplomatic style of political communication and international relations. 
These approaches are useful in this thesis as they are compatible with 
Habermas’ legitimacy framework, the issue of humanitarian intervention 
and the morality and values that are espoused in diplomatic channels.  
Wight’s (1994) first approach can be categorised as Machiavellian. This is 
to say it is essentially pragmatic and one-sided (one-way asymmetrical) in 
which competition and conflict are characteristics of international 
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relations. This approach – the realist position – demonstrates self-interest 
and “seeks to persuade publics to fall into line and governments to 
accommodate organizational interests” (L'Etang, 2006b, p. 384). 
Governments and organisations seek to enhance their own positions and 
the role of public relations is to persuade publics to conform to the 
attitudes and ideas of the government or organisation.  
Wight’s (1994) second approach is the rationalist position associated with 
the 17th century philosopher Grotius who argued that moderate negotiation 
was appropriate in diplomacy (Grotius, 2002). The emphasis rested on 
building good relationships and developing good reputations. This 
approach is concerned with “enlightened self-interest and reciprocity and 
can be likened to claims in the public relations literature which emphasize 
mutual understanding as an organisational goal” (L'Etang, 2006b, p. 384).  
Wight’s (1994) third approach is influenced by Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual 
Peace and described as revolutionist. It “emphasizes a peacemaking 
approach in which the public interest is served by the world order. In 
public relations this is represented by the strong emphasis on public 
relations’ potential to achieve transcendental mutual satisfaction and 
understanding between peoples” (L'Etang, 2006b, p. 385). It also 
corresponds with Grunig’s (1993) symmetrical, ethical international public 
relations, which “provides a vital communication function for 
organizations, nations and even the world, helping to develop an 
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understanding among groups and eventually reduce conflict” (p. 138).  
Wight’s (1994) framework is useful in terms of the international nature of 
the public relations campaign conducted by NATO. It was essentially a 
realist approach (Machiavellian) to using public relations practices to 
reach as many publics as possible. The use of daily press conferences to 
provide NATO’s view of the world was one-sided and pragmatic. This is 
also evident in communicating crises and their effect on the organisation’s 
legitimacy. As such it provides a demonstration in practice that even 
contemporary supranational organisations, such as NATO, are far from 
practicing two-way symmetrical communication. It suggests that older 
international relations theory fits what NATO does much better than the 
Grunigian paradigm, which is the currently dominant theory in public 
relations.  
Crisis communication and legitimacy 
Outside of the Grunigian paradigm, public relations has developed 
considerable expertise on crisis communication that is highly relevant to 
NATO’s attempts at legitimation. An organisation’s legitimacy is at its 
most vulnerable in conditions of crisis when an organisation needs to 
communicate about an event or series of activities (Massey, 2004). A 
legitimacy gap (Sethi, 1979) can open when the behaviours and actions of 
the organisation do not conform to the expectations of key publics, making 
it difficult to maintain legitimacy. Perception management is mobilised 
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in a crisis when the perception is considered to be different from the 
reality. Larabee (1999) contends that “the theory behind perception 
management is that in a crisis, ‘perception’ is out of synch with ‘reality’ and 
successful managers must bring the two together, asserting control over 
the external and internal ‘chaos’ created by a disaster” (p. 109). This aligns 
with the Habermasian (1975) approach to legitimation. Legitimacy is given 
when publics perceive that a policy or a particular perspective is common 
sense and there is no contestation of the discourse. A legitimation gap 
occurs when the actual reality is perceived as not being aligned with the 
communication of it (Roper, 2001).  
Much of the literature on crisis communication covers many aspects of 
how an organisation can allay the potentially negative outcomes of 
communicating under stress, how to communicate with particular publics, 
and the most efficient way of maintaining identity and image during a 
crisis. Heath and Millar (2004) define a crisis “as an untimely but 
predictable event that has actual or potential consequences for 
stakeholders’ interests as well as the reputation of the organization 
suffering the crisis” (p. 2). The organisation’s response to questions 
concerning its responsibility for creating, or allowing the event to happen, 
will be judged in terms of its credibility and ability to regain control over 
the situation.  
Heath and Millar (2004) observe that the “manner in which the 
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organisation addresses this responsibility serves as a turning point for it: 
Respond well and survive the crisis; respond poorly and suffer the death of 
the organization’s reputation and perhaps itself” (p. 2). This is a qualitative 
judgement statement that relies on professional expertise to find an 
appropriate response that will resonate with publics (Stauber & Rampton, 
1995) and thereby avoid a legitimacy gap (Sethi, 1979).  
Heath (1997) argues that by using a strategic issues management 
approach, the effects of a crisis can be mitigated: “Crisis conditions and 
events can be lessened by effective strategic business planning and an 
appropriate sense of corporate responsibility that is implemented by 
effective operation and personnel procedures” (p. 290). Thus, guidelines 
have been developed within the public relations industry that identify best 
practice for dealing with crises (see, for instance, Fearn-Banks, 2001; 
Heath, 2004; Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2001). 
Fearn-Banks (2001) concludes that crisis communication must be 
considered in the light of the fact that crises are likely to happen. If an 
organisation is prepared for the crisis and behaves ethically and 
professionally, it is likely to recover. It is important to have a crisis 
communication plan, but more important is a proactive public relations 
plan in order to prevent crises occurring in the first place.  
However, such plans do not necessarily provide the answers to particular 
crises. Unusual events, especially in time of conflict and war, usually 
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require clear and definitive answers on such questions as: who is to 
blame,? What happened? How is it going to be fixed and how will the 
organisation change its activities to learn from the crisis? Issues 
management is a proactive approach to dealing with crises and as such can 
certainly be considered as part of the post-crisis stage. Seeger et al. (2001) 
agree that there is usually no dispute about the actual facts of the crisis, 
but cause, responsibility, blame and what needs to be done to remedy the 
situation are almost always contestable. The explanation of the crisis is 
important to the publics who want to know what remedial action has been 
taken to prevent further crises. This, then, returns crisis for consideration 
in terms of issues management. 
Monitoring issues can have a significant impact on the way an organisation 
responds to a crisis. Through research, the organisation will have an idea 
of how its principal publics are likely to react to its performance and any 
crisis that may eventuate. As Heath (1997) suggests, if an organisation is 
engaged in issues management, the crisis will be identified before it occurs 
and a crisis management plan will be in place to respond to the event. It 
should identify “points in the organization’s operations where if a problem 
were to occur it would generate public outrage and uncertainty” (p. 303).  
When a crisis occurs, an organisation’s first concern must be in terms of its 
reputation or legitimacy, for without maintaining legitimacy, the 
organisation’s right to exist may be called into question. If publics perceive 
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that the organisation is not behaving in line with social norms and values, 
then its legitimacy will come under public scrutiny (Metzler, 2001). 
Therefore, the communication strategies that are chosen in response to a 
crisis should not only aim to provide the facts and explanations, but also 
should stress the legitimacy of the organisation by making its actions 
understandable and acceptable (Allen & Caillouet, 1994). 
Crisis communication strategies  
The development of crisis communication strategies has been a major 
concern for public relations scholars and practitioners for some time. It 
has also been the subject of many case studies and discussions about how 
organisations communicate under stress. According to Seeger et al. (2001), 
research shows that when an organisation communicates as openly and as 
accurately as possible, the organisation is more likely to be successful in 
maintaining its reputation. From this research, they put together eight 
guidelines for managing a crisis, suggesting essentially that an 
organisation should build on good stakeholder relations and image before 
the crisis occurs, engage in crisis planning by ensuring a crisis 
management team is in place to coordinate and assess the responses. 
When faced with a crisis the organisation should communicate not only 
openly and accurately, but also quickly, be consistent with messages and 
monitor reactions in the media.  
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Hiebert (1991) drew on the first Gulf War in a discussion of public 
relations as a weapon of modern warfare. When it came to crisis 
management, the rules of communicating crises were: “Tell as much as you 
can and tell it fast; centralize the source of information with an effective 
and well-informed spokesperson; deal with rumours swiftly; make as 
much as available to the press as possible; update information frequently; 
stay on the record and never tell a lie” (p. 31).  
Coombs (1995) developed a similar “repertoire of crisis-response 
strategies” (p. 449) that provides messages to shape public perceptions of 
the crisis itself and how the organisation is involved in order to repair the 
organisational image. These strategies fall into five categories, each of 
which has several tactics associated with it. In fact, what Coombs (1995) 
provided was a choice of tactics to be used to communicate with 
stakeholders, depending on the type of crisis occurring.  
Five categories were identified, each of which also had sub-strategies: non-
existence, distance, ingratiation, mortification and suffering. In the first 
category of non-existence, the aim is to eliminate the idea that a crisis 
exists; distance strategies are used when the organisation acknowledges 
that there is a crisis, but that the link between the organisation and the 
crisis itself is somewhat tenuous. This is intended to make the crisis more 
acceptable by making excuses or justifying that the situation is not as bad 
as it may seem. These distance strategies are particularly relevant to 
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NATO’s crisis responses in this study. 
Ingratiation strategies are more concerned with the opinions about the 
organisation itself and are used by making the organisation appear in a 
much more positive light. This can also contribute to the transcendence 
strategies that contextualise the crisis more beneficially so that publics are 
led to consider the crisis from a more positive angle (Ice, 1991). The 
mortification strategies admit to responsibility and offer some form of 
repentance, usually by way of compensating the victims in order to get the 
public to forgive the organisation. The final strategy, suffering, “is unique 
among crisis-response strategies” (Coombs, 1995, p. 453) in that it aims to 
become the victim of the crisis and thus win the sympathy of publics.  
The response to a crisis is generally selected in terms of the threat posed to 
the organisation. The response needs to fit the actual situation as well as 
ensuring that any response should not intensify the culpability of the 
organisation thereby threatening its survival (Coombs, 2002). Thus, each 
event should be evaluated in terms of whether it is a problem or a crisis. A 
problem can be dealt with by using the accommodative strategies 
suggested by theories of apologia and image restoration (Hearit, 2001) 
that tend to focus on helping the victims of an unpredicted event. Coombs 
(2002) suggests a threat grid be used to identify the level of the crisis and 
whether it, in fact, threatens the survival of the organisation.  
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These strategies of finding the right words and conventions to explain 
crises provide a checklist for practitioners, but it is important also to look 
beyond the checklists to the broader contexts in which crises arise. Tyler 
(2005) approaches the issue of crisis communication from a 
postmodernist perspective of the organisation as a storytelling system. The 
organisation has official stories, which provide the outside world with the 
story and culture of the organisation. When a crisis occurs, the official 
story is often upset and the narrative disrupted. This opens up a contest in 
which competing narratives counter the organisation’s dominant story and 
sometimes produce “alternate narratives of which the organization is often 
wholly unaware” (Tyler, 2005, p. 567). 
This, Tyler (2005) suggests, may upset the more traditional guidelines to 
the way communication should be approached. After all, when the 
spokesperson tells the story accurately and quickly, as crisis response 
strategies demand, it is the story that has been conceived by the power 
elite of the organisation, which may or may not be the “truth”. 
Holtzhausen (2000) picks up this point in an examination of the 
modernist interpretation compared to the postmodernist perspective on 
truth:  
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postmodernists accommodate many diverse ideas and 
perspectives, including the modernist perspective. However, 
where modernism maintains that it has found the real truth, the 
postmodern holds that this truth is merely the viewpoint of 
some dominant groups in society and should not be privileged 
over another viewpoint. (p. 96) 
Thus, in any crisis, an organisation must be concerned with the outcomes 
of the way the crisis is dealt with in the first place. It also needs to deal 
with other narratives that may compete with the narrative of the 
organisation. Therefore, the organisation should be concerned with the 
actions they take so as to not only alleviate any suffering involved but, by 
doing so, provide solid ground for maintaining public support for the 
organisation. 
This review draws on theoretical perspectives that underpin public 
relations practices that enabled NATO to maintain and enhance its 
organisational legitimacy during the Kosovo Campaign. The theory 
underpinning the empirical analysis provides an “imaginary road map” 
(Mackey, 2004) to aid understanding of these processes and examine a 
central question posed in this thesis: How did NATO legitimise itself as a 
viable organisation for the 21st century?  
My understanding of the answer also draws heavily on techniques of 
critical discourse analysis. These enable the researcher to illuminate the 
processes and practices at work in language. Accordingly, the next chapter 
moves from the public relations literature to explain the methodology 
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of critical discourse analysis and the nature of the data selected, gathered 
and analysed.  
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CHAPTER 6 
Implementing the project: Methods and 
materials 
The central question of how NATO used public relations to legitimise itself 
as a viable organisation for the 21st century is tackled in a number of ways. 
This question itself directs the focus of the research onto NATO’s specific 
strategic and organisational goals and how the organisation was able to 
adapt to a changing political environment. The thesis takes a dual 
approach: by analysing the discourses of the organisation at this 
remarkable period in its history, the thesis aims to reveal the discursive 
practices that enabled NATO to position itself as a legitimate and essential 
military organisation in a globalising post-Cold War world; and, in 
parallel, by regarding the transformation of NATO as a case study of a 
supranational organisation at a critical juncture, the thesis also provides 
insights that can be extrapolated to other supranational organisations.  
Case study methodology 
Stake (2000; 2005) suggests that by using a case study for qualitative 
inquiry, one is choosing what to study, as well as focusing on the 
epistemological question of what can be learned from studying a single 
case. In public relations literature, Cutler (2004) found that while a case 
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study method constituted one of the dominant modes of research, the 
method was poorly understood and applied.  
There is a considerable literature on case studies outside the public 
relations literature. One of the major theorists, Yin (1994), identified four 
different types of case study. The fourth and last of these – the research 
case – is closest to my use of the Kosovo case. Research cases investigate 
activities and processes that occur within particular social contexts. They 
become a case by their bounded nature and by their flexibility in choosing 
how the data for the research can be gathered. Merriam (1998) extended 
the concept of a case’s bounded nature by suggesting that the boundaries 
are clearly definable in terms of examining a particular concern, issue or 
hypothesis. 
In this project, the case is bounded by a time period, a specific social and 
geopolitical context, as well as the public relations campaign that NATO 
presented to its publics. Furthermore, the choice of the case is both 
intrinsic and instrumental (Stake, 2005) because, first and foremost, the 
case of Kosovo is intrinsically interesting for its own sake, especially in 
terms of: geopolitical power relations; the future of military interventions 
for humanitarian reasons; and how supranational organisations are 
capable of developing a power base that draws on resources larger than 
any of its constituent nation states.  
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Secondly, instrumentally, the case provides insight into the issues of 
NATO’s viability, legitimacy and raison d’être into the 21st century. This 
allows a discussion to advance understanding of how strategic public 
relations communication can support and facilitate organisational change 
and legitimacy. Thirdly, within the case study there are smaller examples 
of crisis cases that illuminate the phenomenon of crisis communication in 
a unique cultural, political and social situation.  
As Stake (2005), who is probably the leading authority on the subject, 
observes, case study method utilises observation and, more importantly, 
reflection: 
the researcher is committed to pondering the impressions, 
deliberating on recollections and records – but not necessarily 
following the conceptualizations of theorists, actors or 
audiences. … The case researcher digs into meanings, working 
to relate them to contexts and experience. In each instance, the 
work is reflective. (pp. 449-450) 
The Kosovo case is particularly appropriate for investigating the public 
relations practices and the construction of messages through critical 
discourse analysis since the data is available in transcription. This allows 
the researcher to deliberate and reflect on the intended meanings. 
Discourse analysis 
As Fairclough observes, critically analysing discourse is important because 
it “is a practice not just of representing the world, but of signifying the 
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world, constituting and constructing the world in meaning” (p. 64). His 
view is reinforced by Chouliaraki’s (2000) suggestion that the “concept of 
discourse points at the fact that mediated language practices do not simply 
relay or ‘talk about’ a reality that occurs ‘out there’, but that they actually 
constitute this reality, in the process of communication” (p. 295). 
The profound economic and social changes that have occurred on a global 
scale in the final two decades of the 20th century have, on the one hand, 
created new opportunities and vastly differing possibilities for many 
people. On the other hand, they have created considerable disruption to 
life, causing poverty and misery in many societies. Fairclough and 
Chouliaraki (1999) draw attention to the fact that these changes have 
“profoundly affected our sense of self and of place, causing considerable 
confusion” (p.3) but change is considered to be inevitable. In their view, 
these changes may be considered to be “at least in part the outcome of 
particular strategies pursued by particular people for particular interests 
within a particular system – all of which might be different” (p. 4).  
This suggests a clear connection with the exercise of power that is often 
obscured through language and is not apparent at the surface level. As 
Mumby and Clair (1997) state: “one of the goals of critical discourse 
analysis is to move beyond a surface-level examination of discourse and to 
show how it simultaneously produces and hides ‘deep structure’ relations 
of power and inequality” (p. 183). 
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In the critical analysis of the discourses of war and propaganda, this 
analysis of language and the way information is communicated about the 
Kosovo campaign to a large variety of target publics aims to shed light on 
the underlying meanings and identify the intended preferred meanings. 
With the increasing professional intervention in the construction of 
meaning through what Fairclough (1992) calls the “technologisation of 
discourse” (p. 67) , it is important to peel back the layers of meaning and 
disarm these communication technologies and techniques in order to 
identify the power relations and ideologies underpinning their discourses. 
Within the sphere of political communication, the discourse practices are 
usually consciously strategic. Fairclough (2000) refers to recent 
developments in the relationships between politics, government and the 
mass media in which “many significant political events are now in fact 
media events” (p. 3). Due to the deep penetration of mass media, political 
leaders, political commentators and aspiring politicians must also be 
concerned with communicative style, which is “a matter of language in the 
broadest sense” (Fairclough, 2000, p. 4). This includes body language, 
hairstyle, dress and posture – all of which can be used to convey messages 
to enhance the political message. As a civilian, NATO spokesman, Dr. 
Jamie Shea presents the receiver with a particular reading of NATO as a 
military organisation. Shea’s communicative style is discussed in chapter 
ten. 
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Political messages are also likely to be constructed by what Fairclough 
(1996) refers to as “technologists of discourse” (p. 73). These experts may 
have particular aptitudes or characteristics in terms of their relationship to 
knowledge, with access to specific information along with the ability to 
produce it for general consumption with an “aura of ‘truth’” (Fairclough, 
1996, p. 73). Also, their role within a particular organisation is identifiable 
and accredited and they may also be in a position to train and mentor 
others. Because of these characteristics, the strategies and tactics for 
constructing text and talk may be analysed to discover how discursive 
struggles shape the text, how particular texts are strategically deployed and 
how such deployment may strengthen certain socio-cultural practices and 
not others (Motion & Leitch, 1996).  
By using a critical discourse method of analysis, this thesis aims to uncover 
the hidden ideological aspects of an organisation’s use of persuasive 
language. It attempts to identify the more subtle ways of managing and 
manipulating the minds of the publics who are the targets of text and talk, 
and whose consent for action is required (van Dijk, 1993).  
Social constructionism  
The epistemological framework for the discussion of critical discourse 
analysis as a social scientific theoretical perspective is informed by Berger 
and Luckmann’s (1966) argument that “reality is socially constructed and 
that the sociology of knowledge must analyse the process in which this 
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occurs” (p. 13). According to Allen (2005) this prompted the change in 
terminology from the sociology of knowledge to “social constructionism” 
and provided a focus for how knowledge develops through social 
interaction.  
Social constructionism, then, is defined by Berger and Luckmann (1966) as 
“the relationship between human thought and the social context in which 
it arises.” (p. 16). In her discussion of more contemporary scholarship of 
social constructionism, Allen (2005) identifies several key assumptions: 
that understanding of the way of the world and ourselves should 
constantly be critiqued and re-evaluated; that all knowledge comes from 
specific historical and cultural contexts; and that “social processes sustain 
knowledge” (p. 37). For Allen (2005), the most important process is 
language, which is not only used to produce knowledge but also provides 
the means of making sense of the world: “Language is a system we use to 
objectify subjective meanings and to internalize socially constructed 
meanings” (p. 38). Finally, she observes how knowledge and social 
interaction are strongly connected.  
The centrality of language is, of course, the means by which we interpret 
and argue our own subjective realities. By using language (discourse) we 
are engaging in a form of social practice (Fairclough, 1992). Indeed, for 
Fairclough (1992), “Discourse is a practice not just of representing the 
world, but of signifying the world, constituting and constructing the world 
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in meaning” (p. 64), and discursive practice “contributes to reproducing 
society (social identities, social relationships, systems of knowledge and 
belief) as it is, yet also contributes to transforming society” (p. 65).  
Critical discourse analysis 
Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is both theory and method, located 
within the critical social sciences (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999). Its 
starting point is social issues and problems. Contemporary issues of 
concern to members of different disciplines, such as education, political 
science and sociology tend to be focused on democracy and the impact of 
globalisation on democracy (Fairclough, 2001) as well as on what 
Habermas (1989) refers to as “the decline of the public sphere” through 
the commercialisation and professionalisation of political communication. 
Furthermore, as a critical method, CDA tries to discover and identify the 
connections between language and other aspects of social life that may not 
be immediately obvious (Fairclough, 2001).  
For van Dijk (1993), CDA is concerned primarily with the “discourse 
dimensions of power abuse and the injustice of inequality that results from 
it” (p. 252). He further insists that any scholar using critical discourse 
analysis as a method must identify their personal socio-political stance – 
“spell out their point of view, perspective, principles and aims, both within 
their discipline and within society at large” (van Dijk, 1993, p. 252) and, as 
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such, make a contribution to understanding change in society.  
Fairclough (2001) notes that there is much greater awareness of language 
and its use in contemporary social life today, especially in the language of 
advertising, and also sexist or racist language. As a result, there are many 
creative ways of consciously attempting to manipulate and “control 
language to meet institutional and organizational objectives” (p. 231).  
More specifically, CDA “focuses on the ways discourse structures enact, 
confirm, legitimate, reproduce, or challenge relations of power and 
dominance in society” (van Dijk, 2001, p. 353). CDA research is concerned 
with how powerful groups or institutions control public discourses on 
specific topics and with the social consequences of such control. Fairclough 
(1992) argues that if discourse is a mode of political and ideological 
practice, it is more than a site of struggle, “but also a stake in power 
struggle: discursive practice draws upon conventions which naturalize 
particular power relations and ideologies, and these conventions 
themselves, and the ways in which they are articulated, are a focus of 
struggle” (p. 67). 
Part of that stake in power struggles can be found through the concept of 
articulation. Articulation is central to the way discourses are formed and 
representations made. Articulation attempts to join together that which 
does not necessarily belong together – discourses, concepts, ideas – to 
create new meanings and new sense. It creates, in effect, a new 
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discourse which then receives acceptance as common sense (Hall, 1986; 
Moffitt, 1994; Slack, 1996). Hall (1986) describes this process as one which 
is dependent upon particular socio-political and cultural conditions at a 
certain time that allows publics to “see the logic” of drawing these two 
elements together and thereby accept the new discourse. For example, in 
the Kosovo case, two discourses are articulated to provide a new discourse 
domain: chapter eleven discusses NATO’s articulation of the military 
discourse with the humanitarian discourse to form the military 
humanitarian discourse. 
The three-dimensional method of critical discourse analysis 
The particular approach to critical discourse analysis followed in this 
thesis draws from that developed by Norman Fairclough (1989; 1992; 
1995a; 2001). Faircloughian CDA draws together language analysis and 
areas of social theory in order to provide tools for understanding the 
ideology that underlies written, verbal and visual texts.  
This type of analysis is particularly relevant to a small sample of texts 
(Fairclough, 1992) but when there is a large corpus of discourse samples, 
the method involves making decisions concerning the content and 
structure of the corpus. This can be done by doing an initial coding of the 
texts in terms of particular topics or discourse elements as well as 
identifying key words that occur relatively frequently (Fairclough, 1992, 
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2000).  
One strategy for selection of particular texts is to identify crisis points in 
the discourse when it appears that things are not going smoothly, where 
there are misunderstandings, when one participant corrects another, 
repetitions and, what Fairclough (1992) calls “exceptional disfluencies” (p. 
230) such as hesitation, repetition, silence and shifts in the style: “Such 
moments of crisis make visible aspects of practices which might normally 
be naturalized, and therefore difficult to notice; but they also show change 
in process, the actual ways in which people deal with the problematization 
of practices” (p. 230). An illustration of such exceptional disfluency is 
provided in chapter eleven. 
In critical discourse analysis, text is analysed within the context of the 
discursive practices (processes of text production, distribution and 
consumption) and the wider socio-cultural practices in which discourses 
occur. These three dimensions: text, discourse practices and socio-cultural 
practices, are not separate but can overlap depending on the level or levels 
that are most relevant to the research at hand. Thus, it is the research 
questions that shape and determine the level of the analysis.  
Textual analysis 
Text is at the heart of discourse analysis and its formal linguistic features 
provide the empirical data for interpretation. In assuming that discourse is 
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both constitutive of, and shaped by social reality, it is through a close 
analysis of the texts that it is possible to discover how and whether text is 
socially motivated. Analysis of both meanings and form are necessary as 
part of critical discourse analysis although Fairclough (1992) notes that the 
differentiation between these two elements is not always clear. He 
suggests, therefore, that if the formal aspects of the text are more 
significant, then they should be included in the discussion of text as 
discourse.  
The “texture” of a text looks beyond the linguistic features to the ways in 
which other discourses are drawn into the text to provide alternative 
meanings and interpretations and to act as a guide to the specific discourse 
practices employed. Identifying the meanings of individual words in a text 
does not necessarily inform the analysis of the text itself, but rather it is 
the identification of “processes of wording the world” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 
77). Or, to put it another way, the lexical style and signification that take 
into account the differences for different people and place them into a kind 
of meaningful order or hierarchy.  
As we shall see in the later debate about whether Kosovo is a war or a 
humanitarian intervention, the use of alternative words can also indicate 
particular political views or ideologies. So also the significance of 
metaphors can impact the terms and nature of political or ideological 
struggles. Metaphors structure reality in a particular way and indicate “the 
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way we think and the way we act, and our systems of knowledge and belief, 
in a pervasive and fundamental way” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 194). Metaphors 
can represent one aspect of the world that is then extended to another in 
different discourses. For example, in public relations, campaigns are 
military constructs: they have goals, objectives, strategies and tactics. So a 
public relations campaign is metaphorically constructed as a military 
operation.  
As part of the analysis of vocabulary, keywords (Fairclough, 2000; 
Williams, 1983) are also identified in the text and interpreted according to 
the context in which they appear. Keywords are those words in a shared 
vocabulary that have a range of meanings and are used widely “to discuss 
many of the central processes of our common life” (Williams, 1983, p. 14). 
Keywords also indicate how changes in social and historical processes 
occur within language (Williams, 1983), demonstrating the complexities of 
the problems of relationships and meanings of words. Some examples of 
keywords in this study are “ethnic cleansing”, “mass graves”, 
“humanitarian catastrophe” and “evil”. The keywords are looked at in 
terms of their salience and repetition in the texts that point to a particular 
discursive construction.  
Omissions in the text are also important in terms of how the text may be 
interpreted. What is not stated may require the reader or listener to “make 
the connections” from implicit knowledge which is based on “common 
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sense”. For example, by omitting the fact that Serbs were also forced to flee 
their homes in Kosovo and required humanitarian aid, people are led to 
believe that it was only ethnic Albanians who were refugees, driven out by 
the Serbs. 
Discourse practice 
Discourse practice, according to Fairclough (1992), does not stand in 
contrast to discourse as social practice but rather as a distinct form of it. 
He states that, in fact, social practice may be entirely made up of discursive 
practices, or a mixture of the discursive and non-discursive. The focus, 
however, in this particular dimension is the production, distribution and 
consumption of the discourses and the manner in which they are 
formulated and interpreted. As such, it is these practices that “mediate” 
between the texts and the socio-cultural practice dimension. In order to 
understand this mediating process, it is important to discuss the three 
main areas identified by Fairclough (1992) for analysis in discursive 
practice: the “force” of utterances; the “coherence” of texts ; and the 
intertextuality and interdiscursivity of the texts.  
The force of utterances in texts is the action part of the text, that part 
which indicates what it is being “used to do socially, what ‘speech act(s)’ it 
is being used to ‘perform’ (give an order, ask a question, threaten, promise, 
etc.)” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 82). The coherence of texts is about making 
sense and that the parts of a text form a coherent whole. It has more to 
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do with interpretation than with the property of the text in that a text can 
only be coherent if it makes sense to the person hearing or reading it. For 
example, NATO spokespeople constantly declared that this was not a war 
against the Yugoslav people, but all of NATO’s actions pointed to the fact 
that bombing was designed to inflict considerable damage on civilian 
infrastructure. For key audiences in NATO countries, however, the 
interpretation of the texts was aided by suggestions that this infrastructure 
was used by the Yugoslav military as well.  
The concept of intertextuality was coined by Kristeva (1986) and refers to 
her observation that text is made up of historical texts as well as a re-
shaping of these past texts into successive texts. By examining 
intertextuality, it is possible to discern what makes history and how 
processes of social change occur. The idea of how new texts are shaped in 
terms of prior texts is dependent on who is in a position to do this, which, 
as Fairclough (1992) points out, requires coupling intertextuality with a 
theory of power relations and the relationship between intertextuality and 
hegemony.  
Hegemony is used by Fairclough as a means of theorising discursive 
changes. These relate to how power relations evolve: “Hegemony is the 
power over society as a whole of one of the fundamental economically-
defined classes in alliance with other social forces” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 
92). It is about the alliances that are formed to alter or influence beliefs 
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held by diverse publics, “through concessions or through ideological 
means, to win their consent” (p. 92). In NATO’s construction of the 
Balkans, it is possible to see the interweaving of factual and fictional 
sources and genres to create a convincing picture from diverse texts rather 
than representing what the actual situation may be. By virtue of its 
widespread acceptance, the “Balkan discourse” can be regarded as 
hegemonic. 
In the discussion of the discursive practices of the NATO texts, it is 
important to look at the question that Fairclough (1995b) poses: “What 
genres and discourse were drawn upon in producing the text, and what 
traces of them are there in the text?” (p. 61). Both interdiscursivity and 
manifest intertextuality are two areas of discourse practices that are the 
focus of text production.  
Analysis of interdiscursivity reveals the different discourses that are drawn 
upon to produce the text with the strategic intention of shaping 
interpretations in particular ways. Manifest intertextuality is an area of 
analysis which is “a grey area between discourse practice and text” 
(Fairclough, 1992, p. 233). It looks at the way the text is constituted, in 
terms of the way other texts have been drawn upon in order to construct 
the text under analysis. In this project, texts and discourses of World War 
II are explicitly drawn upon. 
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As noted above, the distinctions between the three dimensions of analysis 
are not clear cut although Fairclough (1992) attempts to prescribe how to 
divide the topics between text analysis and discourse practice. When 
analysing textual features, text analysis is used. When looking at the 
strategies in the construction of the texts and their dissemination, texts are 
analysed in terms of the discourse practices. It is in the texts themselves 
that evidence of the discursive and social practices are found.  
Social practice, language and investigation 
Language has been at the centre of social investigation in many disciplines 
and its centrality has been understood as the universal structuring agent of 
society that was common to all humanity (Levi-Strauss, 1963). It is 
through language that social reality is constructed and understood and is, 
in Fairclough’s (1992) terms a “mode of action, one form in which people 
may act upon the world” (p. 63). Discourse is a means of reproducing and 
ordering social life for the producer of the discourse, as well as for the 
receiver of it. As such, it is heavily influenced by ideologies, political and 
cultural worldviews.  
But discourse also constitutes social life – it contributes to the way society 
is structured and lived. It is the way we create sense and make sense of our 
lives, which brings us to the concept of “common sense”. It is this common 
sense that provides the “natural” element of the discourse. When analysing 
discourse as a social practice, it is clear that a particular worldview or 
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ideology is shaping the formation of that discourse, but it is also 
contributing to the maintenance of a particular belief system as part of the 
reality. 
In this study, the social and political belief systems of Western ideologies 
within a European context provide the framework for the analysis of the 
discourses as social practice. By drawing out and identifying the stakes in 
particular power struggles for dominance, the socio-political context of the 
discourse provides the context in which the analyst is able to understand 
the texts in terms of their production and dissemination. For NATO, the 
stakes are high, for the organisation must demonstrate not only that it is a 
viable organisation at the turn of the century, but also its organisational 
legitimacy in a changing globalised world.  
Political discourses 
The NATO texts are political texts in the sense that they involve power and, 
indeed, international policies and politics affecting large numbers of 
people (sometimes as a matter of life and death). The texts have clear 
strategic functions that enable the issuing institution to reach its goals. 
Chilton and Schäffner (1997) suggest four strategic functions of political 
discourse: coercion; resistance/opposition/protest; dissimulation; and 
legimisation/delegitimisation. These four functions can either be used to 
analyse how the hearer (receiver) interprets the discourse or as a means of 
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identifying different strategies used by the producer for coherence of the 
discourse in a particular society.  
Three of these four functions are especially relevant in this thesis: 
coercion, dissimulation and legitimisation/delegitimisation. Coercion 
looks at speech acts that are backed by some form of sanction. 
Dissimulation is concerned with the control of information – whether it is 
adequate, uses euphemisms, attempts to blur the meanings and is used as 
a way of diverting the attention of the reader from difficult or unsavoury 
aspects of the information. The most important strategic function in terms 
of this research is legitimisation/delegitimisation. This function recognises 
that the actors must assert their “right to be obeyed” (Chilton & Schäffner, 
1997, p. 213) through legitimacy when they are unable to exert physical 
force or coercion alone. These reasons for being obeyed must be 
communicated linguistically and this can be uncovered by looking at the 
pragmatics (interaction between speakers and hearers); semantics 
(meaning and structure); and syntax (the way the sentences are organised) 
(Chilton & Schäffner, 1997, p. 214).  
By applying Fairclough’s three-dimensional critical discourse analysis 
model, aided by van Dijk’s (1996) suggestion of including the cognitive 
dimensions of structures and strategies that manipulate mental models of 
events through specific discourse structures, this thesis looks at the 
linguistic choices made in the production of the discourses; the strategic 
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functions of the discourse; the interactions between speakers; meanings 
and preferred meanings; the internal organisation of sentences; coherence; 
and word choice. It also looks at the organisational structures and 
processes of disseminating the messages, such as the press conferences 
and the selection of speakers. The context in which the texts are produced 
is a vital element in their interpretation in order to reduce ambivalence 
(Fairclough, 1992). By analysing the texts within the “context of the 
situation” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 81), it is possible to understand the social 
practices of which they are a part, thus focusing the meaning more 
succinctly. 
The war in Kosovo was another war in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY) at the end of a long decade of conflict, civil war and inter-ethnic 
violence in the republics that were breaking away from this centralised 
federation. These historical antecedents add a further dimension to the 
analysis of the discourses that presupposes what van Dijk (1996) terms 
social cognitions or mental models. In order to influence the current social 
cognitions of publics, specific discourse structures are devised, which may 
include themes, headlines, a particular delivery style, rhetorical figures 
and other discursive properties.  
The major element in maintaining power and dominance is based on who 
has access to any particular communicative event. This means looking at 
the initiative for the communicative event, the control of the setting (who 
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is participating and how they are participating), the mode of 
communication used, and the scope of audience control, all of which 
suggest successful “access” to the minds of audiences.  
This is, in fact, the ultimate form of power. Since the majority of the texts 
analysed in this research are from controlled settings, the research 
assumes that the communicative event will be “geared towards the control 
of the minds of participants, recipients or the audience at large, in such a 
way that the resulting mental changes are those preferred by those in 
power, and generally in their interest” (van Dijk, 1996, p. 89). 
Keeping in mind the historical dimensions of the conflict in Kosovo, this 
thesis examines the texts in order to discover the way the current discourse 
is “embedded” within the historical dimension, as well as looking at the 
ways that particular types of discourse and genres are subject to change 
over time. Fairclough (1992) explains that this means that 
the text absorbs and is built out of texts of the past ... the text 
responds to, reaccentuates, and reworks past texts, and in so 
doing helps to make history and contributes to wider processes 
of change, as well as anticipating and trying to shape 
subsequent texts. (p. 102) 
This is a particularly salient aspect for the NATO discourses in that the 
events in Kosovo helped to change the way intervention and 
humanitarianism are viewed in a global context. 
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Thematic Analysis 
Since the three-dimensional critical discourse analysis framework is 
deemed to be most relevant when applied to only a small amount of text, 
Fairclough (1992) suggests that when there is a large “corpus” of texts to 
be analysed, they should first be categorised into themes or topic areas. 
The thesis found Fairclough’s (1992) suggestion of identifying moments of 
crisis in the text to be particularly useful because communication of a war 
is constantly beset with the need to communicate crisis situations.  
Identifying themes in texts was outlined by Owen (1984) in a research 
study of interpersonal communication relationships. This method is used 
in this thesis as an organisational tool to shape its structure. In structuring 
this thesis, instances of major themes were brought together as particular 
chapters. Owen (1984) suggests that a theme is present if there is 
recurrence, repetition or forcefulness in the text being analysed. 
Recurrence is identified when the analyst can identify “the same thread of 
meaning” in more than one part of the text(s); repetition refers to “explicit 
use of the same wording or keywords and phrases; and forcefulness refers 
to the manner in which the text is vocalised” (p. 275).  
Organisational legitimacy is the theme of chapter eight. According to 
Owen’s (1984) classification, it is the recurrence, or “thread of meaning”, 
of the concept of legitimacy that indicates the theme. Chapter nine is 
structured around the Balkans theme in terms of the recurrence and 
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repetition of keywords and how they are used to construct the “other”. 
Forcefulness is also a part of the theme in this chapter in terms of the way 
the texts construct President Milošević. Chapter eleven deals with the 
important theme of humanitarianism. It is the framing of military action 
in terms of humanitarian work that is a central theme throughout the 
NATO texts. 
In this study, some of the texts were indeed broadcast on television at the 
time of the conflict and video clips are also available on the Internet. When 
particular attention is paid to a word, phrase or theme, the analysis of the 
text was extended to the vocalised text and noted. Roper (2000) suggests 
that forcefulness can also be “implied or discerned in particular emphatic 
features of text, such as an apparent emphasis on a negative within a 
sentence” (p. 66). These features are drawn out in the following analytical 
chapters. 
The NATO Texts 
The corpus of work analysed for this thesis are the transcripts from all the 
press briefings that took place at 3 pm daily at NATO Headquarters in 
Brussels between 25 March and 11 June, 1999. The press conferences 
conformed to a similar format everyday with the NATO spokesman 
facilitating the sessions. The press briefings by the spokesman and other 
participants (including those of NATO Secretary-General, Javier Solana 
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and SACEUR, General Wesley Clark) were followed by a question and 
answer session with the journalists present.  
All press releases emanating from NATO Headquarters were also used as 
supporting documentation. The NATO website provided operational 
updates for factual information on Operation Allied Force from 7 May 
until the end of the campaign, as well as extra daily morning briefings on 
the situation in Kosovo and Operation Allied Force, given by NATO 
spokesman, Jamie Shea at 10.30 am from 15 April until 9 June. These 
morning briefings provided supplementary and supporting documentation 
to the more expansive press briefings. 
Fairclough (1992) suggests a number of ways of enhancing the corpus that, 
rather than simply adding to it, helps in the analysis in response to 
questions that arise. The corpus of text that is analysed in this project is 
supplemented by recorded interviews, documentary programmes, as well 
as personal reflections and academic articles by Jamie Shea. The NATO 
spokesman played a significant role in the construction, production, and 
dissemination of the NATO discourses and, therefore, his later writings 
and reflections provide important evidence to supplement the analysis of 
the discourses during the Kosovo Campaign. In particular, Shea’s 
presentation to the United States Institute of Peace (Shea, 2000b) in 
which he provided his perspective of NATO’s public relations campaign 
was an important source, as well as his later articles concerning NATO’s 
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relations with the media.  
Further supplementary evidence of the activities at NATO Headquarters is 
drawn from information provided by General Clark in his memoirs, 
Waging modern war (2001), as well as articles on the media operation by 
Prime Minister Tony Blair’s spokesman, Alastair Campbell.  
Following Owen (1984) the texts were coded into categories and critical 
discourse analysis was then used to analyse the selected sections of text. 
Fairclough’s (1992) suggestion concerning “moments of crisis” also aided 
the selection of texts for analysis. The software programme Highlighter 
was used to identify keywords, clusters of words and proximity of words 
appearing in the texts, while retaining the paragraphs that formed the 
textual context of the themes. This process aided the selection of 
appropriate text sections to answer the research question.  
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CHAPTER 7 
Strategic public relations: Legitimising NATO’s 
identity 
Chapter seven begins a four chapter sequence of analysis. Looking at 
NATO’s transformation as a strong theme because of recurrence (Owen, 
1984), it examines NATO’s strategic use of public relations to legitimise an 
identity transformation. The chapter argues that through the public 
relations strategies deployed around and during the Kosovo conflict, 
NATO made a substantial contribution to this post-Cold War reframing. In 
particular, the chapter will consider the role of this Kosovo project in 
providing justification for NATO’s of re-inventing itself as an important 
supranational organisation upholding the values of the “free world” on 
behalf of the international community.  
The chapter also analyses how the public relations communication 
campaign during the Kosovo conflict clearly contributed to sustaining 
NATO’s position as the premier organisation concerned with security, 
stability and the defence of Western values in an expanded European 
Union. In Europe there were ongoing discussions concerning security and 
defence with the possible mobilisation of a European rapid reaction force 
of the European Union. Also the role of the Organisation for Security 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in defining Europe’s security environment 
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was becoming increasingly prominent (MacFarlane, 2000). 
NATO provided the United States with a continuing political and military 
role in Europe as the leading partner in the North Atlantic Alliance. Its role 
in Europe had, from 1949-1989, been clearly defined as a North Atlantic 
military alliance responsible for maintaining the balance of power in 
Europe against the substantial military forces of the Soviet bloc. As such, 
the United States had an important investment in the organisation. Its 
political identity, though, had been subsumed by the need for constant 
military readiness in the face of possible attack from the East. 
At the end of the Cold War, expectations for the survival of the 
organisation were minimal, and Sjursen (2004) comments that “with the 
loss of its enemy, the very purpose of the organisation, the basis of its 
legitimacy and the glue that kept the allied states together were also gone” 
(p. 687). This chapter, therefore, addresses the question of how NATO 
transformed itself to survive as an expanded and united organisation at the 
turn of the 21st century.  
Organisational legitimation, issues management and 
supranational organisations 
In making this transition, NATO occupies a space of considerable interest 
across the organisational and public relations fields because it disturbs 
particular boundaries. In non-military sectors, Cheney and Christensen 
(2001a) have convincingly argued that internal and external 
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communication practices can no longer be identified as separate fields of 
practice, but rather the boundaries have become so blurred that 
communication is directed at both audiences in order to maintain 
credibility and organisational legitimacy. The resulting attention on issues 
of identity is similar to NATO’s having to engage with how the organisation 
wishes to be understood by all its stakeholders, and how it sees itself. 
Supranational organisations, by their very nature, are required to maintain 
legitimacy and credibility across national boundaries and across diverse 
internal and external publics. By engaging in issues management and 
monitoring of trends in public opinion (Heath, 1997) such organisations 
aim to identify what might impact on their ongoing credibility and 
legitimacy. For these organisations, issues management offers a means of 
supporting, maintaining and expanding their own power and thus their 
legitimacy in the view of the nations that support and finance them.  
Drawing on Cheney and Christensen’s (2001a) conceptualisation of 
identity as a key organisational issue, this chapter examines what NATO is, 
what it stands for and how it wants to be perceived. In effect, these 
“identity-related concerns have … become organizational preoccupations, 
even when organizations are ostensibly talking about other matters” 
(Cheney & Christensen, 2001a, p. 232). Parallel concerns within NATO 
emerge through this analysis. 
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Nevertheless, the supranational organisation has some specific challenges. 
While NATO fits with the approach of identifying a specific issue as being 
useful to the development of the organisation (Hainsworth & Meng, 1988), 
it requires a larger than usual organisational range. Supranational 
organisations, such as NATO, the World Trade Organization and the 
European Union, have not only to identify issues that allow them to 
reinforce their identity in order to maintain the legitimacy and viability of 
the organisation in the long term, but have to do it across cultural and 
geographic boundaries. In other words, the conventional issues 
management importance of having organisations prove their worth 
continuously to their stakeholders (Massey, 2001) is magnified in size and 
diversity.  
Part of that justification depends on an acceptable account of the past. In 
the case of supranational organisations, Chase’s (1984) statement is 
particularly relevant: “History can be created, not just survived” (cited in 
Cheney & Christensen, 2001a, p. 238). In this particular context, the thesis 
will argue, Chase’s comment applies to NATO’s discursive construction of 
a history that acts strategically to legitimise its ongoing survival. In effect, 
it contends that NATO identified Kosovo as an issue with the potential to 
enable NATO’s active involvement while, at the same time, presenting the 
organisation as relevant new geopolitical realities. 
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NATO’s struggle for identity 
At the geographical level, the developing situation in Kosovo provided a 
means for NATO to carve out a slice of influence beyond the traditional 
borders of Western Europe. At the identity level, it also provided NATO 
with an opportunity to (re)establish its legitimacy as an essential 
organisation for contemporary circumstances. Cheney (2005) accurately 
described this discursive legitimising work as requiring actions that are 
“rhetorical in nature and implication: They entail efforts to secure 
legitimacy, to win support, and to engineer the situation (and its ultimate 
history) for certain interests” (pp. 55-56) [italics in original]. In effect such 
discursive efforts concern managing meaning for specific ends, identifying 
multiple target audiences and expanding the boundaries of traditional 
organisational communication. These are all mobilised in order to leverage 
support for a particular interpretation of the world. In this case, for NATO, 
it was also an issue of managing its own identity in order to establish what, 
in another context, Cheney and Christensen (2001a) describe as a unique 
“self” (p. 234). Such a self is designed to allow NATO the political influence 
needed for its survival. 
In the specific case of NATO, this political influence and viability can be 
further illuminated from fields other than organisational communication. 
NATO’s actions form part of a struggle for power that can also be 
considered in terms of Bourdieu’s (1991) concept of the political field 
where power is increasingly concentrated in the hands of professional 
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communicators and “agents seek to form and transform their visions of the 
world and thereby the world itself: it is the site par excellence in which 
words are actions and the symbolic character of power is at stake” 
(Thompson, 1991, p. 26). NATO’s struggle for identity is also played out 
through its need to enhance its own position within the political field, 
which contains a number of other national and cross-national institutions 
that are vying for support in an overcrowded European Union market.  
In this competition, NATO has some advantages. Walt (2000), for 
example, paints a picture of NATO’s highly institutionalised alliance as one 
of the reasons for its resilience and stability.  
NATO is supported not only by the common interests of its 
members but by an elaborate transatlantic network of former 
NATO officials, defence intellectuals, military officers, 
journalists, and policy wonks whose professional lives have 
been devoted to the security issues of the Atlantic community. 
This elite community is unlikely to advocate dissolving NATO, 
and has labored hard to keep it alive. (pp. 15-16) 
Such a community of professionals has a huge influence on, and in, 
international organisations as well as within their own home governments. 
Their lobbying to keep NATO as an independent organisation forms an 
essential element in the contest for legitimacy. NATO has also developed 
strong intra-alliance functions that have contributed to Western European 
stability amongst states that had often been bitter enemies in the past 
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(Duffield, 1994-5).  
Because those earlier external threats that had brought NATO into being 
had ceased to exist, NATO was faced with threats to its very existence. As a 
result, NATO had to adapt and transform itself by identifying particular 
issues in its environment in which it could be involved, and seen to be 
involved, as a significant player. In effect, this is a defensive form of issues 
management (Heath, 1997). Furthermore, as a pro-active organisation that 
recognised the changing environment, NATO consciously sought a new 
focus for its activities. By recognising that its existence could be questioned 
by any of its members, NATO engaged in strategic planning based on 
established methods such as scanning, monitoring and analysis the 
environment (Heath, 1997).  
Inventing identity and history 
This can be identified, albeit retrospectively, as early as the 1990s. Looking 
back on the changes in his work as SHAPE spokesman at NATO during the 
period 1990-1993, Freitag (2005) reflected on changes from the 
perspective of a public relations practitioner. Recognising the need to 
counter questions concerning the continuing existence of the Alliance, he 
stressed the importance of messages being constructed to promote the 
ongoing the relevance of the organisation. He highlighted the importance 
of emphasising how NATO could continue to contribute to stability in a 
region that had known so much strife and war in the past century. In 
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his terms, messages also needed to “delicately introduce” (Freitag, 2005, p. 
235) NATO’s interest in issues beyond its borders. This delicacy was 
important since the “out-of-area” concept was highly controversial both 
inside and outside the Alliance. This way of managing issues provided a 
means of responding to criticism or change along the lines recommended 
in Heath’s (2005b) summary of the practice. 
Although the Cold War was over, Freitag (2005) noted that NATO 
carefully avoided statements that incorporated references to “winning” 
that war. This, together with the “extremely delicate” issue of possible 
expansion of NATO’s borders was designed, by inference and omission, to 
avoid any confrontation with Russia. These issues were also highly visible 
in the Alliance’s Strategic Concept, which was implicitly affirmed by Heads 
of State and Government in Rome, 1991, and which states that there was 
little likelihood of risks to NATO’s territorial integrity from aggressive acts. 
The new Strategic Concept recognised that risks were more likely as a 
result of “serious economic, social and political difficulties, including 
ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries 
in eastern and central Europe” (NATO, 1991) and that this could develop 
into armed conflict causing intervention by outside powers. Furthermore, 
it was envisaged that if such conflicts were to arise, it was likely that they 
would “spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect on the 
security of the Alliance” (NATO, 1991).  
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This, however, did not reflect the interests of the United States in NATO. 
While the Soviet Union existed and was strong militarily, the United States 
had clear national interests at stake but now was the only remaining global 
superpower. For the United States, in general, there was dwindling 
political interest in Europe and, in particular, not much political will to 
keep footing the bill for European defence (Kupchan, 2000). Since 1989, 
there had been successful unification in Europe under Franco-German 
auspices, resulting in the reduction of United States forces in Europe. The 
message coming from the United States Congress was that Europe should 
be left to the Europeans, although concerns were expressed that this might 
result in the rise of a new superpower and threaten the hegemony of the 
United States (Kaplan, 2004).  
Furthermore, the coup against the leader of the Soviet Union, Mikhail 
Gorbachev in August 1991, the man more than any other who had 
contributed to a reunified Europe, provided strong evidence and “gave 
credence to the worry about instability in the region and, by the same 
token, increased reliance on the US as the comforting arm of NATO” 
(Kaplan, 2004, p. 116). These political and military challenges were 
identified as potential dangers to Europe from economic, political and 
social issues arising out of ethnic strife and territorial disputes. These 
challenges provided NATO with a new strategic function: crisis 
management.  
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Inventing identity and crises 
Concern about the developing instability in the region was realised with 
the beginning of the Yugoslav wars of secession in Croatia and Slovenia. 
These wars then extended into the attempted secession of a third Yugoslav 
republic, Bosnia Herzegovina. This would be the first test of NATO’s new 
Strategic Concept and this new outbreak of hostilities provided NATO with 
a number of “firsts” that “have helped shape NATO’s evolution since the 
end of the Cold War” (NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2005a). Through 
its participation in events surrounding these crises, NATO was able to 
redefine itself, gain legitimacy and maintain its credibility as an 
organisation essential in Europe and of importance beyond it. 
By receiving a mandate from the United Nations for its first offensive foray 
into Yugoslavia, its actions were deemed not only to be legal, but also to be 
necessary as part of its new role of managing crises. As an organisation, 
NATO was able to position itself as an essential force in Europe and shape 
its image by emphasising its distinctiveness and unique contribution to a 
particularly salient issue (Cheney & Christensen, 2001a). As Kaplan 
(2004) notes: “A collaboration between NATO and the United Nations 
would give the international organisation the benefits of the infrastructure 
NATO had built over the decades and at the same time legitimise the new 
NATO mission of maintaining stability in Europe” (p. 118). There was now 
a distinct possibility of NATO becoming involved in other countries, 
regions or provinces that bordered on its territory, or even beyond. 
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NATO’s current involvement in the “war on terror” in Afghanistan is 
evidence of this possibility becoming a reality. 
Following the Dayton Accords that brought an end to the war in Bosnia 
Herzegovina in 1995, NATO turned its attention to the developing 
situation in the province of Kosovo in the southern part of Serbia. The 
situation provided an opportunity for NATO to complete its 
transformation from defending “liberal, democratic values embodied in 
the preamble to the original NATO treaty; namely ‘democracy, individual 
liberty, and the rule of law’” (Moore, 2004, p. 3) to an organisation that 
could not only threaten military force, but apply it by offensive 
intervention.  
Drawing on its experience of limited actions in Bosnia, NATO was able to 
continue its transformation. By introducing the defence of values as an 
essential component of its raison d’être, NATO began to forge a distinctive 
new identity. This became particularly relevant with the use of coercive 
force in Kosovo, a campaign requiring an intensive public information 
campaign to embed it as legitimate and to transform its identity in the 
minds of publics. In the following statement, Javier Solana, then 
Secretary-General of NATO, articulates defence with offensive action as 
part of the new NATO: 
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NATO has changed too: the new NATO that emerged from the 
Washington Summit is ready for the next millennium. In all of 
this our core principles remain constant: in 1949 the founder 
members of NATO signed the North Atlantic Treaty to defend 
democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. These remain 
directly relevant to the world of today, and proclaiming them is 
not sufficient. The Kosovo crisis obliged us to take action to 
defend them. … We have a moral responsibility to act to defend 
our values once the efforts of diplomacy have failed. (Solana, 
1999c) 
This statement illustrates clearly the confirmation of the transformation of 
the organisation by articulating defence with offensive action. This is the 
essence of the transformation. Kosovo has been identified as the crisis 
issue that provides the opportunity for action. By proactive management of 
these issues, NATO was able to participate in the creation of new policy 
that impacted directly on its “institutional destiny” (Chase, 1982, p. 1). 
NATO had clearly developed and implemented a programme of action in 
response to the political and military challenges that presented themselves 
at the end of the Cold War.  
Identity frameworks 
NATO’s role in Yugoslavia certainly provided the framework to operate 
politically and militarily and so maintain its identity as both a political and 
military organisation. In words that tended to legitimate the strategy, 
Javier Solana, Secretary-General of NATO, constantly referred to the 
values of the organisation: “We have a moral responsibility to act to defend 
our values” (Solana, 1999a). This articulation of moral responsibility 
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and defending values discursively positions NATO with an offensive role. 
Moore (2003) insists that NATO has always stood for the values enshrined 
in the original mission statement of the organisation. She claims that the 
Alliance is united by these values because they are central to the interests 
of each of the individual members. While she may be right, Kosovo also 
provided the opportunity for NATO to discursively apply these values to its 
organisational identity and help justify offensive actions against Serbia.  
The opportunity for NATO to extend these values throughout the 
European continent provided legitimacy for their “ongoing efforts to 
(re)shape their image” (Cheney & Christensen, 2001a, p. 242) . While 
admitting that there had been dramatic changes in the world over the past 
50 years, Secretary-General Solana outlined his understanding of Western 
ideology as underpinning these values by stating: “The concept of security 
embraces economic, social and humanitarian issues” (Solana, 1999c). This 
discursively and practically reframes the meaning of security in Europe 
from its early sense of military defensive measures. Solana was widening 
the discourse domain by incorporating the economic, the social and the 
humanitarian into the definition of security. 
The intervention in Kosovo was undoubtedly connected with individual 
rights which, in the new NATO, cannot be separated from issues of 
security. Not only was NATO becoming involved with the humanitarian 
aspects of human rights, but also this humanitarianism was a means of 
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embedding the transformation of the organisation. It provided NATO with 
a “coherent sense of ‘self’” (Cheney & Christensen, 2001a, p. 232) and the 
strategic communication practices, which maintained that NATO was a 
values-based organisation, provided a central platform in the Kosovo 
Campaign. 
Individual rights are strongly associated with the ideology of the protection 
of human rights. NATO’s intervention in Kosovo on behalf of human rights 
to protect civilians within a sovereign state, indicates a marked ideological 
shift from interests to values (Woodward, 2001). By emphasising values as 
the reason for bombing, NATO “created a new precedent in international 
relations, that defending human rights can override national sovereignty” 
(Thussu, 2000, p. 348). Furthermore, NATO could claim moral legitimacy 
for both the organisation and its actions (Suchman, 1995).  
Aligning identity and humanitarianism 
For NATO, human rights and humanitarian actions were a key part of the 
public relations strategy in legitimising military action against Yugoslavia 
in favour of Kosovar Albanians. This will be dealt with in more detail in 
Chapter 11 with a discussion of how NATO framed war as humanitarian 
intervention.  
The characterisation of NATO as an organisation with shared values offers 
a seemingly natural progression from an organisation with a shared enemy 
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during the Cold War. The shift also enabled the organisation to see itself as 
one with a collective interest in the defence of its shared values (Moore, 
2003). The Alliance itself is made up of free, democratic states that are 
concerned with the protection and promotion of democracy and freedom 
as the way to a Europe “whole and free”.  
Indeed, this was a view voiced by Secretary-General Solana: “The values 
we agreed in 1949 are also the values of the next millennium. We now have 
a framework to move forward; and to play our part in ensuring a safe and 
stable Europe for tomorrow” (Solana, 1999c). Here, again, is the argument 
for NATO to remain a viable, credible institution for the future. Solana is 
explicitly stating, that by using the original values of NATO as a 
framework, the organisation is able to continue to act within Europe, in 
spite of the fact that the collective enemy no longer exists. By using values 
as the focus for the organisation, NATO is discursively developing a new 
raison d’être and reinforcing its relevance in Europe (Sjursen, 2004).  
In an article distributed to the international press on the occasion of 
NATO’s 50th anniversary summit meeting in Washington in April 1999, 
Solana directly articulates NATO’s actions in Kosovo with NATO’s future: 
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If anything, the Kosovo crisis has reinforced the need for the 
Washington Summit. For this Summit is as much about Kosovo 
as it is about the future of wider Euro-Atlantic security, because 
as we reaffirm the Washington Treaty, we reaffirm our 
commitment to the core values on which this new Europe must 
be built. The summit will not only reaffirm these values – it will 
also ensure that we continue to have the means to protect these 
values when they are threatened. (Solana, 1999b) 
NATO is ultimately a military organisation, one which was established as a 
collective force for the defence of Europe and, in 1999, presented itself as a 
force for the protection of the “core values on which this new Europe is 
built” (Solana, 1999b). NATO has been able to use not only the threat, but 
the actual application of military force, as a tool to legitimise itself as an 
organisation in practice and in theory. NATO thus confirms that 
democratic values lie at the heart of its mission and identity. Moreover, it 
presents the promulgation of these values as the contemporary extension 
of its original defensive mission.  
Reinforcing organisational identity through values 
This strategy of articulating NATO’s core values with the intervention in 
Kosovo provides a means whereby the intervention is endowed with 
cognitive validity (Fairclough, 2003). This is a rationalisation of actions by 
reference to value systems that are constantly invoked as part of the wider 
Western ideology and the underpinning of democratic societies. They are 
what Western societies are said to aspire to, adhere to, and believe in. As 
such, they provide the moral evaluation for legitimation (Fairclough, 
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2003). Over time, these values have become natural and taken for granted 
and align well with what Habermas (1975; 1996) refers to as the 
“generalised” motives that ensure mass loyalty. However, there is little 
reference to applying these values to regions that may not share them, or 
indeed, have little or no experience of them.  
The strategic use of the word “values” in the NATO statements is to 
reinforce not only the legitimacy of the intervention in Kosovo, but by 
doing so, also to reinforce the organisational identity of NATO: 
The crisis in Kosovo represents a fundamental challenge of the 
values of democracy, human rights and the rule of the law for 
which the Alliance has stood since its foundation. That is why 
the 19 democratic nations around this table could not remain 
indifferent. That is why we had to act. (Solana, Press 
Conference, Washington, April 23, 1999). 
Solana’s positioning of the intervention as one based on the defence of 
values and, indeed, justified by the moral necessity of acting on these 
values, the text is doing “ideological work” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 58). That 
work helps to cement the existing hegemony and to confirm the 
universalisation of a particular set of values.  
Using “values” as the prime motive for initiating this intervention, the 
intervention itself is vested with a particular meaning, with positive 
connotations. When this is later coupled with the word “humanitarian”, 
the ideology underpinning the legitimacy of going to war is complete. 
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NATO was concerned with maintaining the dominance of the meanings it 
wished to perpetuate. By using words like “values” and “moral duty”, the 
ideological meanings were made clear. This meant that NATO gave itself 
the moral mandate to intervene not only in a geographical region that was 
part of a sovereign nation, but one that was also outside the European 
sphere of influence.  
In another press briefing by NATO Secretary-General Solana and 
SACEUR, General Wesley Clark on April 1 (after more than a week of 
bombing), values were again invoked to sustain NATO’s position:  
What we have seen in Kosovo in the last few days is a direct 
challenge to all the values on which we are building our new and 
undivided Europe. Milošević and his government are the 
antithesis of all we value. So we cannot tolerate the behaviour of 
a more barbarous age in a Europe, in our continent, which is 
striving towards a more united and more enlightened future. 
Our cause is a just one. It is our duty to fulfil it. (Solana, Press 
Conference , April 1, 1999) 
This quotation is a re-emphasis of the justification for the bombing 
campaign that has resulted in large numbers of refugees fleeing to the 
borders with Macedonia and Albania. The logical implications (Fairclough, 
2003) drawn from the contrast between “a more barbarous age in Europe”, 
which draws resonance from World War II imagery of refugee columns 
and “a more united and more enlightened future” as the likely result when 
the war is over, draw on the “implicit meanings which can be logically 
inferred” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 60). Furthermore, the repetitive use of 
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the pronouns “we” and “our” are significant in reinforcing that NATO has 
the correct moral values and has the duty of defending them. The inference 
is clear: that President Milošević and his government are responsible for 
this more “barbarous age”; and those subscribing to NATO values are 
“enlightened”. NATO is able to lead the way by defending “our” values and 
also, by identifying its own actions as a “duty”. 
There is also a moral evaluation strategy implicit in these references to 
value systems. It is identifying the value systems, which do not need to be 
spelt out, are taken for granted and provide motives for ensuring mass 
loyalty (Habermas, 1975, 1996). By following Habermasian (1975) theory, 
Solana’s claim that Milošević is challenging the value system, which is 
prevalent in the rest of Europe, can be tested discursively for validity since 
it is the basis on which NATO is acting. By presenting the issues in Kosovo 
as moral ones, Solana is carefully aligning the organisation with Europe’s 
future and asserting that any attempt to undermine these values must be 
stopped, because it is, by implication, immoral.  
This claim to legitimacy and positive public opinion rests on the 
underlying consensus of communicative action: that it is understandable; 
its proposition is true; the speaker is sincere; and that it is appropriate for 
the speaker to be performing this act (Habermas, 1975; Marlin, 2002). 
Furthermore, articulating the value system with moral duty provides a 
robust and persuasive argument for “selling” the action to publics (Roper, 
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2001).  
Even though the above statement was made at a press conference and the 
speaker was available for questioning, not one of the journalists from 
Western nations considered anything Solana had said here to be 
controversial. The only journalist present who broached the issue was from 
the Belgrade paper, Novosti. She questioned the bombing of civilian 
infrastructure as a means of defending moral values. The Secretary-
General’s response to this was: 
With all respect to you let me say again, emphasize, that we 
have nothing against the Serbian people, on the contrary, we 
would like very much to see the Serbian people integrated into 
the movement which now is trying to construct Europe. A 
Europe that looks to a 21st century which is more united, which 
has the values it has defended always. (Solana, Press 
Conference, April 1, 1999) 
In his response, Solana does not engage with the question regarding the 
morality of bombing civilian infrastructure as a means of defending the 
more prevalent moral values of a unified Western Europe. Solana, as the 
producer of the text, takes the issue of values as given and thus taken for 
granted. He hedges his response by inviting Serbian people to participate 
in the construction of a new Europe and thus dodges the issue of morality. 
There is no discursive testing when the value system is not up for debate. 
Solana is drawing on moral evaluations and value systems to legitimise 
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NATO military action.  
Habermas’ (1975) notion of claims being discursively redeemed or tested 
in a conflict situation requires rational argumentation (Fairclough, 2003). 
However, the context in which the claims need to be discursively tested 
provides little or no time to debate the issues. Any argumentation put up to 
challenge the claims of the dominant voices are lost in the rapid changes as 
the situation unfolds.  
However, one could argue that books, articles, newspaper commentary 
and analyses during, and following, the war informed this debate. These 
can only be understood as a reflection on what actually occurred, rather 
than as a means of rational argumentation to discursively test the claims 
made by NATO. Many authors have tried to resolve some of the apparent 
contradictions that surfaced during the campaign. Some authors focused 
on the humanitarian issues facing NATO and the legitimacy of armed 
intervention from this perspective (Booth, 2001; Buckley, 2000; 
Habermas, 1999; Shinoda, 2000; Smith, 2004; Thussu, 2000). Others, 
such as Chomsky (1999b), Parenti (2000; 2001), Johnstone (2000a; 
2000b; 2002), Chandler (2000) and Gidron and Cordone (2000) railed 
against NATO’s actions and claimed that it was Western involvement that 
had brought Yugoslavia to its present condition.  
Others were concerned about the role of the media in the propaganda war 
(Goff, 1999; Hammond, 1999a; Hammond & Herman, 2000; Hoijer, 
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Nohrstedt, & Ottosen, 2002; Weymouth & Henig, 2001) and, although 
Daalder and O’Hanlon (2000) supported the war, they believed that NATO 
had gone about it the wrong way. Ignatieff (2000) presented Kosovo as a 
virtual war, one that was fought with technology for the right reasons. 
Latawski and Smith (2003) examined NATO’s role in terms of European 
security, and Martin and Brawley’s (2000) collection of papers were 
concerned with the organisational consequences of NATO’s actions in 
Kosovo.  
By positioning itself as the organisation for the propagation of Western 
values throughout Europe, NATO strengthens its organisational identity in 
the intervention in Kosovo. However, the imposition of “moral values” on a 
society through coercive means needs to “fit” the desired identity of the 
organisation with the view of the publics who provide legitimacy for its 
actions (Roper, 2005a). This is achieved by articulating values with 
coercive force and bringing the two disconnected ideals brought together 
to forge a new discourse construction. 
This process of constructing a new discourse is ideological in that publics 
are able to identify with the values and are then guided to accept coercive 
force as a legitimate means of imposing values in these circumstances. 
From NATO’s perspective, the legitimacy of its actions in Kosovo are 
dependent on this discourse being accepted as common sense (Hall, 1986; 
Slack, 1996). Evidence of this acceptance can be found in the facts that the 
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bombing campaign continued unabated for 78 days, with no Alliance 
member withdrawing support.  
Organisational identity and humanitarianism 
Claiming a distinct identity as a values-based military organisation runs 
the risk of being an oxymoron, especially when bombing for a just peace. 
Nevertheless NATO used that as a means of processing “its unique ‘self’ 
while connecting its concerns to those of the ‘cultural crowd’” (Cheney & 
Christensen, 2001a, p. 234). There is little doubt that in Western Europe 
and the US, there were growing concerns about human rights, democratic 
and moral values. Some surfaced in tangible form as voices calling on 
governments to “do something” in the face of such humanitarian situations 
as the fall-out from the first Gulf War in 1991, the genocide in Rwanda and 
the Yugoslav wars of secession (Barsa, 2005).  
In a theoretical framework in which the concept of power is central, 
Cheney and Lair (2005) suggest that there is a need to explore the tension 
between the concepts of power and persuasion. In the case of NATO and 
Kosovo, the use of military force as a means of achieving humanitarian 
ends has a rather dissonant quality that requires discursive strategies to 
explore the rationality of undertaking these actions. As Cheney and Lair 
(2005) note: “rationality must be ‘positioned’ not only vis-à-vis 
irrationality or nonrationality but also in terms of how reason is 
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accomplished in the processing of organizationally produced messages” 
(p. 74) [italics in original].  
Public relations practice has had an important influence on organisational 
communication in this respect. Although the mainstream public relations 
model (Grunig, 1992) is ethical in theory, the practice of public relations is 
still very much determined by economic and institutional environments. 
As a consequence, organisational communication tends more towards 
propaganda (the organisation “speaking”) than towards dialogue between 
organisation and publics (Cheney & Christensen, 2001a, 2001b; Cheney & 
Lair, 2005).  
As an organisation speaking, NATO claimed to be acting out of 
consideration for human rights and in defence of its values. In this way, 
NATO was attempting to reshape its identity by emphasising the 
humanitarian function of the organisation. By making humanitarian 
values as the focus of its distinct identity, NATO expressed a rationale for 
humanitarian bombing.  
 Following the commencement of the bombing campaign, the success of 
this organisational voicing can be seen in how the term “humanitarian 
catastrophe” became part of the common usage in press statements and 
press conferences. In the following statement, the term is used as part of 
the rationale for initiating the bombing campaign:  
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Our actions are directed against the repressive policy of the 
Yugoslav leadership. We must stop the violence and bring an 
end to the humanitarian catastrophe now taking place in 
Kosovo. We have a moral duty to do so. (Solana, Press 
Statement, March 24, 1999) 
In this statement, Solana is articulating NATO’s moral duty with a 
humanitarian catastrophe. This articulation is a peculiarly difficult one to 
embrace, since bombs were directed against a “repressive policy”, which 
has no physical form, except perhaps in the human forms of the Yugoslav 
leadership. Aerial bombardments were also being used as the means of 
stopping violence and bringing the “humanitarian catastrophe” to an end. 
This message was consistently repeated in press conferences to support 
NATO’s claim that coercive military actions support humanitarian aims. In 
this way NATO supported its claims to be humanitarian in nature and 
explicitly expressed that as what the organisation stood for and wanted to 
be (Cheney & Christensen, 2001a). 
A good illustration of this can be found in the press conference on 28 
March, 1999 (after four nights of bombing raids). That conference was 
presented by NATO spokesman, Jamie Shea (a civilian) and Air 
Commodore, David Wilby, the representative from SHAPE (Supreme 
Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe). Shea opens the conference with a 
brief comment on the previous night’s bombing raid and then moves on to 
discuss the humanitarian situation: 
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I’d like to dwell on this if I may just for a few moments because I 
think this is the most significant development of the past few 
days. If we like it or not, we have to recognise that we are on the 
brink of a major humanitarian disaster in Kosovo the likes of 
which have not been seen in Europe since the closing stages of 
World War II.  
By taking the time at the beginning of the conference, Shea is emphasising 
NATO’s concerns. Up to this point, use of the word humanitarian was 
preceded by the words prevent, avoid or avert. In this statement Shea 
directly links the current situation in Kosovo with the image of refugees 
during World War II/ The image is extremely potent and brings to mind 
the devastation and appalling tragedies that occurred during that period. 
NATO deploys this discursive practice many times throughout the press 
conferences during the campaign to promote the rightness of NATO’s 
actions by association. Shea develops the image in the following way: 
We now estimate that the number of people displaced from 
their homes in Kosovo has gone over the half million mark. That 
is well in excess of 25 per cent of the total population of Kosovo, 
and that number is increasing at a rapid pace. Just over the last 
few days 50,000 people have been uprooted and are trying to 
seek shelter wherever they can. We have reports which are 
being confirmed with every passing hour of about 20,000 
fleeing from the fighting in the northern central areas of Kosovo 
trying to get into Albania. (Shea, Press Conference, March 28, 
1999)  
Keeping in mind that this text is part of the press conference proceedings, 
Shea provides numbers for the journalists. He also provides facts for them. 
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The “numbers” and the “facts” are never questioned by the journalists and 
Shea colours the statistics with other visual images: 
Many are still at the border, where reports indicate that they are 
being stripped of their identity documents, of any possessions 
that they may still have on them, and their car number plates 
are being also taken if they have motor vehicles. That suggests a 
policy by the Yugoslav authorities to make it very difficult for 
those people to go back. (Shea, Press Conference, May 28, 1999)  
Relocating refugees 
By depicting the Kosovo situation in terms of images familiar in World 
War II deportations and persecutions, Shea is engendering strong 
emotions that reinforce claims that strong actions are a rational response 
in the face of atrocity (see, for instance, Paris, 2002), just as they were in 
World war II. Aligning the Fascist past with the present Serbian behaviour, 
NATO implicitly positions its stance as a defender of democracy and 
humanity. Continuing in a similar manner, Shea fills out the picture:  
And even more alarming is that the majority of these people are 
women and children. What has happened to the males between 
the ages of 16 and 60? That is a big question which has to be 
clarified. (Shea, Press Conference, May 28, 1999) 
Now he is able to focus attention on the humanitarian problem in all 
conflicts – the women and children. At the same time, he is making a 
suggestion that something else is occurring as well. He is not providing 
facts here, but rather insinuations. He is also delivering this information to 
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the world press, thereby ensuring that such information is disseminated 
widely in order to encourage the sense of moral outrage. Such moral 
outrage helps maintain a positive public image of the organisation as 
acting ethically in a difficult situation.  
For further support, Shea returns to the image of NATO as a responsible 
and non-aggressive organisation who have only been pushed into action 
reluctantly: 
I would also like, if I may, just to take a very brief moment to 
remind all of you that NATO’s air operations are a last resort. 
This is not a trigger-happy organisation. We have taken a long 
time to come to this painful decision to strike. (Shea, Press 
Conference, March 28, 1999) 
The reiteration of the process by which NATO implemented air strikes “as 
a last resort” and as a “painful decision” emphasises the transformation of 
NATO to a values-based organisation that is concerned with how its 
actions are perceived by the wider public. Shea is insistent that NATO does 
not act without thinking – that it is not “trigger-happy” but rather, it is an 
organisation that takes its responsibilities seriously and only acts when 
there is no alternative.  
There is further reinforcement to conclude this section of the press 
conference where Shea refers again to the images of World War II. In 
referring to an ongoing awareness of how public opinion rates NATO’s 
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actions, Shea repeats the justness of the cause and the need to avoid a 
humanitarian catastrophe: 
Finally, I would just like to say that our governments are 
resolved because we are acting in a just cause. We are convinced 
of that. And I believe also that there are indications that we have 
the support of our public opinion. I don’t expect public opinion 
to be enthusiastic about the fact that we are dropping bombs on 
Yugoslavia. Naturally not. But I believe the current opinion 
polls show that public opinion understands that this has to be 
done to avoid the greatest humanitarian catastrophe in Europe 
since World War II and we are grateful for the support and on 
the basis of that support we will continue until our objectives 
are met. (Shea, Press Conference, March 28, 1999) 
Recognising the need to keep public opinion on side during this campaign, 
this speech again links the present with the past through the image of 
refugees in World War II and in Kosovo. It also reminds publics of the 
justness of the cause. This is a particularly effective persuasion tactic in 
that the organisation appears to be acting in a rational manner (Cheney & 
Christensen, 2001a) and responding to public opinion polls. Shea is 
speaking to a selected audience at the press conference, made up of 
journalists from all over the world. They are the means by which NATO 
communicates its position to the wider public. This, too, fits with current 
organisational practices such as those laid out by Cheney and Christensen 
(2001a): “By ‘communicating’ systematically with selected audiences, 
organizations promote the elusive ideal of ‘public opinion’ while 
presuming to identify and respond to it” and this communication can be 
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used to “maintain themselves and confirm their identities” (p. 252). 
This chapter’s analysis began an examination of NATO’s strategic use of 
public relations to legitimise its identity in a post Cold War world. It placed 
the Kosovo Campaign in relation to recent developments in organisational 
communication and public relations. It concluded by looking at the 
growing challenge to NATO’s strategy as the bombs continued to fall and 
the refugee problems escalated. The next chapter continues the analysis as 
NATO attempts to maintain, refine and strengthen its new identity as the 
Kosovo campaign runs into further challenges. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Shifting positions: NATO, the international 
community and refugees 
This chapter addresses the changing challenges to NATO’s attempt to 
forge, and then reinforce, a new organisational legitimacy as the Kosovo 
situation deteriorated. It analyses how NATO spokespeople engaged with 
the possible negative fallout over the bombing and refugee crises through 
the convergence of a military role with a humanitarian one for coping with 
the large number of refugees exiting Kosovo to neighbouring countries. It 
also tracks NATO’s discursive refinement, which included framing NATO 
as acting within the interests of the “international community” 
(Schoenberger-Orgad, 2002), and provided the basis for a new “Doctrine 
of the International Community” outlined by UK Prime Minister Tony 
Blair at the height of the Kosovo Campaign. 
Shifting issues and falling bombs 
Shea’s press conference, mentioned at the end of chapter seven, engaged 
with the issue of bombing and defended NATO against possible 
accusations of being “trigger-happy” and mobilised a discourse of 
humanitarianism to justify the action: 
Chapter 8: Shifting positions 
 
177 
But I believe the current opinion polls show that public opinion 
understands that this has to be done to avoid the greatest 
humanitarian catastrophe in Europe since World War II and we 
are grateful for the support and on the basis of that support we 
will continue until our objectives are met. (Shea, Press 
Conference, March 28, 1999) 
Examining Shea’s speech in this press conference from an issues 
management perspective, it appears that NATO had not considered that 
public opinion might waiver if the bombing went on too long. The speech 
was delivered on 28 March after four days of bombing, during which there 
had been little response from Yugoslavia to the demands of NATO. It has 
often been claimed that NATO had expected the air strikes to coerce the 
Yugoslav authorities to agree to their demands quickly (as had been the 
case in Bosnia) and were somewhat surprised by the fact that the Yugoslav 
government did not capitulate quickly (Remington, 1999).  
As a result of both the NATO bombing and the internal displacement of 
refugees because of fighting in the region, there was a massive outpouring 
of ethnic Albanians across the borders into Macedonia and Albania. At the 
March 28 press conference noted above, Shea said: “I would just like to say 
that our governments are resolved because we are acting in a just cause. 
We are convinced of that.” This was a means of defending NATO’s 
bombing. The defence was necessary because it was clearly apparent that 
the bombing had caused the outpouring of refugees and given the Serbs 
more reason to continue their operations in Kosovo. This was an 
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unintended and unforeseen issue that arose very early in the campaign. 
 As Shea’s speech indicates, NATO was very much aware of the need for 
legitimacy and the necessity of keeping public opinion behind the air 
operations by being proactive on the information front. The continuing 
justification for the action means “being involved in the definition and 
construction (albeit not necessarily control) of reality” (Cheney & 
Christensen, 2001a, p. 253).  
NATO’s particular version of reality of what was occurring in Kosovo was 
communicated to its publics in ordered fashion. However, it had no control 
over what happened on the ground. In their critique of NATO’s planning 
and actions over Kosovo, Daalder and O’Hanlon (2000) state that not only 
did NATO not expect the war to take very long, but that NATO had not 
even planned for that eventuality. Hard evidence for this claim is the 
minimal amount of forces and hardware available for a long bombing 
campaign. There was also widespread internal criticism of poor war 
preparation by Alliance senior commanders who claimed that NATO 
“lacked not only a coherent campaign plan and target set but also staff to 
generate a detailed plan when it was clear that one was needed” (Daalder & 
O'Hanlon, 2000, p. 104).  
Unplanned issues 
Furthermore, the lack of planning caused other endemic failures in the 
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system. No scenarios were built on what might happen on the ground in 
Kosovo after NATO began its bombing campaign. Daalder and 
O’Hanlon(2000) are particularly scathing about the lack of foresight of 
both the political and military leaders of the Alliance: 
Convinced that a little bombing would force Milošević to accept 
NATO’s terms, the allies failed to envision what might happen 
on the ground in Kosovo as it began to bomb from high 
altitudes. Remarkably, some officials appear to have ignored the 
basic fact that NATO airpower would simply not be physically 
able to stop Milošević’s onslaught against the Kosovars. NATO 
leaders collectively ignored the distinct possibility that 
Milošević might actually intensify his efforts once NATO bombs 
began to fall. (p. 106) 
As a result of this lack of foresight, two things happened. The first was 
that, when the bombing began, the Serbs increased the pressure on the 
ground against the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, and the second was that 
the Serb population in Serbia united behind its government. As Judah 
(2000) notes after the first day of bombing:  
A profound psychological homogenization was beginning to 
take place. Over the next few days all the bitter divisions in 
Serbian society simply vanished. The rule of Milošević, an issue 
which had caused such dissension in recent years, and 
particularly in middle-class society, became irrelevant. There 
was only one issue now, which was that the country was being 
attacked. (p. 238) 
Opposition to Milošević was silenced and even the Opposition was terrified 
that a purge was underway to root out all opposition journalists, 
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academics and anti-Milošević dissidents and activists. Censorship of what 
had been a reasonably free media meant that there was only one line of 
argument to be broadcast: “All of us are one party now – its name is 
freedom” (Judah, 2000, p. 239). 
It was this state of affairs that required NATO to develop an issues 
management strategy that would aid the maintenance of credibility of the 
organisation and enable it to continue its activities. NATO needed to 
persuade publics that the actions in Kosovo would reap genuine benefits 
for the Kosovo Albanians. The continuing bombing campaign needed to be 
communicated as a viable option and a natural consequence of the fact 
that NATO’s demands had not been met. Such a strategy would need to 
convince both internal (NATO ambassadors and NATO member 
governments) and external audiences (political pundits, ex-generals, 
analysts, think-tanks and the general public) that by bombing targets in 
Yugoslavia and Kosovo, NATO would ultimately be successful in achieving 
the goals it had set itself prior to the campaign.  
Part of NATO’s response to these issues was to not only align, but also to 
conflate itself with the category “international community”. As such it 
could claim a mandate to demand acquiescence to conditions and thus 
achieve military goals. By stubbornly reiterating the military goals and, at 
the same time undertaking humanitarian work, the identity and image of 
NATO was reshaped and transformed in line with its Strategic Concept 
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(NATO, 1991). 
NATO and the international community 
This strategy was apparent in the early press releases of 1998, as NATO 
discursively aligned itself with the international community by taking over 
the role of spokesperson for this “imagined” community: 
NATO and the international community have a legitimate 
interest in developments in Kosovo, inter alia because of their 
impact on the stability of the whole region which is of concern 
to the Alliance. (NATO Press Release 98-29, March 5, 1999) 
In this press release, NATO’s stated interest fits clearly with its 1991 
Strategic Concept of the need for stability in the region (NATO, 1991). 
These interests are semantically conflated with those of a constructed 
“international community”. Indeed, the use of “international community” 
calls into being a group of nations, which supports certain actions, has no 
formal institutional infrastructure and no democratic decision-making 
processes. Rather, it is a loose configuration of Western-oriented nation 
states, which either exert international political pressure or have it exerted 
upon them. The use of the word “community” implies fellowship and 
shared interests and, by adding “international”, it maps “political desire 
onto geopolitics” (Poole, 2006, p. 28). 
In this conflict the role of the actual, recognised international community, 
the United Nations (UN), was reduced to passing a number of Security 
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Council resolutions. Although there were intensive discussions at the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to formulate a resolution about 
the situation in Kosovo, NATO was already purporting to be acting on its 
behalf by activating military operations. In UNSC Resolution 1160 (1998), 
adopted March 31, 1998, there was no reference made to NATO. Instead, it 
referred only to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE), the Contact Group and the European Union. It was to these 
bodies that the UNSC gave recognition as having a role in Kosovo. 
In this situation, therefore, NATO chose to determine a role for itself 
rather than be included in the UN deliberations. Therefore, NATO could 
not be acting on behalf of this world recognised international community. 
The significance of this can be seen in the fact that three of the largest 
countries in the world, China, India and Russia, did not support NATO’s 
actions in Kosovo. It was a very selective international community that 
NATO purported to speak for or with. 
Nevertheless, NATO statements and press releases consistently used the 
legitimacy of a constructed international community to legitimise its own 
actions. Moreover, as Taylor (2000a) points out, their approach won the 
tacit assent of mainstream media organisations since there was no 
discussion or debate “about the legal and indeed wider moral implications 
about an enlarged NATO’s new, post-Cold War, role not just within Europe 
but also possibly beyond” (p. 294). Taylor’s perception seems prescient in 
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hindsight, considering that NATO has indeed gone on to develop a crucial 
security role for itself well outside European boundaries.  
Avoiding a legitimacy gap 
The lack of public debate about the wider role of NATO in Europe and the 
moral implications of NATO being a military force of intervention, suggest 
a recognition of the dangers of a legitimacy gap (Sethi, 1979). Such a gap 
would become more visible if NATO operations failed and would also 
contribute to the undermining of the cohesiveness of the organisation.  
An awareness of the dangers of the development of a legitimacy gap can be 
seen during the first week of bombing. During this time, questions were 
being asked at the Brussels press conferences concerning the campaign’s 
objectives, the legitimacy of the bombing campaign and NATO’s role. 
Because the threat of military action had originally aimed at getting an 
agreement for the internationally sponsored drafts accord for the 
withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo, Secretary-General Solana was 
asked whether the objectives had changed. The question continued with 
greater specificity: 
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Now the objective and the justification is being stated in a 
rather different way, and I wondered if that's partly because of 
the problem of having militarily achievable aims and secondly 
whether there's a legal issue, whether you're trying to come up 
with a justification that makes some sense, at least in a context 
of international law. (Sarah Chase, National Public Radio, Press 
Briefing March 25, 1999) 
This question illustrates the journalist’s awareness of NATO’s need to have 
a legitimate international mandate for its operations. The Secretary- 
General replied by attempting to conflate NATO with the international 
community, in order to provide a clear justification and to infer an 
international mandate for action: 
I don't think that the objectives of the international community 
have changed and I don't think that the objectives of NATO in 
supporting the international community have changed. From 
the very beginning, we said that we would be prepared to help 
with our capabilities to achieve the objectives of the 
international community in general terms until the agreement 
was reached in October. (Solana, Press Briefing March 25, 1999) 
The Secretary-General is hedging by stating that “we would be prepared to 
help” to achieve the objectives “in general terms”. These objectives are the 
ones that the UN recommended in its two resolutions in 1998. Solana 
states that NATO is “helping” the international community to achieve its 
objectives, even though there was no UN mandate to support the bombing 
campaign. In this case, Solana is identifying the UN with the international 
community.  
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Other correspondents also raised the question of legitimacy with the 
Secretary-General, whose reply was consistent: 
let me say that the NATO countries think that this action is 
perfectly legitimate and it is within the logic of the UN Security 
Council and therefore that is why we are engaged in this 
operation in order not to wage war against anybody but to try to 
stop the war and to guarantee that peace is a reality for a 
country that has been suffering from war for many, many years. 
(Solana, Press Briefing March 25, 1999) 
Coping with paradox 
While taking into account that this is an unprepared reply to a question, it 
is full of paradoxes that suggest the NATO leadership was well aware of the 
inconsistencies and limitations of their claim to the legitimacy of their 
actions in bombing Yugoslavia. On the one hand, NATO’s actions are 
“within the logic of the United Nations Security Council”, which legitimises 
an operation of not waging war against anybody (when they are obviously 
waging an offensive military action through bombing). On the other hand, 
this action is “to stop the war and guarantee that peace is a reality” for 
Yugoslavia. The discursive positioning of NATO with the international 
community adds weight to the argument for legitimacy. 
In this statement a particular view of what is legitimate is shaping the 
NATO discourse. This illustration of “legitimising the legitimacy” of the 
action not only serves to influence, but also to perpetuate the belief that 
NATO operates within and for the “international community”. 
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However, it is clear that NATO has defined this community in its own way 
for its own purposes. Once again the circumscribed community excludes 
such key geo-political nations as China, India and Russia.  
NATO developed a strategy of authorisation for legitimation (Fairclough, 
2003; van Leeuwen, 2007) by reference to an institutional authority, even 
though this authority had not been defined. NATO was aware that it was 
open to significant international criticism of its actions in Kosovo. This 
required it to develop a strategy for legitimising its activities by reference 
to an “international community”, which oversees, authorises, states aims 
and goals and makes demands. By doing so NATO was, in fact, using the 
term “international community” to authorise its own demands, aims and 
goals in this situation and thus legitimise them.  
By aligning itself and, at times, conflating itself with the term, 
“international community”, NATO was able to influence and reassert its 
dominance in the coordination of both military and humanitarian affairs 
in Europe. This was done by means of constructing a collective identity for 
NATO together with the international community. 
Who are “we”? 
The construction of the collective “we” always draws the line between who 
is included and who is excluded. It serves to identify who the group is 
claiming to speak for, and who it speaks against (Fairclough, 2000). In 
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NATO’s discourse, “we” is used in different ways, but it is mainly used to 
refer to NATO exclusively and only sometimes to include the international 
community. These two uses of “we” are then combined to stand in 
opposition to him (Milošević) or them (the Serbs) as in the following 
excerpt: 
You see also now that we are able to turn off and on the light 
switch in Belgrade, and hopefully also thereby to turn the lights 
on of course in the heads and minds of the Belgrade leadership 
as they realise that they have no option but to meet the essential 
demands of the international community (Shea, Press 
Conference, May 4, 1999) 
In effect, NATO is the international community and no longer acting on 
behalf of it. “We” is not specified, but the intention is clear that it now is 
synonymous with the international community. This is illustrated at the 
outset of the bombing campaign: 
Let me reiterate we are determined to continue until we have 
achieved our objectives: to halt the violence and to stop further 
humanitarian catastrophe. … The responsibility for the current 
crisis rests with President Milošević . It is up to him to comply 
with the demands of the international community. I strongly 
urge him to do so. (Solana, Press Briefing March 25) 
In this excerpt the international community and NATO are one and the 
same. This is repeated more forcefully by General Wesley Clark (SACEUR) 
in the same press briefing: “We are going to systematically and 
progressively attack, disrupt, degrade, devastate and ultimately destroy 
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these forces and their facilities and support, unless President Milošević 
complies with the demands of the international community”.  
General Clark’s language is unequivocal and forceful. It is clearly what 
Fairclough (1992) would term militarised discourse. With the added 
impact of alliteration, it fits with the social practices and the construction 
of this particular reality and acts to normalise the actions taken. With the 
build-up and apparently authorised legitimacy given by the “international 
community”, the rationality of the actions is explicit and clear. 
Furthermore, those making the statements have authority and are 
endowed with credibility. Such a rationalisation allows society “to endow 
them with cognitive validity” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 98). There is a clear 
alignment again here between the military discourse and the current social 
practices.  
Ideology and belief systems in Western Europe and North America place a 
high value on international legitimacy in military offensive actions. This 
legitimacy underpins the democratic process and democratic institutions. 
Constant reference to the international community, acting on behalf of the 
international community and demanding what the international 
community demands, places the international community as the central 
signifier of the validity for the action.  
This forms part of the strategy by which NATO naturalised itself as the 
military arm of the international community. NATO presented itself as 
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a common sense part of the accepted system of belief and knowledge 
(Fairclough, 1992) of the 19 countries making up the NATO Alliance, as 
well as those other countries in the Western world who subscribe to 
similar belief systems. As van Dijk (2001) suggests, people are likely to 
accept what is said, especially if they believe that the source is 
authoritative and trustworthy. As a consequence, they invest power in the 
authors of the statements.  
This means of naturalising the discourse for acceptance is also illustrated 
in UK Prime Minister Tony Blair’s explanation of the Doctrine of the 
International Community, using Kosovo as an example. 
Doctrine of the International Community  
On the eve of the Washington Summit for NATO’s 50th anniversary, Blair 
(1999) gave a speech to the Economic Club of Chicago on April 22, 1999. 
This club is often referred to as the “who’s who and who’s to be” of 
Chicago’s business and professional life (www.econclubchi.org). In this 
speech, he devoted a large section to Kosovo and placed it within the wider 
global context of economic, political and security issues. The title of his 
speech, in which Blair advanced the cause of internationalism over that of 
isolationism, was “Doctrine of the International Community”.  
Blair spoke of internationalism in terms of the global economy and called 
for reform of the international financial regulations and increased efforts 
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in free trade. He also spoke of security and the need to defend “the values 
we cherish” because “the spread of our values make us safer”. He then 
went on to consider intervention and how it should be determined. The 
third issue discussed was politics, defining “The Third Way” in 
international terms as “an attempt by centre and centre-left governments 
to re-define a political programme that is neither old left nor 1980s right” 
(Blair, 1999).  
Fairclough (2000) has provided a fuller critical analysis of this speech as 
part of his work on the discourses of New Labour. The thesis does not seek 
to duplicate that more comprehensive coverage but concentrates only on 
aspects of the speech that are relevant to the understanding of how NATO 
set itself up as the military force to do the international community’s 
bidding.  
These three areas – economy, security and politics – provide the context 
for Blair to introduce the Kosovo Campaign because: “…I do not believe 
Kosovo can be seen in isolation.” Fairclough (2000) comments that, “it is 
clear from Blair’s speech: the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia has to be 
seen as part of a new reality, which connects the global economy, 
international security, and international politics” (p. 151). By placing 
Kosovo within this context, Blair is paving the way for claiming legitimacy 
for the international community by making a coherent connection between 
the discourse domains.  
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Fairclough’s (2000) analysis focuses on the use of “we” within the three 
discourse domains of economic globalisation, international security and 
the political discourse of the Third Way. He finds that “we” is a concept 
that “slides between NATO, G7, the ‘new centre, centre-left Governments’ 
who are oriented to the notion of the ‘Third Way’ as well as a more 
inclusive but undefined grouping of nations” (p. 152). Fairclough (2000) 
suggests that:  
people could see what he was getting at, and see what he meant 
by the ‘international community’, by ‘we’” and from this one 
could extrapolate that there was a common sense argument 
here which was clear to everyone that “a small number of the 
richest and most powerful countries, stand for, represent, act on 
behalf of, etc., the rest. (p. 152). 
Political parallels 
When deconstructing this particular speech and looking carefully at what 
“we” means in this context, this author contends that Blair had two main 
objectives. The first was to place NATO firmly within the international 
community, and the second was to conflate the two entities. By 
contextualizing the Kosovo Campaign as part of the economic, political 
and security framework for the new millennium, Blair was not only making 
a conscious connection with his audience – The Economic Club of Chicago 
– in terms of his wide-ranging view of global interdependence, 
globalisation, international security and politics, but also placing NATO’s 
Kosovo Campaign firmly on the side of legitimate intervention: “No-one in 
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the West who has seen what is happening in Kosovo can doubt that 
NATO’s military action is justified” (Blair, 1999). In this sentence, Blair is 
appealing to the emotional reactions of the listeners, encouraging them to 
participate in the way he sees the situation in Kosovo while, at the same 
time, making the case for justification based on this emotion.  
As Fairclough (2000) points out, language is one of the elements of social 
practice that “holds diverse elements of social life together within a sort of 
network” (p. 144). By using the words “no-one in the West … can doubt” 
members of the audience are being incorporated into the justification 
argument, as are all citizens of Western countries. The ambiguity evident 
in this sentence serves the strategic intent of providing the dominant 
discourse concerning Kosovo as one of justification and moral right. Blair 
(1999) then goes on to claim the “values” argument: “This is a just war, 
based not on any territorial ambitions, but on values. We cannot let the 
evil of ethnic cleansing stand. We must not rest until it is reversed”. 
In these two instances of using “we”, Blair includes the selected members 
of the Economic Club of Chicago, people of high business and professional 
standing who are able to wield some power and influence within political 
circles, together with the NATO Alliance. 
The verbs used in association with ethnic cleansing – stand and reverse – 
are unusual in terms of the discursive strategies. The use of the term 
“ethnic cleansing” is often used as a euphemism for “genocide” (Poole, 
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2006) depending on the particular political requirements of the time. The 
movement, from not allowing it to “stand” and then to “reverse” it, 
reinforces the justification of the bombing activity.  
In Blair’s (1999) next sentence: “We have learned twice before in this 
century that appeasement does not work”, the intertextual link is implicitly 
specified through vocabulary. The key term is “appeasement”, a word that 
has such strong connotations with British political failure on the eve of 
World War II that the connection is completely clear. The “we” in this case 
refers to Britain, for it was the British who learned that appeasement did 
not work when Neville Chamberlain tried to appease Hitler. The “we” 
changes again with the next sentence: “If we let an evil dictator range 
unchallenged, we will have to spill infinitely more blood and treasure to 
stop him later” (Blair, 1999). 
It now includes not only the British, but the Americans and other Alliance 
nations who fought against the evil dictator in World War II. The 
conditional clause is used to suggest a general understanding or common 
sense meaning followed by the consequences that are likely to occur. The 
evil dictator “range[d] unchallenged” in World War II, causing “us” to spill 
“infinitely more blood and treasure” to stop the carnage. The use of the 
word “treasure” is interesting since it is used as a metaphor for finance, 
money and wealth, thereby making the association with the listening 
audience.  
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In this section, the notion of a doctrine of the international community has 
been discussed in terms of NATO’s positioning within and beside the 
international community. The timing and location of this important 
speech adds to the evidence for NATO’s transformation in identity as the 
military arm of the international community. Furthermore, the authority, 
credibility and political position of Prime Minister Blair underlines the 
naturalisation of military intervention as an international response to a 
deteriorating humanitarian situation.  
NATO’s role in coping with refugees 
This section discusses the transformation of NATO from a military focused 
organisation into a humanitarian organisation as it provided logistic 
support to other agencies to cope with the flood of refugees and displaced 
persons from Kosovo. It argues that, in spite of the astonishment and 
horror at the results of the first days of the bombing campaign, the leaders 
of the Alliance nations and the NATO leadership realised that they would 
now be required to explain this apparently unforeseen situation. 
Furthermore, it argues that NATO saw the opportunity to maintain its 
credibility, redefine itself by its own actions and, most importantly, keep 
public opinion on side.  
Recognising the new environment in which it was operating, and also 
preparing for the possibility that it would be blamed for causing the flood 
of refugees into other countries, NATO took action to capitalise on this 
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situation. Organisations do not always define the environment in which 
they operate in broad terms and, as a consequence, need to take control 
and redefine the situation in “self-serving and self-referential terms” 
(Cheney & Christensen, 2001a, p. 253). 
NATO reacted to its new environment very quickly. It devoted a lot of time 
in the press conferences to covering the situation facing the people in 
Kosovo and in reminding publics that NATO bombs were not responsible 
for the situation. Their proactive management of the issue (Heath, 1997), 
was designed to reduce and deflect the criticism that could be directed 
towards them. By redefining the environment, NATO attempted to 
determine “which voices from the outside deserve a hearing or how 
different opinions should be prioritized” (Cheney & Christensen, 2001a, p. 
254). One key aim had to be to defend itself from the criticism of being 
responsible for the confusion and for the outpouring of refugees from 
Kosovo. The situation needed to be urgently addressed if NATO was to 
maintain its legitimacy, credibility and, most importantly, favourable 
public opinion. It became proactive in managing the issues daily and did 
not just concentrate only on information about its bombing campaign. 
By incorporating a humanitarian discourse into its organisational identity, 
NATO was not only communicating with its important key publics 
throughout the Alliance, but ensuring that the communication was also 
“self-serving and self-referential” (Cheney & Christensen, 2001a, p. 253). 
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In this way, the organisation was engaged in defining its identity through 
its own actions and its comments on them.  
In the press conference following the fifth night of bombing, Shea (1999) 
addressed the issues of what he called “this appalling humanitarian 
situation”. He claimed that the outpouring of refugees was part of a 
planned strategy by Milošević. This claim attempts to both remove any 
blame from NATO and, at the same time, to justify the bombing campaign:  
if we look at President Milošević’s record as an ethnic cleanser 
we see that he has been involved in this activity for some time 
already and well before the Kosovo crisis began. Particularly in 
Croatia and Bosnia where we have seen the same systematic 
efforts to create mono-ethnic territories by permanently 
changing the identities of towns and villages. Unfortunately we 
are seeing the same again. (Shea, Press Conference, March 29, 
1999) 
In referring his audience to previous conflicts, Shea positions Milošević 
firmly at the centre of the refugee crisis by naming him as a “systematic 
ethnic cleanser”. He goes on to refer to NATO’s experience in Croatia and 
Bosnia (self-referential) to confirm that NATO had expected this situation 
to occur by articulating the current situation in Kosovo with Bosnia: 
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we have seen this before in our experience in Bosnia that the 
only time President Milošević has stopped doing this has been 
when he has met a combination of firm diplomacy and a 
readiness of the international community to use force as a last 
resort. It is true that President Milošević is very tenacious, so 
are we. (Shea, Press Conference, March 29, 1999) 
This simultaneously signals NATO’s intention to carry on its mission 
against Yugoslavia while reaffirming its commitment to its actions. 
Drawing on experience from negotiating the Dayton Accords, NATO 
seemed to assume that bombing would resolve the humanitarian issues at 
stake. However, with the outpouring of refugees, NATO was immediately 
faced with maintaining the public view of the reality it had constructed. 
NATO also needed to maintain a united alliance of nations faced with the 
reality of the destabilisation of the southern Balkans area and further 
conflict developing in neighbouring countries. To this end, NATO had to 
reinforce the idea that not only was its strategy effective, but was also 
producing the desired results: 
Yes, we are being effective, yes the mission is working. This is a 
methodical, systematic and progressive air campaign to strip 
Serb leadership bare of their military capabilities. … President 
Milošević is beginning to run out of options and as the days go 
by he will have less and less options, so we are having an  
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impact. We’re on plan, on timetable and we’re on target and we 
are going in the next few days to progressively tighten the noose 
around the Serb war machine in Kosovo. (Shea, Press 
Conference, March 29, 1999) 
This is an example of auto-communication (Cheney & Christensen, 2001a). 
It acts to bolster the morale of the nations of the Alliance and also of those 
working within the organisation. The statement illustrates how NATO is 
defining its identity through its own actions. Through the use of the 
metaphor of “tightening the noose”, Shea identifies NATO’s objectives and 
also admits that NATO is carrying out extensive bombing raids in Kosovo 
and making an impact. The situation now requires an extended mandate to 
deal with this new environment: 
NATO’s immediate concern and by that I mean both the 
organisation that the Allies as individual member states is to 
mobilise all our efforts to address the plight of the refugees. … 
our Euro-Atlantic Disaster response Co-ordination Centre here 
at NATO Headquarters is activated, remains activated to co-
ordinate NATO assistance to UNHCR. (Shea, Press Conference, 
March 30, 1999) 
Shea’s words discursively position NATO as the logical respondent to the 
new challenge presented by the humanitarian situation. They confirm 
NATO’s transformed identity “as a responsible organization ready to take 
substantial measures to protect the environment” (Cheney & Christensen, 
2001a, p. 256). They address concern at NATO headquarters about the 
developing situation and the risk of key publics perceiving it as being the 
result of the NATO bombing. Shea’s words contribute to a number of 
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NATO efforts to rectify any negative impression of callous bombing 
strategies causing widespread hardship and humanitarian disaster: “this 
situation makes us all the more determined to stop the fighting on the 
ground. Milošević cannot invade neighbouring countries with refugees in 
the hope that he can destabilise them” (Shea, Press Conference, March 30, 
1999). 
The closing statement reflects concern that President Milošević is trying to 
counterattack NATO by “invading neighbouring countries with refugees”. 
The use of this military metaphor is an attempt to explain this unforeseen 
situation in terms of “a master plan”, which is manifest intertextuality 
(Fairclough, 1992) through reference to World War II texts: 
What we are seeing in Kosovo I think demonstrates increasingly 
that these actions of the Serb forces have been following a pre-
arranged pattern. This type of humanitarian disaster is not 
improvised. It represents a master plan that was conceived and 
well on its way to being executed before the first NATO bomb 
was dropped against a military target. (Shea, Press Conference, 
March 30, 1999) 
What Shea calls a “master plan” connotes semantically with the Nazi 
master plan and “Final Solution”, which was also “conceived and well on 
its way to being executed” by the Nazis. The use of intertextuality draws on 
specific other texts, which are familiar to audiences to persuade them that 
NATO’s bombing was not the reason behind the sudden outflow of 
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refugees.  
Javier Solana reinforces this notion of a “master plan” in the press 
conference two days later when he interprets Milošević as “preparing for 
this ethnic cleansing for months now. Even before the talks in Paris ended, 
he had started his clean-and-sweep operations through Kosovo. He 
demonstrated that he was really only interested in a military solution, and 
totally on his terms” (Solana, Press Conference, April 1, 1999). This is what 
van Dijk (1993) refers to as “hyperbolic enhancement of ‘their’ negative 
actions” (p. 263). If this “military solution” is to ethnically cleanse Kosovo 
of Albanians, then the military solution aligns with the “master plan” 
referred to by Jamie Shea and draws interdiscursively on the “Final 
Solution” as discussed above. The negative construction of motive has its 
own motive as Solana uses it to pretend that the only option was a NATO 
offensive (albeit couched in the general term of “military operations” 
rather than bombing: “He left the Alliance with no other option but to start 
military operations” (Solana, Press Conference, April 1, 1999). The text is 
ambivalent here and requires the reader or listener to interpret it. This 
presupposes that the consumers of the text will make the association with 
the “final solution” and the role of the West to intervene to comply with the 
“never again” statements made at the end of World War II. 
The idea of a systematic plan for the clearance of ethnic Albanians from 
Kosovo is a presupposition. This is reinforced as Shea goes on to point out 
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that refugees were forced from their homes before the NATO bombing: 
On March 20th, the day after the Paris talks were suspended, the 
Serbs began to drive thousands of ethnic Albanians from their 
homes. Some of them were executed and then their homes were 
set on fire. That was four days, four days before NATO initiated 
air operations. By the time NATO’s first planes took off from 
their bases, thousands of ethnic Albanians were already fleeing 
towards the borders. And contrary to what you may hear from 
certain quarters, it is not NATO’s planes that are forcing people 
to flee. (Shea, Press Conference, March 30, 1999) 
There appears to be a rising tension in the justification of NATO’s actions. 
The second sentence in the excerpt presupposes that Shea’s listeners will 
take this fact for granted, even if there is no quotable credible source, or 
witness to the fact. He is manipulating the text by introducing statements 
that have no evidence to support them, such as, “some of them were 
executed”, and by using random numbers of “thousands were already 
fleeing” prior to the actual bombing. Shea’s final statement, “it is not 
NATO’s planes that are forcing people to flee”, is an attempt to reinforce 
his claim that NATO bears no responsibility for causing the humanitarian 
disaster in Kosovo. The repetition of this key message may be accounted 
for by public awareness of the other side of the claim In effect, such claims 
stand in direct contradiction to what people generally know from the past. 
In previous wars, when countries and cities are bombed from the air, the 
usual experience was of civilians pouring out of the bombing target areas 
to try to find shelter in a place where no bombs fall.  
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In the Kosovo situation, however, NATO’s positioning as a humanitarian 
organisation puts it in line to take responsibility for the vast numbers of 
refugees in Macedonia and Albania. Shea observes how this put extra 
pressure on the organisation to juggle resources between providing aid to 
the neighbouring countries for the influx of refugees and logistically 
supporting an ongoing air campaign: “We are urgently formulating the 
organisation and plans to dovetail the flow of aircraft carrying 
humanitarian aid in with the activities associated with our operational 
mission. This is a complex task but we are moving ahead quickly” (Shea, 
Press Conference, April 4, 1999). This unexpected organisational 
dimension of the situation led NATO to explains its new position and its 
commitment to work collaboratively with other humanitarian groups: “We 
are confident that with the goodwill and excellent liaison existing between 
all the major agencies involved, we will be able to manage this problem 
efficiently and without detriment to our combat operations” (Shea, Press 
Conference, April 4, 1999). With this statement, NATO has completed its 
transformation into an organisation dealing with both coercive force and 
humanitarian aid and combining with the international community and 
other humanitarian agencies. 
 Shea goes on to hedge in terms of the timing and length of the bombing 
campaign, but at the same time suggests that this will be offset by the 
simultaneous relief efforts. Further statements dealing with humanitarian 
airlifts, aid, assistance, convoys, efforts, flights, missions, operations and 
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relief form a major part of the first section of each of the subsequent NATO 
press conferences. As discussion extends on the humanitarian 
consequences of NATO’s actions in Kosovo, Shea is evermore adamant 
that the bombing did not create the outflow of refugees: “I’d like to stress 
again that NATO countries did not create, have not created this terrible 
humanitarian tragedy” (Shea, Press Conference, March 31, 1999). 
These discursive interventions combine deliberate efforts to deny 
responsibility for the situation, accounts of providing humanitarian aid, 
and presentations that separate the bombing operations from contributing 
to the refugee situation in Kosovo. This major theme of humanitarianism, 
which positions NATO as a newly transformed humanitarian military 
organisation, is developed further in chapter eleven in a discussion of how 
the NATO discourses frame the Kosovo bombing campaign in terms of 
legitimate intervention on behalf of humanitarian relief. The next chapter 
further develops the background to the “we” and “they” binary division 
observed earlier in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 9 
Supplementing public relations: Theory, 
practice and the Balkans as “other” 
Chapter eight addressed the changing challenges to NATO from the 
consequences of the prolonged bombing. This chapter looks further back 
in the Kosovo Campaign and in Balkan history, to analyse how the Office 
of the NATO Spokesman was confronted with constructing discourses 
about cultures with which its publics had little familiarity. Such cultural 
dimensions have not been explored widely in public relations research 
(Sriramesh, 2002). This chapter hopes to add an unusual aspect to them 
by analysing the deeper cultural contexts of the Kosovo issue and how 
these have been constructed in support of organisational ends. The 
chapter’s conclusions, that the cultural construction of meaning enabled 
the greater power, NATO, to pursue further legitimacy for its actions and 
thus embed organisational change, may well have relevance outside the 
bounds of this study.  
For Yugoslavia, the lesser power in this public relations clash of 
civilisations, the critical asymmetry left it with few options in terms of 
public information. It was clearly the underdog in the information war 
(Toledano, McKie, & Roper, 2004) although there were opportunities to 
use the Internet as a means of disseminating information. These sites, both 
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official and unofficial, provided a “cultural snapshot” of how Serbs 
perceived the conflict (see, for instance, Ignatieff, 2000). 
Binary oppositions and cultural coordinates 
The chapter does looks more deeply into the way NATO drew on historical, 
political and media discourses as a means of legitimising its military 
intervention in a region that had always been problematic for Western 
interests. It shows how critical discourse analysis helps to reveal the wider 
discursive practices underpinning NATO’s intervention in the Balkans and 
examines the way in which NATO used a clear dichotomy to distinguish 
“our” (civilised European) values from “their” (uncivilised Balkan) 
behaviour.  
It argues that these binary oppositions provided an enabling structural 
framework: to legitimise NATO’s bombing campaign; to allow NATO to act 
in an active and interventionist – rather than passive and defensive – 
manner; and underpin a post-Cold War role that provided a rationale for 
NATO to survive as an institution. This chapter illustrates how, in 
executing these processes, NATO’s public relations strategy reinforced 
already current perceptions and stereotypes of the Western collective 
understanding of the Balkans region. This was a central theme in the 
NATO discourses (Owen, 1984).  
In both continuing, and contributing to, already existing Western 
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metanarratives of the Balkans, the NATO public relations intervention 
drew from a number of archives. Nearly all reinforced a consistent 
Western image of the Balkans as an area of bleakness, political chaos, 
savagery and discord. More recently, in the immediate post-Cold War 
political collapse, events in many of the Balkan states seemed to confirm 
these territories as populated by people perched on the edge, waiting to be 
tipped into a final fight for survival. Political and media representations of 
the region and the people have “focused on uncertainty, irrationality and 
violence” (Kuusisto, 2004, p. 169).  
This chapter is divided into two parts: the first dealing with literature 
concerning the image of the Balkans; the second part illustrating how this 
image provided the contextual framing, which underpinned NATO’s 
construction of the Kosovo Campaign with its use of binary oppositions, 
metaphor and personification of the conflict in the figure of President 
Milošević .  
The chapter positions NATO’s public relations strategy as constructing the 
bombing campaign not only as a natural and “civilised” international 
reaction to what Jamie Shea termed “the demon” force of the Balkans, but 
also as a virtuous one where “moral and humanitarian standards, rather 
than national interest, were offered as a rationale for this campaign” 
(Behnke, 2002, p. 130). It did so by reinforcing the perception that the 
“inhabitants [of the region] do not care to conform to the standards of 
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behavior devised as normative by and for the civilized world” (Todorova, 
1997, p. 3). This enabled NATO to present itself as a predominantly values-
based humanitarian and caring organisation first and, only secondly, as a 
military organisation that could use the threat of force to back up its 
demands. 
Framing interventions 
Framing the peoples of the Balkans as being less able or reliable in 
governing themselves in a civilised manner in a post-Cold War world gave 
NATO certain advantages. NATO could for example, build on that 
framework to claim further, apparently legitimate, reasons to take a 
proactive role in sorting out the internal conflicts of states of the previous 
Communist bloc. Many of these developing conflicts were “nipped in the 
bud” through diplomatic or economic means. This has been borne out by 
invitations into the NATO Partners for Peace programme, as well as 
ongoing discussions for accession to the European Union.  
However, the process of bringing Yugoslavia into the “family of Europe” 
was more complicated in that the peoples of the different republics still 
had to work through their own internal conflicts before acceding to new 
democratic and economic requirements. It was essentially these embedded 
internal conflicts that NATO sought to smother and extinguish through its 
interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo.  
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As identified earlier in this study, a major problem for NATO was the 
legitimacy of its intervention. Although national interests did play a part in 
the decision-making processes, these were not crystal clear (Thussu, 
2000). As a consequence, the media had some difficulty in providing an 
appropriate framework for reporting the wars and conflicts that ravaged 
Yugoslavia. They responded by framing their coverage in terms of the 
never-ending ethnic hatreds, violent history and traditionalist attitudes in 
the Balkans. These ethnic and cultural characteristics from history and 
fiction then account for contemporary troubles in the Balkans, rather than 
the fact that the West has used the region “as a theatre for their power 
politics” (Gowan, 1999, p. 105).  
Gowan’s (1999) claim of Western interference finds support in Chandler’s 
(2000) view that, in fact, it was the Western powers that prevented any 
possible compromise solutions for the conflicts between the republics of 
the Yugoslav Federation by undermining those institutions by their own 
policies and actions. Nevertheless, by reverting to such frames for 
explanation of the occurrences in the Balkans, those involved in 
disseminating information are able to simplify the conflicts for their 
consuming publics into uncomplicated, well-known and ubiquitous binary 
oppositions such as “us and them;” “good and evil;” “peace-loving and 
violent;” “developed and backward;” “consensus and discord;” and so on.  
The use of these binary oppositions are scattered throughout the NATO 
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texts and provide an easily intelligible framework for general 
comprehension of the events in the region. Such deployment of binary 
oppositions is not new in the discourses of war, but for the “new” war 
discourses (Kaldor, 1999) the first Gulf War in 1991 provided a model: 
“they” are the unseen enemy – or the enemy who is personified through 
the name of the leader and seen only through the nose camera of the 
falling bomb; and “we” are the ones with the enlightened and correct 
values (Robins, 1993) and are bombing for the right reasons. 
 Baudrillard (1995) also referred to these oppositions in terms of the power 
asymmetry when he claimed that the Gulf War did not take place, but was 
rather a simulation. He saw the spectacle in terms of a fight “over the 
corpse of the war” (p. 23) because the Iraqis were no match for the 
international coalition brought together by the United States. The Serbs, 
too, were no match for NATO. NATO mobilises these same binary 
oppositions in Kosovo, using intertextuality from earlier conflicts; in 
particular the discourses from World War II and Nazi atrocities, as well as 
likening Saddam Hussein and Milošević to Hitler and nazifying the Serbs 
(Hume, 2000).  
Cultural sources for binary oppositions 
NATO could also access fictional sources in its construction of the Balkans. 
Numerous references to the Balkans in Western literature since the 18th 
century have provided a particular image of Yugoslavia and the Balkan 
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peninsula “as a kind of Eastern frontier, a dangerous peripheral zone away 
from the civilising influences of the centre” (Hammond, 2005, p. 145). This 
sense of danger is associated with a number of metaphors that emphasise a 
collision, or clash – the fracture zone of Europe. 
Goldsworthy (2002) points out that this timeless figurative expression of 
“colliding cultural and religious tectonic blocks” (p. 25) goes well together 
with the “equally timeless ‘ancient hatreds’ as the preferred explanation for 
every Balkan conflict” (p. 26). This theme has been taken up many times, 
not only by Victorian and early 20th century travel writers (Hammond, 
2005), but also by writers, diplomats and journalists who were, in one way 
or another, involved in the coverage of the wars in the break-up of 
Yugoslavia (see, for instance, Crampton, 2002; Holbrooke, 1998; Kaplan, 
1993; Nicholson, 1994; Owen, 1995; Prentice, 2000; Simpson, 1999; 
Winchester, 1999).  
Other authors have written popular fiction set in the Balkans, the most 
famous of which are Bram Stoker’s (1897) Dracula and Agatha Christie’s 
(1934) Murder on the Orient Express, which have been made into films 
where “the Balkans have often provided a threatening space – the 
mysterious and unhomelike (unheimlich) Eastern location for the 
unfolding of Western adventure” (Goldsworthy, 2002, p. 33).  
Some more recent writing about the Balkans has tried to redress the 
balance and has identified the not insubstantial role of foreign powers 
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in the region (see especially, Glenny, 1999a). Nevertheless, on the whole, 
most writers have been content to bed down the common understanding of 
the Balkan peninsula as the home of people who are primitive and 
backward. As Hammond (2005) notes:  
The West’s response to the Yugoslav wars was to set the tone for 
the conceptualization of the whole peninsula. The 
understanding of Yugoslavia as a collection of fractious, 
malevolent entities was central to the wider discursive recovery 
of Victorian balkanism, the assessments and accusations that 
marked western commentary on the nation quickly spreading to 
encompass all post-revolution societies, and helping to make 
the Balkans once again a byword for mendacity and savagery. 
(p. 139) 
Such representations contribute extensively to perceptions that have been 
built up over decades and are constantly reinforced by media articles and 
statements. Individually and cumulatively, they have laid claim to the 
fertile ground of imagination with dominant images that can then be 
exploited for particular ends. 
This ground offered fertile soil for planting the seeds for legitimate 
international intervention without needing to explicitly draw on the 
“common sense” understanding of the region. Simply through the already-
existing intertextual context, the NATO discourses could frame a particular 
interpretation that served their own interests. They could simply reinforce 
existing perceptions, that the Balkans were out of line with “civilised” 
nations, use them to support NATO’s overriding requirement for 
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organisational legitimacy (Massey, 2004) and appear to be acting not only 
legitimately, but honourably, in undertaking a necessary bombing 
campaign.  
Complexity or simplicity? 
The perception of the Balkans as a volatile, unstable region has provided a 
strong structural basis for the construction of particular realities as 
required. At the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, many observers 
expected the Yugoslav Federation to be the first country of the former 
Eastern bloc countries to move to a democratic society following market 
forces economic reforms. In the following example, there is a before-after 
comparison offered as an illustration of this expectation. Shea contrasts 
two different images of Yugoslavia. In the first part, in a response to a 
question from a Yugoslav journalist, he talks about Yugoslavia in terms of 
what it used to be like before the end of the Cold War: 
I would like to really stress we have no quarrel with the people 
of Yugoslavia. NATO has sympathy for the people of Yugoslavia. 
Ten years ago when the Berlin Wall came down, any economist 
looking at the map of Europe would have probably designated 
Yugoslavia as the country emerging in the post communist 
period which was most likely to rapidly catch up with the 
Western European mainstream. It was a wealthy country. 
People had private bank accounts, they went skiing in Austria 
and Switzerland, it was a very civilised country indeed and 
many people obviously went there on holiday and enjoyed it. 
(Shea, Press Conference, April 3, 1999) 
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This idyllic picture of a wealthy, “very civilised” country whose citizens 
enjoy “skiing in Austria and Switzerland” and have “private bank accounts” 
provides no context of the economic turmoil that preceded the break-up of 
Yugoslavia in the 1990s. By using these images, Shea is reinforcing 
particular Western understandings of economic stability and wealth and 
using his text to do the “ideological work” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 58). This 
was a representation of the reality for some Yugoslav citizens and it was 
NATO’s intention is to return this way of life to the people for whom it had 
sympathy. The target publics in Western European nations can relate quite 
easily to these particular images, for they themselves would probably be 
amongst those who have been on holiday and enjoyed the sights of 
Yugoslavia, gone skiing in Austria and Switzerland, etc.  
The stark contrast of the imagery presented in the first part of this quote 
underlines the trauma and shock of the second part, again through use of 
an economic market-oriented discourse:  
But look at it now after ten years. It's gone from being at the top 
of the league of the post-communist societies to being virtually 
at the bottom. Its GDP has fallen by about 50 per cent vis-a-vis 
1989. The military budget has completely consumed virtually all 
of the domestic resources that its [sic] being produced. (Shea, 
Press Conference, April 3, 1999) 
Here is a stark description in economic terms, set against the break-up of 
the Yugoslav federation. The consumption of domestic resources by the 
military indicates poor management, a militaristic society and 
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economic ruin. In this example, Shea is removing the reality from its 
economic context with no reference to the economic hardships and 
inflation of the 1980s (Allcock, 2000). The separation allows him to use 
volatility, instability and implacable inter-ethnic hatreds as the logical 
coordinates for an imploding country. 
During the Bosnian war (and prior to it, during the violent secession of 
Croatia and Slovenia) Western leaders used the complexity of the issues of 
the region to legitimise non-intervention. In that conflict, the narrative of 
the region was framed by the use of metaphors emphasising not only the 
misery, senselessness and ugliness of war but also as a warning about the 
risks of getting involved. Any involvement could result in “a horrible 
dream of the dark hours, a sudden and violent natural catastrophe, and a 
treacherous swamp or quagmire” (Kuusisto, 2004, p. 181). 
Similar metaphors can be used for quite different purposes. The point is to 
emphasise the role of public relations in the discursive deployment of 
public information about international politics, conflict and national 
interests. These are far from innocent practices and often feature the 
privileging of some versions of history over others. In her work on Western 
foreign policy statements during the war in Bosnia, Kuusisto (2004) found 
that the West legitimised its non-intervention by stressing “the complexity 
of the situation, the special nature of the people and the terrain, and the 
awkward position of outside powers” (p. 173). Ultimately the West 
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concluded that it was simply a civil war in which the West had no reason to 
intervene. The dramatic discursive shift from legitimation of non-
intervention in Bosnia to legitimising a large-scale, multi-national military 
intervention in Kosovo requires an explanation. 
The complexity of the situation in Bosnia provided the West with a reason 
for non-intervention in that it was impossible to identify clearly which 
particular national community was to blame for the egregious human 
rights violations in the conflict. Bosnia had been a multi-ethnic republic 
made up of three national communities: Serbs, Croats and Bosnian 
Muslims, none of whom made up a significant majority. Atrocities 
committed by all sides in the fight to retain or capture territory for future 
purposes made it difficult to categorically identify one community as the 
aggressor, though the Serbs were, in the later stages of the war (after the 
events at Srebrenica) clearly the perpetrators of some of the worst 
atrocities.  
Kuusisto’s (2004) work on the rhetoric of Western leaders concludes that 
even though there was a recognition that the conflagration of Bosnia was 
in danger of spreading to other areas, it would be foolhardy to intervene: 
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The speeches of the Western leaders affirmed to the 
international audience that delivering humanitarian aid, 
watching over the no-fly zones and safe havens and offering 
negotiation opportunities (that is, assuming minor roles in the 
drama) was the best possible plan for third (or fourth or fifth ) 
parties to adopt in Bosnia. The war was terrible and messy and 
mysterious; no purpose could be served by making foolhardy 
charges into the tragic battle. (Kuusisto, 2004, p. 174) 
By claiming that the situation in Bosnia was too complex to take sides, 
Western countries appeared not only to be haunted by the spectre of the 
Balkans, but also by the prospect of being bogged down in a quagmire 
from which it would be difficult to extricate forces (as in Vietnam). There is 
a sharp contrast with the opposite attitude of Western leaders with regard 
to the developing situation in Kosovo. Ironically, Bosnia, and the failure of 
the international community to respond to the unfolding tragedy there, 
provided the dominant argument for intervention in Kosovo. Both US 
Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright and British Defence Secretary 
George Robertson claimed that lessons had been learned from Bosnia and 
the West could not stand by and watch another human catastrophe unfold 
in Kosovo.  
This analysis will examine the NATO texts in terms of how the discourses 
represent the region and its peoples and the presuppositions embedded 
within the texts. In particular the analysis will look at intertextuality by 
identifying the different discourses that have been drawn upon to create 
the new text. It will also look at what Fairclough (1992) calls manifest 
intertextuality that “raises questions about what goes into producing a 
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text, but it is also concerned with features that are ‘manifest’ on the surface 
of the text” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 233). 
Instability and abandonment 
One key term, which appears frequently in the NATO discourses, is 
stability, or stabilisation. Used in relation to the Balkan region and, in 
particular, Yugoslavia and its neighbours, it is marked by the absence of 
stability and contrasts with an area that is in chaos, has no secure ground 
and is prone to jolts (both physical and political). The implication of such 
internal instability is that it can only be secured by external help.  
Jamie Shea draws a picture of the economic vulnerability of Yugoslavia 
with no reference at all to the economic sanctions imposed by United 
Nations sanctions in 1992. He provides only a stark contrast of a country 
brought to its knees in order to emphasise the instability afflicting the 
region and, in particular, the neglect of the needs of the people of the 
region afforded by the current leadership: 
The Serbs and people in other parts of the former Yugoslavia 
have suffered terribly because of the policies of their 
government. I mean if there ever was a people that really has 
been let down by bad leadership its been Yugoslavia and we 
don't want this situation to happen. We don't want Yugoslavia 
to be what it currently is, a prior [sic!] state. (Shea, Press 
Conference, April 3) 
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The introduction of an imposed singularity of Yugoslavia – bad leadership, 
bad policies and a pariah state – allows Shea to reinforce the “them” and 
“us” opposition. Yugoslavia is no longer part of the civilised world but a 
pariah state. He goes on to position Yugoslavia as the outsider, the country 
that needs to be brought back into the mainstream, back into an 
embracing Europe. He goes on to say: 
We want to have a situation of stability in the Balkans so that we 
can bring Yugoslavia into the same democratic mainstream as 
virtually all of the other countries of Europe. … but we can't 
start even thinking of this until we end the current process of 
moving backwards into the 19th century, but hopefully there 
will be a better perspective tomorrow, but I want to make it 
clear that our quarrel is with your Government, not with your 
people. (Shea, Press Conference, April 3, 1999) 
Shea’s rhetoric positions Yugoslavia not only as an outside other, but as an 
undemocratic backwater that needs to be brought back to the mainstream. 
In this case, “we” are seeking to stabilise it in order to allow it to catch up 
with “our” normal state. The repetition of the theme that this is not a war 
against the Yugoslav people but against the leadership, reinforces the 
argument that NATO’s intervention is a humanitarian intervention for the 
good of the people of Yugoslavia. The bombing of the infrastructure is 
really only a means of destroying the military power of a bad leadership 
and ending “the current process of moving backwardness into the 19th 
century” (Shea, Press Conference, April 3, 1999). 
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This statement shows how readily the perception of the Balkans as an 
unstable backward region can be called upon to reinforce a particular 
argument. In the earlier example of Yugoslavia being a wealthy country 
where (some) people had private bank accounts and went skiing in Austria 
and Switzerland contrasts with the process of moving backwards into the 
19th century. The ideological work of this text (Fairclough, 2003) is to 
embed the assumption that Yugoslavia should be part of the “democratic 
mainstream as virtually all of the other countries of Europe” and that there 
is no place to deviate from this mainstream. 
As Fairclough (2003) points out: “Seeking hegemony is a matter of seeking 
to universalize particular meanings in the service of achieving and 
maintaining dominance, and this is ideological work” (p. 58). The 
hegemonic view is to draw the “other” into the mainstream, thus 
neutralising the particular identity of a nation and providing the warrant 
and backing for the argument by associating any deviation from this norm, 
or common sense, as a return to the “backwardness of the 19th century” 
(Shea, Press Conference, April 3, 1999). 
In an earlier statement, Shea combined the idea of backwardness with the 
metaphor of abandonment, to shift to a family metaphor and suggest that 
Yugoslavia (the Balkans) is an orphan needing good parents in order for it 
to be stable: “I believe that they really do show that this is an area where 
we simply cannot abandon the Balkans to Milošević. We know what has 
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happened in the past and we know what would be the consequences if we 
did that” (Shea, Press Conference, March 31, 1999). 
Not only is Shea reinforcing the “badness” of Milošević, but he is also 
drawing on what he believes to be the common historical knowledge of his 
audience about the Balkans. “We” know what has happened in the past – 
there is obviously no need to spell it out – and “we” also know the 
consequences that would occur if “we” do not intervene. This is what 
Jowett and O’Donnell (1992) refer to as “white propaganda”, where the 
source is credible and where the political ideology also fits. In this 
quotation, the assumption is that in the past –with no reference to recent 
or distant past – there was only turmoil, hardship and war. It omits any 
reference to the more than 40 years of peaceful co-existence in the former 
Yugoslavia. This is part of “the interwoven trinity” (O'Shaughnessy, 2004, 
p. 65) of rhetoric, symbolism and myth where the rhetoric provides the 
emotional persuasion, the myth is the underlying narrative, and “we” 
symbolise the “protectors” of stability in the region. Here, the “we” is 
inclusive of “all of us” and “our” understanding of the region.  
Earthquakes and metaphors 
The unstable metaphors associated with the Balkans are augmented 
through the geography and liminality of the region, particularly the use of 
language such as the “fault line” and the Balkan “tinderbox” (Krasteva, 
2004). An example of this particular kind of unstable metaphor is well-
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illustrated in the speech given by President Clinton at the beginning of the 
air strikes on 24 March, 1999: “We act to prevent a wider war; to diffuse a 
powder keg at the heart of Europe that has exploded twice before in this 
century with catastrophic results” (Clinton, 1999). 
Clinton’s metaphor of the “powder keg” that has exploded reinforces the 
mental concept of the area as being unstable and prone to explosions, thus 
requiring some intervention to prevent “catastrophic results”. These types 
of metaphors work powerfully in suggesting that the forces involved are 
uncontrollable and that they should be expected because they are a 
product of nature and not a human construction. The metaphors work in 
ways that the listener is able to make sense of the meaning without too 
much effort (Chilton, 2004). For instance, the use of the word 
“earthquake” adjacent to “demographic” in reference to the flow of 
refugees out of Kosovo during the NATO bombing suggests that this was 
both uncontrollable and unstoppable. The effect is to suggest the flow is 
disconnected from the human activity of bombing: “The focus of the 
Alliance this morning is still very, very much on the demographic 
earthquake that we are experiencing in and around Kosovo” (Shea, Press 
Conference, April 3, 1999). 
For the previous ten days, NATO had been bombing Kosovo both day and 
night, and yet categorising this exodus as “a demographic earthquake that 
we are experiencing”, removes causal agency from NATO activities. As 
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Shea continues the tectonic metaphor he extends it into the scientific 
language associated with earthquakes with the use of the Richter scale 
(even though, in Shea’s own qualified terms, it is not a scale to measure the 
intensity of a physical earthquake but rather a humanitarian scale of 
suffering): “I think that on the humanitarian Richter Scale of suffering, we 
hit a nine over the weekend” (Shea, Press Conference, May 25, 1999). 
With this use of the earthquake metaphor, Shea is tapping into the already 
established understanding of the region as part of a natural fault line, 
subject to earthquakes, an area which is unstable and which, like other 
natural disasters, requires intervention for humanitarian reasons. The 
articulation of earthquake, the measure of the earthquake (Richter scale) 
and the humanitarian suffering evoke an image of a natural event and 
distances responsibility for the actual physical bombing of the area by 
NATO.  
This is extrapolated from the strong notion of instability already associated 
with the region. It implicitly provides an underpinning support for 
whatever action it takes to stabilise the region. This extrapolation survives 
after the war when a “Stabilisation Force” is implemented (e.g., as in 
Bosnia) with NATO as the core of this force. A future role for NATO in 
Kosovo is established although they can “be flexible as to who participates 
provided that it has a NATO core and we have already the successful model 
of IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia that has functioned extremely well, which is 
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called Implementation Force or Stabilisation Force, has a NATO core but 
where you have the participation of 20 countries” (Shea, Press Conference, 
May 5, 1999). 
Shea seamlessly links the earthquake metaphor and the legitimisation of 
NATO’s role in the region in the development of the plan for the future: 
our formula is for far-reaching autonomy following a 
transitional period in which of course Kosovo would have to be 
under the protection of the international community and would 
have to be reconstructed and it's more likely, in my view, for 
Yugoslavia to go in a democratic way if part of Yugoslavia is 
already a multiethnic, democratic society under the influence of 
the international community. We would have a better chance 
than if it were hived off completely because as we found, any 
kind of partition tends to encourage the extremist parties rather 
than the democratic parties in the states that survive (Shea, 
Press Conference, April 28, 1999) 
Here, Shea is positing the idea that through its intervention, Kosovo will 
become a multiethnic, democratic society that will lead the way for 
democracy throughout Yugoslavia. The ideological work of this text 
suggests an “unquestioned and unavoidable reality” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 
58) that when the bombing campaign is over and NATO achieves its goals, 
Western-style democracy of tolerance and understanding will be 
unequivocally adopted by the inhabitants of the region. 
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Victims and villains 
Binary oppositions also work to create villains and victims by demonising 
the enemy. Linguistically, it is also a means of delegitimising (Chilton, 
2004; Chilton & Schäffner, 1997) the other by negative representation. In 
the case of Kosovo, the villain has a name, a face and a particular 
personality with which audiences became increasingly familiar. However, 
the villain requires victims as well and NATO was able to clearly identify 
the victims as ethnic Albanians. As Louw (2001) points out: 
Finding “victims” to “save” has become an important device for 
justifying the use of NWO [New World Order] violence against 
foreigners. … Essentially, mobilizing “victimhood” discourses 
that are already “trendy” in journalistic circles, means that psy-
ops stories, promoted by military PRs, tend to receive no critical 
scrutiny from journalists. Propaganda is easily “placed” in the 
media if it confirms existing journalistic bias and/or fits their 
news frame. (p.174) 
The support of the “underdog” in an international situation is not new in 
journalism and is known to provide positive propaganda results for the 
more powerful party. But this is only the case when the victims have been 
identified and characterised so that the listener is able to connect 
emotionally with the victim.  
Accordingly for NATO, finding victims was an important device for 
legitimising a new offensive operation that could help transform the 
organisation. NATO’s claims to be helping the victims of ethnic cleansing 
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through a hostile bombing campaign raise the question of whether there is 
a hierarchy of victims in this particular intervention.  
Victims and the villains could be readily identified in the Kosovo conflict. 
From the very outset, there was a particular construction of reality in the 
NATO texts. This construction was necessary from the perspective of 
keeping the Alliance together and staying focused on a particular enemy; it 
was also a necessity from the point of view of maintaining faith with public 
opinion. Although the decisions regarding confrontation were apparently 
made by a supranational institution, it was important to maintain positive 
public opinion amongst the citizens of the Alliance countries. The decision-
making processes in representative democracies depend on citizen 
consent, taking the form of mass loyalty (Habermas, 1975) in which the 
citizen needs to be “discursively convinced” (p. 43) that such power is only 
exercised when there is a legitimate norm of action. Since rationality is at 
the crux of the relationship between the citizen and the state, it is 
necessary for the public relations professional to construct the weightiest 
and most rational arguments in favour of their political clients (Roper, 
2001).  
Text and talk are used in subtle ways to suggest particular meanings and 
thereby manufacture consent for the actions (van Dijk, 1993) and as Louw 
(2001) points out, demonisation of an opposition leader is a common 
feature of media war planning and is “often accompanied by identifying 
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refugees and exile groups and promoting them as future alternative 
governments. Demonization also involves the selective portrayal of history, 
especially where intervention is being made on one side of a civil conflict 
(as occurred in Kosovo)” (Louw, 2001, p. 178). 
By discursively constructing the opposing leadership as irrational and 
unreasonable, it is possible to maintain positive public opinion for 
whatever actions are required to bring about a rational and reasonable 
solution to the issues at hand, thus maintaining legitimacy.  
The “demon” force 
From the early press releases to the final press conferences, it was quite 
clear that the villain was represented by one person, President Slobodan 
Milošević. The process of delegitmising (Chilton, 2004; Chilton & 
Schäffner, 1997) him was a predominant theme across the discourses. His 
name appears in the NATO documents 1,229 times. In comparison, the 
word Yugoslavia appears 540 times, Serbs appears 234 times; Yugoslav 
government appears 13 times; Yugoslav leaders, twice; Serbian 
government, twice; Serbian forces 21 times; and Yugoslav forces 98 times. 
The name Milošević was also used as a possessive noun for: government, 
machine, regime, authorities, citizens, command-and-control, 
communication, forces, military, objectives, policies, power, resolve and 
strategy. 
Chapter 9: Supplementing public relations 
 
227 
The constant repetition of Milošević as the perpetrator of the conflict made 
plain the villain of the conflict. He had a name, a face and was, in fact, the 
embodiment of evil. On one occasion, Shea metaphorically described 
Milošević as diseased: “We are preventing Milošević from infecting the 
entire region with his virus of nationalism” (Shea, Press Conference, April 
23). The interdiscursivity here, drawing on the medical discourse domain, 
as well as intertextuality with Nazi representations of Jews in Europe as a 
“plague” that was infecting Aryan society, presents an incredibly powerful 
metaphor for the demonisation of President Milošević. Furthermore, the 
statement articulates Milošević with an infectious virus, which infects the 
region.  
It was this evil that needed to be defeated. In the NATO texts, Milošević 
and evil are used in close proximity: 
there is always a cost to defeat an evil, it never comes free 
unfortunately, but the cost of failure to defeat a great evil is far 
higher in the long term. So this Alliance will not be shaken, we 
will not stop and we will not let up until Milošević and his 
killing forces withdraw from Kosovo. (Shea, Press Conference, 
May 31, 1999) 
The articulation between Milošević and evil is clear, as is Milošević’s 
ownership of the “killing forces”. Evil, as personified by Milošević, presents 
the challenge to the NATO Alliance. There is now an exhortation to 
continue the battle, resonating from Churchill’s speeches at the height of 
the Battle for Britain that are manifested on the surface of the text 
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(Fairclough, 1992). These well-known examples of war-time speeches 
exhorting the people to support the efforts of the armed forces: “We shall 
not flag nor fail. We shall fight … we shall never surrender” (13 May, 1940) 
and “Victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory however long 
and hard the road may be” (4 June, 1940), reinforce the mental models 
inherent in the discourse of the morality of this campaign as when Shea 
says: “…this Alliance will not be shaken, we will not stop and we will not let 
up” (May 31, 1999).  
Shea also relates NATO’s actions to the value of making the effort to defeat 
evil. Putting a price on it draws on an economic discourse, as did Churchill 
(“victory at all costs”). The resulting interdiscursivity, of military and 
economic discourse domains, suggests an underlying aim of the campaign 
as having economic implications for the whole region. The discourse is 
shaped in terms of a future financial perspective. A victory for the forces of 
good (NATO) and a defeat for the forces of evil (Milošević) is not simply 
the removal of Serb forces from Kosovo, but embraces the wider 
implications of gathering “Yugoslavia into the same democratic 
mainstream as virtually all of the other countries of Europe” (Shea, April 3, 
1999) with, by implication, an accompanying rise in the standard of living 
towards that of Western Europe. 
Shea reiterates the need for action against these forces of evil. At the same 
time, he revisits the actual expulsion of Kosovar Albanians occurring since 
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NATO began its campaign: 
I would like just to recall a phrase that came to me yesterday 
which I think is very appropriate from Edmund Burke, who 
wrote "Reflections on the Revolution in France" at the end of 
the 18th century: "The only thing necessary for the triumph of 
evil is for good men to do nothing!" and NATO isn't prepared to 
do nothing. We'd rather accept those risks than simply allow 
Milošević to carry on expelling the entire Kosovar Albanian 
population. (Shea, Press Conference, May 16, 1999). 
By referencing Edmund Burke, Shea cleverly impresses his public with his 
erudition, reinforcing his credibility, his intelligence and his ability to 
interpret the situation deeply. The expulsion of Kosovar Albanians is now 
the unquestioned and unavoidable reality (Fairclough, 2003) of the 
conflict. The key message is reiterated: Milošević is evil and it is NATO’s 
job to stop evil even though there are risks involved. This is at the root of 
instability and dysfunctionality and is linked with suggestions that maybe 
Milošević is not a rational being – “it's very difficult for rational people in 
Western democracies to anticipate what irrational people are going to do, 
particularly as President Milošević is a rather silent figure” (Shea, Press 
Conference, April 5, 1999). In fact Milošević’s behaviour deviates 
disturbingly from “rational” democracies in the West: “He doesn't make 
many speeches. He doesn't give State of the Union addresses to his 
Parliament. He doesn't produce government programmes as such. And 
therefore, we don't quite know what he is intending to do and when” 
(Shea, Press Conference, April 5, 1999). 
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This quote is structured around the opposition of rational and irrational. 
And implies that leaders who do not use Western democratic processes are 
or obstructing rational understanding. By painting Milošević as irrational 
(or, at times, mentally ill or insane), Shea is again drawing on a medical 
discourse, this time one of psychiatric disorder (as another dimension of 
instability). By using this interdiscursivity, the personality of Milošević 
provides an explanation for the need to continue the bombing campaign.  
At this point, less than two weeks into the campaign, NATO seemed to 
expect that the initial bombing would bring Milošević to accede to NATO’s 
demands. Therefore an explanation was required as to why the campaign 
needed to continue. Shea draws on previous experience with Milošević 
during the Bosnian war, suggesting that maybe he is not as irrational as he 
is painted: 
Is he an irrational leader? Well, his habit in the past is that 
when he really does see that there is no way out, when he knows 
fully well that the international community is united and fully 
determined, he does, even at the 11th hour - or shall I say the 
11.3/4 hour? - seek a way out so I wouldn't quite credit the idea 
of an irrational leader who is, if you like, going to go down in a 
kind of Wagnerian, if you like, ending. No, I wouldn't do that 
and I think at the end of the day there are enough people 
around Milošević to persuade him to do the opposite, to stop 
that before it happens. (Shea, Press Conference, April 28, 1999) 
In this quote, Shea departs from the original line that only Milošević has 
responsibility for controlling the events in Kosovo, but prefers to posit that 
there is some rationality still within the Yugoslavian regime that will 
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not allow Yugoslavia to be reduced to rubble. An irrational leader would go 
down in a “Wagnerian ending”, another metaphor for the flamboyant, 
irresponsible behaviour that Milošević is demonstrating, one who prolongs 
the systematic bombing of his country. However, by applying the norms of 
Western democracies to Yugoslavia, Shea is determining that there is a 
consensus amongst the Alliance nations about what is and is not rational 
thereby providing a moral argumentation (Habermas, 1975) for consensus 
amongst NATO nations. 
This framing of Milošević as the demon leader, as the personification and 
perpetrator of evil, provides an unequivocal construction of the villain. At 
its most extreme, this delegitimisation effectively denies Milošević his 
humanness (Chilton, 2004). Over time, as the picture is built up of an 
irrational and unreasonable person, who does not subscribe to common 
values but is willing to do anything to maintain his personal power, then 
the villain emerges within the discourse:  
I have lost count of the number of senior envoys from NATO 
and other countries that have visited Belgrade and have tried to 
impress upon Milošević our desire and the rational preference 
for a diplomatic solution. The problem is that it is Milošević 
who doesn't seem to like diplomacy, quite frankly. (Shea, Press 
Conference, April 5, 1999) 
This is an example of how Shea constructs the reasonableness of NATO 
and Western diplomacy in the face of obstructive, irrational behaviour on 
the part of President Milošević. The role of international diplomacy is 
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accepted by reasonable and rational people. Shea represents international 
diplomacy from a realist perspective (L'Etang, 2006b) and is using the 
NATO information platform of the press conferences as a means of 
influencing attitudes and opinions (Signitzer & Coombs, 1992). Shea goes 
on to argue:  
As I have said, he had a golden opportunity just a couple of days 
ago to avoid the situation that he is now in, by signing a Peace 
Agreement at Rambouillet which gave Serbia a great deal, as 
well as of course to the Kosovar Albanians. But instead of 
negotiating, he stonewalled, wanted to re-open everything, and 
then even before the talks had ended, signalled his preference 
for a military solution by restarting his "clean and sweep" 
operations in Kosovo. So, it takes two to tango and it takes two 
to negotiate. But obviously, we would very much hope to start 
diplomacy as quickly as we can. (Shea, Press Conference, April 
5, 1999) 
The simplistic arguments posited here, that Serbia was offered “a great 
deal” and that Milošević “signalled his preference for a military solution” 
buried the complexity of the issues facing Yugoslavia over the problems in 
Kosovo. Shea omits any legitimate interests of the Serbian nation as the 
sovereign power, and the determination of leading NATO powers to 
instigate the bombing campaign. By delegitimising Milošević through 
blame and by making him solely responsible for the situation, NATO 
maintained its own legitimacy in exercising physical coercion on a 
sovereign nation and thus was able to establish “the right to be obeyed” 
(Chilton & Schäffner, 1997, p. 213).  
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By clearly identifying Milošević as the villain of Kosovo, the discourses 
focus on the burden of responsibility through vilification: “Clear 
responsibility for the air strikes lies with President Milošević who has 
refused to stop his violent action in Kosovo and has refused to negotiate in 
good faith” (Solana, Press Statement, March 24, 1999). 
It was NATO’s decision to implement the air strikes and carry them out, 
but this articulation of the air strikes with Milošević makes him alone to 
blame for the hardship, destruction and collateral damage caused by the 
bombing. This position is reiterated many times during the course of the 
campaign: “Let me reiterate once again: NATO is not at war … The 
responsibility for the current crisis rests with President Milošević who has 
refused to stop his violent action in Kosovo and has refused to negotiate in 
good faith” (Solana, Press Statement, March 27, 1999). 
Again, the responsibility lies with Milošević. This time, air strikes are not 
mentioned, but Solana carefully points out that this is not a war between 
nations – it is really only a punishment strike against one person. 
Mccgwire (2000) notes that there was an assumption by NATO that 
Milošević was able to halt the process himself and that no other persons 
were involved. This, in itself, is more than an oversimplification of the 
context and the political process in Yugoslavia. NATO assumed, rightly or 
wrongly, that Milošević was the sole decision-maker and dictator of 
Yugoslavia. Thus, Milošević himself was discursively constructed as the 
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enemy. Mccgwire (2000) states: 
By demonizing one man, ignoring the complexities of Belgrade 
politics and absolving the Serbian people of any blame for the 
policy in Kosovo, NATO political leaders seem to have blinded 
themselves to how the Serbs would react to the threat and 
actuality of a bombing campaign. The Serbs have always been 
proud of their ability to fight in defence of their interests and 
their capacity to absorb punishment. (p. 19) 
The issues raised here by Mccgwire highlight the fact that NATO provides 
no historical context for the discourses other than cursory references to 
earlier events in the break-up of Yugoslavia. The people of Yugoslavia are 
largely ignored in the NATO discourses, except on the basis of the 
insistence at the beginning of the campaign that this was not a war against 
the people of Yugoslavia.  
By suggesting that chaos was the natural order of life in the Balkans, and 
that recent events represented a reversion to a more tribal, primitive 
backwardness based on ancient enmities and ethnic hatreds, NATO’s use 
of metaphor and imagery offered ways to engage the popular imagination 
and reach audiences throughout the Western world. The strategy 
presented the idea of a virtuous bombing campaign for humanitarian 
ideals. In the process NATO repositioned itself from a purely defensive 
organisation so that the Kosovo Campaign simultaneously legitimised its 
intervention as an offensive military force. Such repositioning justified its 
own survival in post-Cold War conditions that no longer required it to act 
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as defender of the non-communist world.  
By introducing a particular construction of reality, NATO persisted with 
discursive efforts to maintain credibility for the specific worldview it 
espoused. As a prominent, credible and trustworthy organisation, NATO 
was fortunate in having some latitude in the way it represented the context 
and the actual situation (Kuusisto, 2004). For target audiences in Europe, 
and especially in the United States, the region of the Balkans in general, 
and Kosovo in particular, were relatively unknown in terms of geography, 
culture, values and ethnicity. As such, the narratives could be framed to 
achieve maximum credibility for the organisation and its actions.  
Conclusion 
These last three chapters have been tracking NATO’s efforts to reposition 
itself from a purely defensive organisation to an offensive military force. 
Such repositioning aimed to justify NATO’s survival in post-Cold War 
conditions that no longer required it to act as defender of the non-
communist world. Following on from chapter seven’s establishment of the 
Kosovo situation as an opportunity for NATO to find a post-Cold War 
identity, chapter eight considered the difficulties of sustaining the 
humanitarian component of that new identity wile simultaneously 
bombing a civilian population.  
Both chapters related NATO’s strategic communication to developments in 
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issues management and organisational legitimation. This chapter 
examined how, as part of NATO’s identity construction and justification, 
NATO spokespeople were able to draw on the deeper cultural contexts of 
the Kosovo issue and to mobilise them in support of their organisation’s 
ends. The next chapter looks at how NATO managed some of this identity 
work in two main ways: the first by avoiding accusations of propaganda 
that would have undercut its whole project; and second, by presenting its 
unique self through a unique messenger.
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CHAPTER 10 
Confronting “the ultimate public relations 
challenge”: Unique message and unique 
messenger 
Propaganda is that branch of the art of lying which 
consists in nearly deceiving your friends without quite 
deceiving your enemies. 
F. M. Cornford, British poet (1886-1960) 
A central question introduced at the beginning of this thesis was: How and 
why do we believe what we believe? What makes us open to receiving 
information in a particular manner and accepting it as truthful and 
credible? Cornford’s quotation refers to an “art” in the use of language, 
which partially answers this question. But it is important to understand 
how language is used to achieve specific aims and thereby increase our 
consciousness of how we are informed, how we form our own opinions and 
avoid the trap of being deceived.  
This chapter presents overarching public relations and information 
challenges that faced NATO in its bid to inform, persuade and rally public 
opinion to support NATO’s actions and its embryonic new identity. When 
communication practices are concerned with information about conflict 
and war, these practices are rarely understood to be public relations 
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activities but are more likely to be labelled as propaganda. Essentially, for 
NATO spokesman Jamie Shea, the ultimate public relations challenge was 
to pre-empt and denounce any information coming out of Belgrade and to 
“occupy the media space” (BBC, 1999) with NATO information. The 
premise, put forward by Shea, was that NATO provided frank and truthful 
information to the public through its media relations and it was the other 
side – Milošević and the Serbs – that delivered propaganda.  
This suggests that, at least in Shea’s mind, there is a clear differentiation 
between propaganda and public relations. The establishment of a clear 
demarcation serves public relations practitioners by maintaining the 
credibility in their dissemination of truthful information. However, since 
public relations itself suffers from a negative reputation (L'Etang, 2006a), 
and public relations professionals are often tainted by the label of “spin 
doctor”, it is the job of the public relations professional to build trust and 
respect amongst the variety of target publics that s/he addresses.  
Propaganda, public relations and spin 
This chapter develops the discussion of the differentiation between 
propaganda and public relations in order to analyse Shea’s references to 
“our” truth and “their” propaganda, and his assertion that NATO did not 
engage in propaganda but was only interested in telling the truth. It is not 
the intention in this chapter to either prove or disprove Shea’s assertion, 
Chapter 10: The ultimate PR challenge 
 
239 
but rather to analyse the output of the NATO information section to see 
whether such a distinction has any relevance in this study. 
For Taylor (2003), propaganda is the “deliberate attempt to persuade 
people to think and behave in a desired way” (p. 6) [italics in original] and 
public relations is simply a nicer way of describing it. Since the process is 
deliberate, the core meaning of propaganda refers to the intent of those 
who use it. Rather than making an argument as to whether an information 
campaign is propaganda or not, or whether it is positive or negative, Taylor 
argues that “one needs to redirect any moral judgement away from the 
propaganda process itself and more to the intentions and goals of those 
employing propaganda to secure those intentions and goals” (p. 8).  
This usefully suggests that the source of the information should be 
identifiable and that the stance taken should reflect the position of the 
organisation disseminating the material and is in line with thinking on 
propaganda in standard accounts (Jowett & O'Donnell, 1992). That view is 
central to the argument of this thesis that NATO, as an organisation, can 
be assessed in terms of its intentions and goals on the strength of its 
information/public relations campaign during the Kosovo crisis.  
O’Shaughnessey (2004) claims that it is often difficult to distinguish 
propaganda from other forms of persuasive discourse, except 
retrospectively, since “propaganda in the social environment is often 
‘naturalised’ and we are unaware of it” (p. 2). Therefore, defining 
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propaganda does not necessarily provide any clarification for identifying 
the type of communication being undertaken by the organisation, but it is 
only through later analysis that an organisation is charged with using 
propaganda, or simply utilising propaganda techniques. Moloney (2006) 
argues that all public relations is simply “weak propaganda” and comes in 
a variety of formats as a “Niagara of spin” (p. 1).  
L’Etang (2006a) argues that the discussion about propaganda has “itself 
become propagandised” (p. 28). This discussion, she suggests, is less 
conceptual and more politically driven and has more to do with the 
speaker than the actual occurrences that are being described. There is no 
doubt, in NATO’s case, that spokesman Dr Jamie Shea, played a major role 
in the credibility of the information campaign directed by NATO. In this 
role he played an integral part in the success of maintaining positive public 
opinion until the end of the 78 day bombing campaign. Furthermore, he 
was joined by two of the best political communicators of the late 20th 
century, President Bill Clinton of the United States and Prime Minister 
Tony Blair of the United Kingdom, both of whom were passionately in 
favour of bombing Yugoslavia. 
Perception management 
In considering these aspects of the public relations/propaganda debate it is 
useful to incorporate the term “perception management” as it is used in 
information operations as part of a military campaign. Reid (2002) 
Chapter 10: The ultimate PR challenge 
 
241 
argues that it does not matter whether it is called perception management, 
marketing or spin doctoring, for it is really corporate public relations 
techniques that are utilised as the key elements in information operations 
“and as a cornerstone of 4th generation warfare” (Reid, 2002, p. 51). 
Perception management is about “shaping” the information space during 
conflict and war and “targets the human dimension in politics and conflict 
in a way that kinetic weapons cannot” (Dearth, 2002, p. 2). It can also be 
part of the “influence operations” of information warfare but, as Taylor 
(2002) points out, “perception management may well be yet another 
pseudonym for propaganda” (p. 25). It involves a number of 
communication practices including public diplomacy, media relations, 
PSYOPS (psychological operations, including leaflets, broadcasts and 
loudspeakers), and “soft” power (the use of cultural and educational 
relations between countries). Taking these aspects together, it is crucial 
that the source of the information be seen as credible and that the target 
audiences are willing to believe what they are told (Taylor, 2002).  
In terms of NATO’s efforts to stake out a claim for the hearts and minds of 
the Serbian people during the Kosovo conflict, the credibility of the 
organisation suffered in that they were seen simply as “the enemy” (see, 
for instance, Hromic & Deckert, 1999; Ignatieff, 2000; Prentice, 2000; 
Seierstad, 2006). This thesis argues that NATO was less concerned with 
perceptions and understanding amongst the Serbian people. As a 
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consequence, the lack of research, understanding and environmental 
scanning of the Balkans and its history resulted in a completely 
unsuccessful strategy to encourage the Serbian population to support 
NATO and its efforts to undermine the power of President Milošević in 
Serbia.  
NATO’s public relations efforts in Yugoslavia included the air distribution 
of more than 100 million leaflets over Serbian cities and warnings to 
Yugoslav forces in Kosovo to flee before an attack (Taylor, 2003). Jamie 
Shea would not discuss these particular aspects of the campaign but 
insisted instead that it was a part of the military operation rather than the 
information operation (Press Conference, May 30, 1999).  
In spite of repeated claims – by NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana, 
SACEUR General Wesley Clark and Shea – that NATO was not at war with 
the Yugoslav people, Serbian people rallied around President Milošević. 
The leaflets dropped by NATO planes focused on the same claim, but to no 
avail. Instead, the population rallied to Milošević and a new slogan 
encouraged the population to new patriotic fervour. “We are all targets” 
encouraged civilians to demonstrate on the main bridges in Belgrade to 
prevent NATO bombing the bridges as military targets. This was in direct 
opposition to scenes a year earlier when there had been month-long street 
demonstrations in Belgrade for the removal of Milošević from power 
(Taylor, 2003). This suggests that the efforts of NATO were either 
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misguided, or ill-planned or simply ineffective and that there was little 
accurate knowledge of the target audience. 
Furthermore, as Taylor (2002) points out, the Serbian population had 
access to a wide range of Western media outlets such as CNN, BBC World 
and Sky News that failed to ignite any significant support for the Western 
Alliance’s perspective because it was seen to be associated blindly with the 
NATO information line (Seierstad, 2006; S. Taylor, 2000). For Serbian 
civilians, NATO was attacking them because they were Serbs fighting for 
their historic rights in Kosovo.  
For NATO’s main target audiences, the Alliance nations, it was the scenes 
of thousands of refugees fleeing their homes allegedly because of Serb 
atrocities, which was the perceived reality that contributed to the 
maintenance of positive public opinion about the bombing campaign. This 
may be the crux of the matter. It was more important for NATO to 
maintain its relations with its own publics than it was to win hearts and 
minds in Serbia for, after all, those are the publics who indirectly fund and 
support NATO as an organisation and who will ultimately decide its fate in 
the future.  
The personal is political communication: The case of Jamie 
Shea 
NATO spokesman, Dr. Jamie Shea, must be credited with much of the 
success of NATO’s media and public relations campaign and 
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undoubtedly became a media celebrity during the campaign. As Scott 
Taylor (2000) observes: 
When NATO officials first visited the war-ravaged Kosovo 
capital, the ethnic Albanian residents of Pristina hailed the 
delegation as ‘liberators’. Ironically, it wasn’t NATO Secretary-
General Javier Solana or General Wesley Clark upon whom the 
adulation was bestowed, but rather on the Alliance’s 
spokesman, Jamie Shea, who was held aloft and cheered as the 
conquering hero. (p. 113) 
Shea was seen to be the harbinger of good news for Kosovar Albanians: 
success in the bombing campaign, reiteration of NATO demands, and the 
“liberator” of the territory. Taylor (2000) notes that it was this gratitude 
on the part of the Albanians that “indicates how perception has overtaken 
other fundamental values in shaping world opinion. Information has 
become the most devastating weapon, and the media the most potent 
delivery system in modern warfare” (p. 113). 
For the Serbs, on the other hand, the bombing of their country was seen 
via a “Jamie Shea lens” of which Shea himself was very aware: “I appeared 
on Serb Television many times during the Kosovo air campaign but as a 
hate figure and a basis for caricature” (Shea, 2004, pp. 109-110).  
Both these examples suggest that Shea was more than simply a 
spokesperson for an organisation. Other spokespeople, particularly in the 
United States, also appeared daily at press briefings (e.g. Ken Bacon at the 
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Pentagon and James Rubin at the State Department) but did not reach the 
celebrity status of Shea in Brussels. As he himself stated: “I went through 
the Kosovan crisis and got my 78 days of fame” (cited in Kirk, 2003).  
This fame was the subject of a number of articles in the British press 
during the Kosovo Campaign. For Simon Hattenstone of the Guardian, 
Shea had been an “unknown spokesman withering away in Brussels” who 
then became the star of the show: 
Jamie Shea is having the war of a lifetime. Here he is 
conducting his daily briefing and the journalists gaze in awe. An 
audience with Jamie Shea. A little bit of information, a few 
purple passages, the odd hint of black propaganda, a smattering 
of jokes, and a whole load of ego-tickling seduction. You suspect 
the journalists would have paid for a seat in the stalls. 
(Hattenstone, 1999, para. 2) 
Setting and credibility 
It was these press conferences that were the stage for the Shea daily 
briefings. Knightley (2002) observed: “Shea and the NATO officers were 
on a podium with high-tech equipment for displaying images to illustrate 
their points – maps, film from cockpit cameras, gun and bomb sight and 
target details” (p. 503). Their position contrasted markedly with the 
journalists who “sat below the podium in rows of seats like in a classroom 
[and] like in school, they had to attract the attention of the podium to ask a 
question” (p. 503). It was little wonder that he concluded from “a 
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psychological viewpoint, there was no doubt about who was in control” 
(Knightley, 2002, p. 503).  
This particular architecture provides yet another context for the delivery of 
text and talk. Its influence on the participants can only be gauged by the 
success of the public relations campaign overall. The control exerted over 
the information, as well as who would be chosen to ask questions (Chilton, 
2004; Chilton & Schäffner, 1997) provided the NATO spokesman with an 
unusually compliant audience.  
More than 400 journalists had converged on NATO headquarters in 
Brussels in the first week of the operation (Skoco & Woodger, 2000) 
providing NATO with a captive audience for its own particular worldview. 
As Louw (2001) observes: “Wars now have been designed as media events 
which, if all goes according to plan, strengthen the dominance of the ruling 
hegemony by generating a ‘feel good factor’ and enhancing legitimacy for 
the ruling alliance” (p. 179). This dominance of the media space 
contributed significantly to the readiness amongst the citizens of the 
Alliance countries to consent to the decisions being made on their behalf, 
especially since they were fed a daily diet of information on the number of 
sorties flown, damage assessments and optimistic scenarios.  
From a critical political approach (Trujillo & Toth, 1987) to the public 
relations practices employed during press conferences, NATO was able to 
maintain and enhance its power and credibility as an authoritative and 
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acceptable organisation (Chilton, 2004; Chilton & Schäffner, 1997), 
carrying out the policies of its member governments on behalf of their 
citizens. The campaign was initiated and executed in the name of the 
NATO Alliance as a whole. Significantly, at no point during the 78 days of 
the air campaign, did any NATO member repudiate the attacks. 
The daily press conferences served to inform these publics of the nature of 
the results of the decision-makers. Ongoing operations reached a stage 
where there was very little criticism or heated discussion of the campaign 
in the mainstream media (Hammond & Herman, 2000; P. M. Taylor, 
2000a). Apart from a few querulous articles in the mainstream press 
(Hammond, 1999b; Watson, 1999), on the Internet (www.stratfor.com ; 
www.transnational.org; www.zmag.org) and in critical news monthlies 
(see for instance, Chomsky, 1999a; Ramonet, 1999), most op-ed articles 
supported the position of NATO. 
Although the format of the press conferences always required a uniformed 
military spokesman as well, it was Shea who dominated the conferences 
and developed beneficial relations with journalists and media 
representatives. His autobiographical details confirm his skill as a 
spokesperson with an academic background of a doctorate from Oxford, 
adjunct professorships at a number of European and American 
universities, a fluent speaker in five languages and the author of scholarly 
works on NATO and European interests. However, it was his manner 
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rather than his academic qualifications that proved to be the most effective 
element during his time as spokesman for NATO. Also, much comment 
was made concerning Shea’s “flat vowels” and East London accent, 
suggesting that credibility and authenticity were enhanced by the 
“common touch” of this particular spokesman.  
This again raises the question: how and why do we believe what we 
believe? Aristotle (1952) believed a speaker’s personal character makes 
persuasion possible because they are considered credible. People believe a 
person of good character. In this case, is it because the spokesman exhibits 
a credibility that may be lacking in others? Does the fact that the same 
person appears and builds relationships over a lengthy period make a 
difference to the way the information is received? Did Shea’s warm 
relationship with the correspondents in Brussels influence the way they 
reported the facts?  
Messenger and message: Personalisation and 
professionalisation 
For Steven Pearlstein of the Washington Post, Shea’s persuasive influence 
was a decisive force in the campaign to stop Milošević:  
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In contrast to the other weapons used in NATO’s high-tech war 
against Yugoslavia, Jamie Shea is an anachronism, a rhetorical 
Gatling gun in en era of precision-guided munitions and poll-
tested political manipulations. … Every day at 3 p.m., Shea, 45, 
would wade through a platoon of television cameras, some 
hapless general in tow, and unleash another verbal barrage 
against Milošević and his campaign of ethnic cleansing. The 
daily ‘Punch and Judy show’ as he called it, was an idiosyncratic 
blend of press briefing, homily, university lecture and theatrical 
performance ... His voice would alternate between lip-curling 
sarcasm and moral indignation as he likened Milošević to Harry 
Houdini, Louis XIV, Al Capone and Sadaam Hussein. 
(Pearlstein, 1999) 
Through Shea’s personalisation and complete identification with the 
Kosovo Campaign, he was “the actor in the drama” (Castells, 1997,p. 322). 
The fact that he outshone both the other key personalities in the Kosovo 
conflict reinforces Castells’ statement that “the messenger becomes the 
message” (1997, p. 322). Neither Javier Solana nor General Wesley Clark 
could claim the same level of authenticity and credibility. Alastair 
Campbell, former spokesman for British Prime Minister Tony Blair, 
remarks that: 
Jamie was seen, rightly, as a real person talking to real people. 
They believed him. That’s why at the end of the day, as he might 
say, he was so effective. … to the public, he was an honest bloke 
telling them what he knew, reassuring them that we were doing 
the right things, and making clear that any refugee tuning in 
should stay tuned, and stay hopeful. And they did. (Campbell, 
1999, p. 36) 
Shea was the acceptable face of NATO, the human face of an impersonal 
high altitude bombing campaign. He represented a military 
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organisation, yet was a civilian. He used military terminology, discussed 
bombing assessments and military strategy while drawing out the 
emotions of the audience with his verbal imagery, elegant literary 
quotations and professional conduct on the podium. At the end of the 
campaign, it was Shea who was carried aloft by ethnic Albanians in the 
Kosovo capital of Pristina and hailed as the hero. He is the man, 
remembered in Serbia today, as not only the voice of NATO, but the main 
perpetrator of the dreadful days of bombing in 1999 (Blagojevic, Z., 
personal communication, May 26, 2006). So, how was this achieved and 
maintained over such a long period requiring daily briefings, interviews 
and press conferences? 
The professionalisation of political communication in the hands of media 
experts is often believed to influence the public in a negative manner. 
Instead of educated and informed discussion of the issues, with the 
strongest rational argument achieving some kind of public consensus, it is 
the media experts, trained in message development, advertising, image 
building, etc. who dominate and persuade publics of the rationality and 
rightness of their messages (Peri, 2004; Roper, 2005a). These 
communication professionals who construct the discourses are the 
discourse technologists (Fairclough, 1989, 1992, 1995b; Motion & Leitch, 
1996) who “sell” the messages to the consumers (Roper, 2005a).  
This chapter maintains that Shea, as both spokesman and discourse 
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technologist was, in fact, the central identity of NATO’s military operation 
in Kosovo. Since there could be little doubt of NATO’s military superiority 
and its ability to call on any number of resources, it was Shea who 
successfully positioned the organisation to achieve maximum positive 
media coverage and thereby maintain popular public opinion.  
Operationalising an organisational “self” 
Cheney and Christensen (2001a) observe that an organisation’s public 
relations activities work towards the establishment of the organisation’s 
“unique self” (p. 234) while, at the same time, taking into account the 
concerns of target audiences. In this case, Jamie Shea became the “unique 
self” of NATO with the identity of the organisation being concentrated 
within the persona of the spokesman. His abilities in discourse production 
were evident throughout the 78 days of the campaign. 
In particular, Shea’s use of literary quotes and references to celebrities 
provided his journalist audience with quotes and sound bites to better 
express and illustrate NATO’s position during the campaign. One such 
example is from the press conference on April 7 in which Shea recounts a 
story he heard from Strobe Talbott, the US Deputy Secretary of State, in 
which a woman had described the sound of NATO jet engines in the skies 
above Kosovo as “the sound of angels”. Shea’s comment to this was, “I 
could never have put it so eloquently.” 
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However, one of Shea’s laments about NATO’s media operations was that 
whereas President Milošević controlled the pictures, he had to try to make 
up for the lack of pictures by grabbing media attention with his own brand 
of infotainment. This reinforced the uniqueness of the organisation and of 
the air campaign itself. Although Shea himself acknowledged he had the 
words, he grudged Milošević having the images: “I’m going to be honest, I 
would have given up all my Shakespeare quotations, my quotations from 
Edmund Burke, from Frank Sinatra and the Beatles for one or two good 
pictures that illustrated our side of the story” (Shea, 2000b). 
Shea’s total self-identification with the campaign and his determination to 
maintain public opinion with NATO is illustrated extensively throughout 
the press conferences. He was certainly instrumental in articulating the 
NATO military organisation with humanitarian aims to produce a new 
discourse of humanitarian intervention. As he later wrote: “NATO had to 
be able not only to take care of Milošević but also to show the other side of 
NATO as a humanitarian organization building refugee camps able to take 
care of these victims” (Shea, 2000b). 
Shea attempts to present NATO as indeed a unique organisation – one that 
marries military intervention with humanitarian aims. The ambiguity in 
the use of the verb “to take care of Milošević” and later, “to take care of 
these victims” illustrates this “unique self” that differentiated NATO from 
all the other European organisations – humanitarian, military, political or 
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economic – and allowed the organisation to reach its original objectives in 
this campaign. NATO has two arms – one to take care in the military sense 
and one to take care in the humanitarian sense. Shea helped to maintain 
this as a dominant public relations strategy that played out over the 78 
days of the campaign. 
However, it was not only Jamie Shea who was responsible for media 
relations and dissemination of information. The military wing of NATO, 
SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe) also provided 
spokespeople for the press conferences. 
SHAPE spokesmen in the media campaign 
Every press briefing at NATO headquarters included a spokesman from 
SHAPE. These spokesmen represented General Wesley Clark (SACEUR) at 
the media press conferences. In the first weeks of the campaign, this 
representative was Air Commodore David Wilby of the Royal Air Force. 
The SHAPE spokesman provided the military updates of the activities of 
NATO before Shea took over the general briefing.  
Over the course of the campaign, there were changes in SHAPE personnel. 
The first instance was when Wilby was replaced briefly by Colonel Konrad 
Freytag, the Chief of Public Information at SHAPE. This replacement was 
on the orders of the Secretary-General after several mistakes had been 
made by the SHAPE public affairs office. Freytag took over the briefings 
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until a replacement spokesman, General Guiseppe Marani from the Italian 
Air Force, was appointed on April 14, the same day as the first major 
incidence of collateral damage, which will be discussed in Chapter 12. 
Another Italian, Commander Fabrizio Maltini, from the Italian Navy also 
appeared from time to time to update the press on NATO’s humanitarian 
efforts.  
For the three days of the NATO Summit in Washington, Colonel Freytag 
accompanied Jamie Shea to the podium for press briefings and then 
Marani returned to provide the daily updates again in Brussels. On 3 May, 
Marani was replaced by General Walter Jertz of the German Air Force who 
continued the SHAPE briefings until the end of the conflict. Although the 
nationalities of the spokesmen may not have any particular meaning or 
substance, it is important to point out that they represented two nations – 
Italy and Germany – both of which were recognised as having difficulties 
in persuading their publics of the legitimacy of the air campaign. It is 
beyond the scope of this research to delve any deeper into the reasons 
behind these appointments but it is sufficient to note the point. 
Public relations: Strategies and tactics  
The central strategy of articulating the NATO military discourse with a 
humanitarian discourse is evident throughout the NATO briefings. From 
the outset of the Kosovo Campaign, NATO had articulated the military 
with the humanitarian as a means of justification for the aerial 
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bombardment. Bombing was a means of coercing the Yugoslav state to 
accede to the demands of NATO. The articulation of the two discourses 
promoted a new, valid discourse domain of military humanitarianism, 
which provided a means of legitimising NATO and delegitimising the 
Yugoslav government. It was also a means of controlling the discourse in 
order to maintain favourable public opinion (Chilton, 2004).  
This strategy can be illustrated by analysing the press conference 
conducted by Jamie Shea, together with Air Commodore David Wilby on 
April 5, 1999. The analysis identifies several of the tactics used to 
implement the discourse strategy. This press conference was at a crucial 
point in the air campaign. It had now become obvious that a few days of 
bombing was not likely to coerce President Milošević into withdrawing his 
forces from Kosovo; the weather was getting better, thus allowing more 
NATO sorties to be flown; and the numbers of Kosovar Albanians leaving 
Kosovo had increased significantly. 
The conference opens with Wilby describing NATO’s military activities by 
notifying the listeners that the bombing campaign has been stepped up 
another notch and affirming that NATO is keeping to its strategic mission. 
He does not elaborate on the particular targets of the bombing raids, but 
instead moves very quickly into positioning NATO as the backbone of the 
humanitarian effort: 
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NATO has also increased efforts to assist in addressing the 
disaster and human misery created by President Milošević in 
Kosovo and exported to the neighbouring countries. NATO 
military forces on the ground in Albania and FYROM [Federal 
Yugoslav republic of Macedonia] are conducting operations in 
direct support of the governments’ and human relief 
organisations’ activities; we are doing this to alleviate the 
human suffering and to ensure the safety and well being of the 
deportees until they are allowed to return to their homes. 
(Wilby, Press Conference, April 5, 1999) 
Wilby, a high-ranking officer in the British Air Force, has clearly identified 
the role of NATO as a humanitarian support system for the relief of 
suffering. The discourse that is prominent in this section of the press 
conference is clearly about humanitarian aid for those suffering 
displacement. The use of the word “deportees” is an example of manifest 
intertextuality, which draws on earlier other texts that exhibit clear 
connotations with the deportations during the Nazi era in World War II. 
This example of intertextuality draws on shared meanings amongst the 
target publics in Western Europe who may themselves have experienced 
such deportations or are, at least, aware of recent European history.  
In reference to NATO’s efforts in “addressing the disaster and human 
misery created by President Milošević”, Wilby asserts the responsibility of 
just one person in an attempt to maintain the line that NATO is not 
conducting operations against the Yugoslav people, but only against their 
President. The text, as it has been produced, makes an attempt to separate 
the two entities even though the targets for the bombing campaign are 
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definitely associated with the population living in these particular areas.  
Personalising the humanitarian angle 
As a further illustration of this key strategy of positioning NATO as a 
humanitarian organisation, the press conference continues with Jamie 
Shea taking over the briefing with the following statements: “I would like 
to focus my briefing on the humanitarian situation. As you know, NATO 
wants to be a good Samaritan to all of the refugees and displaced persons 
that have been forcibly expelled from Kosovo in recent days” (Shea, Press 
Conference, April 5, 1999). 
He goes on to enumerate all the different activities that NATO is involved 
with and the help it is giving to the international relief organisations. In 
this selection of text, it is notable that Shea does not repeat Wilby’s 
assertion that the people involved are deportees but rather refers to them 
in the normal parlance of war and conflict: displaced persons and refugees, 
although he does make a nod towards the underlying meaning of 
deportation in that the same people have been “forcibly expelled”. By 
positioning NATO as the good Samaritan, Shea is reinforcing the 
identification of NATO with humanitarianism and is articulating the 
military discourse with the humanitarian one.  
In the following section, Shea talks about the deployment of NATO forces: 
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At the same time we are actively planning for a small, but 
significant NATO troop presence in Albania … to be able to 
provide immediate practical assistance. Already, certain 
advance elements, however, have been deployed on a national 
basis in advance of the formal activation order for this Force 
from the North Atlantic Council. There are some Greek forces, 
some Italian forces, and the United States has also now sent a 
force of 35 that have arrived at Tirana airport and are already 
installing equipment to offload refugee supplies from incoming 
aircraft. (Shea, Press Conference, April 5, 1999) 
This provides an example of interdiscursivity where the military discourse 
is used in this description of humanitarian assistance. The features of this 
text are clearly associated with military language: significant troop 
presence; advance elements; deployed; formal activation order. The 
movement between military and humanitarian objectives is apparently 
seamless in that the discourses fit nicely together with no apparent 
barriers.  
All these facilitate the perception that the organisation is taking a stand on 
humanitarian issues and NATO is doing so “with a distinctiveness that 
allows the organization to create and legitimize itself, its particular ‘profile’ 
and its advantageous position” (Cheney & Christensen, 2001a, p. 241). By 
linking the two aspects of its role, NATO is claiming a distinct identity and 
“unique self” (Cheney & Christensen, 2001a) that distinguishes it from 
other organisations in Europe. This acts to position NATO in terms of the 
European Union as well as in terms of a possible development of a Rapid 
Deployment Force in Europe, and so reinforces the way the organisation 
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legitimises itself as both a military and humanitarian organisation.  
A further example, from a later press conference, illustrates the separation 
of the military and humanitarian discourses. This suggests that the public 
relations strategy being used in the press conferences is adapted to the 
circumstances and can therefore be fluid, depending on the questions 
asked, so that the text (or evidence) is constructed as a coherent and 
aligned argument. In the following example from the press conference on 
April 29, the question is posed: “If NATO’s been so successful in 
suppressing the Yugoslav air defences, why hasn’t some kind of air-drop 
mission been undertaken?” (Bill Drozdiak, Washington Post). Shea’s 
answer is an explanation of the difference between the military arm and 
the humanitarian mission: 
The military are still looking at planning and various options for 
trying to bring some kind of assistance but we do not believe 
that air drops can be a panacea. It would be wonderful if they 
could be but they can’t, not just because of the operational risks 
that NATO aircraft would be faced with …these C-130 aircraft 
that would be responsible for air drops would have to go in very 
low to be certain of being able to see the people that they are 
meant to be dropping the food to and would have to fly quite 
slowly because it’s very difficult to do an accurate drop if you’re 
flying at supersonic speeds. (Shea, Press Conference, April 29, 
1999) 
This is obviously a difficult question for Shea to answer. On the one hand 
he is explaining why the idea of providing humanitarian assistance 
through the use of relief air drops cannot be implemented while, at the 
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same time, he is misrepresenting (Chilton, 2004) at least one side of the 
situation. If NATO had indeed wiped out the Yugoslav air defences there 
would be no problem with flying in air drops of food. However, Shea is 
explicit that the planes doing air drops would need to fly slowly and rather 
low. What is most interesting, however, given the fact that there are still 
many displaced people in Kosovo who need humanitarian aid, together 
with the claim that air defences have been eliminated in the region, NATO 
is not prepared to institute air drops of food because of the dangers for 
low-flying aircraft. 
Shea fudges the issue of the destroyed air defences that should allow for 
low-flying planes to aid the humanitarian effort by suggesting a solution to 
the overall problem: 
The best way of achieving the result is obviously to stop the 
violence. I keep coming back to this point. Why are there people 
who are hungry, why are there people living in the hills? 
Because they’ve been force out by the Serb security forces. As 
long as the fighting carries on, we may be able to feed one group 
in place X but then of course see more ethnic cleansing going on 
in place Y, it would be a never-ending business. … We have to 
stop the violence, that’s the only way to start reversing this 
humanitarian situation and therefore we’ve got to keep our eye 
on the air operation, intensifying it, putting the pressure on the 
Serb forces. (Shea, Press Conference, April 29, 1999) 
Here again, Shea is hedging. After building up a picture of NATO as a 
humanitarian organisation involved in the provision of aid to tens of 
thousands of displaced people, he does not want the organisation to be 
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perceived as not following through with the aid that had been promised at 
the Washington Summit on 21st April. Furthermore, he is “defocusing” 
(Chilton, 2004, p. 46) on the presumed lack of air defences by generalising 
the humanitarian aid effort in which NATO is involved. 
The spokesman manages these issues as they arise through constructing 
the discourse to portray the organisation in the best light possible and to 
align it clearly with the current socio-cultural values and worldviews of its 
publics. Shea has been concerned with “shaping the attitudes the audience 
hold toward the organization” and “the audience or public becomes 
something that is ‘pursued’ with the goals of understanding, persuasion 
and control” (Cheney & Christensen, 2001a, p. 239). It is important for 
NATO that its publics see it as pursuing the correct path in its approach to 
the humanitarian situation in Kosovo, while at the same time embracing 
the military option of coercion in order to alleviate the humanitarian 
suffering as described by the organisation.  
Other tactics implemented in the press conferences include daily bomb 
damage assessments (BDA) and lists of atrocities attributed to the Serb 
forces on the ground in Kosovo. This became particularly evident following 
the establishment of the Media Operations Centre (MOC) after the first 
major case of collateral damage. This aspect will be discussed in more 
depth in Chapter 12.  
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Strategies of legitimisation are positive constructions of the self and 
delegitimisation of the other through negative constructions (Chilton, 
2004). As noted above, the articulation of the military with the 
humanitarian discourse provided a legitimisation strategy for the 
organisation to be seen in a positive light. It was not only performing its 
main task as a military organisation, but also acting on current moral 
values to provide a humanitarian response to the situation. 
One of the major tactics within the production of the press conferences 
and the construction of the discourses was to use the theme of Serbian 
atrocities as an on-going accompaniment to the bombing damage 
assessment and the humanitarian aid. This included not only the reported 
evidence of mass graves, burned houses and rape camps, but also 
summary executions, human shields, deportations, or the separation of 
men from their families. The majority of press conferences dealt with at 
least one or two of these issues on a daily basis. For example, on April 10, 
Shea draws a grim picture of life within Kosovo: 
Unfortunately, the ethnic cleansing continues. I think all of you 
have seen, like I have, the distressing, almost unbelievable 
pictures unfortunately not in the movies but in real life, of 
another village which was ethnically cleansed yesterday, about 
50 miles from the Albanian frontier. Again, the usual story 
which is now becoming the daily routine of everybody being 
stripped of their identity cards, their valuables, whatever, being 
frog-marched to the border and then pushed over. 
Chapter 10: The ultimate PR challenge 
 
263 
In this quote, the distress of the people in Kosovo is the basis of everyday 
life. Shea recognises that there may be some compassion fatigue amongst 
viewers and listeners and reminds the audience that this is not the movies 
but is real life. Furthermore, it is real life that is happening all the time. It 
is “the usual story” and the “daily routine” of atrocities. It is presented as a 
factual picture of daily life, and yet it is an emotional appeal to the 
sensibilities of the audience since the only evidence produced for these 
stories are accounts from the refugees crossing out of Kosovo.  
This raises the question posed at the beginning of this chapter as to 
whether there is a line between propaganda and public relations. Using 
atrocity stories is a recognised form of propaganda, used effectively by the 
British against the Germans in World War I and since then, a common 
dimension in propaganda. Taylor’s (2003) contention that it is the 
intention behind the statements that determines whether it is propaganda, 
suggests that the use of atrocity stories was intended to reinforce NATO’s 
articulation of military and humanitarian discourse domains.  
However, at the end of the bombing campaign, it was found that many of 
the stories disseminated from the podium in Brussels were merely that, 
stories, and appeared to have little substance in fact (Gilan, 2000; Goff, 
1999; Hammond, 1999a, 1999b; Hammond & Herman, 2000). 
Furthermore, the bomb damage assessment data, which was delivered at 
each of the press conferences, were also found to be somewhat inflated 
Chapter 10: The ultimate PR challenge 
 
264 
when the conflict was over (Barry & Thomas, 2000; Halimi & Vidal, 2000; 
Reporters sans frontières, 1999).  
Taking into account that mistakes are made in “the fog of war”, the 
problem of verifying facts on the ground during the conflict was difficult. 
At the beginning of the bombing, President Milošević had banned most 
foreign journalists from Yugoslavia and those who remained were tainted 
by the fact that they had been given permission to remain. This meant that 
there were few alternative information sources for audiences to access 
(other than official Yugoslav websites) and therefore there was little to 
contest.  
Following Weaver et al. (2006), this situation presumes that if it is 
propaganda then it is counter to the public interest, but if it is public 
relations, then it works for the public interest. Within this context, the 
analysis suggests that even when facts are not necessarily true, they can 
work towards the construction of a particular reality and neither be for, 
nor against, the public interest. 
As Jowett and O’Donnell (1992) suggest, if the source of the information is 
identified and the stance taken reflects the position of the organisation, 
NATO can only be judged in terms of moral evaluation (Fairclough, 2003) 
in its use of questionable data. As O’Shaughnessey (2004) points out, 
identifying points of propaganda does not necessarily clarify a situation, 
but can definitely cloud it. This supports Moloney (2006) who argues 
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that all public relations is simply “weak propaganda” (p. 1). In the next 
chapter, this theme is developed further with a discussion of framing 
discourses and constructing social reality using ideas from public relations.  
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CHAPTER 11 
Offensive defence: Framing, public relations 
and the politics of humanitarianism 
As Mackey (2006) points out, framing is a “process controlled, or at least 
strongly influenced by the intentions of those with power over the means 
of communication” (p. 2), This chapter builds on Mackey’s insight in 
relation to Kosovo, and Owen’s (1984) use of thematic repetition, to 
examine how framing, and access to the commanding heights of the means 
of communication, enables those with communicative power to convert 
that to ideological power through winning the consent of publics.  
More specifically, it focuses on how NATO’s discourses frame the 
intervention in Kosovo in line with a particular Western worldview and 
emphasise the aspects of intervention that coincide with the beliefs and 
values of key publics. It goes on to suggest that such framing assists the 
exercise of power in ideological terms by winning the consent of these 
publics. In analysing the ideological underpinnings of this framing, the 
chapter identifies particular elements within the discourses that convey 
this worldview.  
The job of the disseminators of particular worldviews is to make them 
appear natural, or common sense (Hall, 1986). Once a disseminated 
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version of reality is widely accepted as reality, then it becomes extremely 
difficult to operate outside, or to contest, that version as anything other 
than reality itself. In Fairclough’s (1992) terms, when ideologies are 
“embedded in the discursive practices” (p. 87), they are at their most 
effective so that, for example, when a government’s claim that the nation is 
in danger of going bankrupt is accepted by that nation’s population, it 
become unrealistic (or even unthinkable) to raise wages or lower taxes. 
In examining NATO’s discursive work in terms of framing, this chapter 
addresses two central issues in the debate about Kosovo: the intervention’s 
legitimacy in terms of international law; and its ethics, by asking the 
follow-up question, if the operation was not legitimate, was it “illegal but 
moral”? (see Kaufman, 1999; Koskenniemi, 2002; Woodward, 2001). The 
chapter argues that by framing the intervention in humanitarian terms, 
NATO’s discursive strategy attempts to legitimise, in terms of public 
opinion, the use of military force in an offensive operation in ways that 
promote it with positive perceptions of the organisation. It further 
contends that NATO’s framing of the war in Kosovo as a humanitarian 
intervention, or more precisely, as a war to prevent a “humanitarian 
catastrophe” was unique.  
Framing discourses 
The framing of reality is often discussed in terms of the hegemonic or 
ideological processes inherent in it. From a Habermasian perspective, 
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“communicative reason is constantly under attack in the present social and 
political milieu by the ‘strategic action’ of the dominant commercial and 
political power blocks” (Mackey, 2006). This advantages those who have 
the means of framing the issue in ways that allow them greater resources 
for creating, adjusting and/or defending dominant meaning.  
This chapter draws on Entman’s (1993) definition of framing as a basis for 
understanding how discourses are framed: “To frame is to select some 
aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem 
definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation for the item described” (Entman, 1993, p. 52) [italics in 
original]. 
In earlier chapters, the thesis has illustrated how NATO promoted its 
selective view of the Kosovo intervention as a humanitarian one. This was 
discussed in chapter eight in terms of the way that NATO coped with the 
huge outflow of refugees. However, even when the frame’s particular 
construction of reality has been introduced, the framers need to make 
ongoing discursive efforts to maintain the credibility of this particular 
worldview as circumstances change. This chapter analyses these ongoing 
discursive strategies in terms of the challenges faced and how NATO was 
able to maintain its credibility through to the end of the conflict.  
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There have been few cases of states taking military action under the guise 
of humanitarian intervention. Apart from Kosovo in 1999, the other two 
notable interventions for humanitarian reasons were: the United States 
intervention in Somalia in December 1992; and the Australian-led 
intervention in East Timor in 1999. Both these interventions were 
mandated by United Nations Security Council resolutions and were 
legitimised by their respective governments as humanitarian interventions 
(Wheeler & Dunne, 2004).  
The intervention in Kosovo was discussed by the Security Council and two 
resolutions were passed. The first, UNSCR 1160 (1998) on March 31, 1998 
stated that the UNSC would keep a watching brief on the situation in 
Kosovo and emphasised “that failure to make constructive progress 
towards the peaceful resolution of the situation in Kosovo will lead to the 
consideration of additional measures” (United Nations Security Council, 
1998a). In the second resolution, adopted in September of that year, the 
UNSC decided “should the concrete measures demanded in this resolution 
and resolution 1160 (1998) not be taken, that it would consider further 
action and additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability 
in the region” (United Nations Security Council, 1998b). This second 
resolution expressed concern about the deteriorating humanitarian 
situation and it called on both the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the 
Albanian leadership in Kosovo “to avert the impending humanitarian 
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catastrophe”. 
Neither of these resolutions refers to any military action, nor do they 
mention NATO as an interested party. Furthermore, the use of military 
force for what was claimed to be legitimate humanitarian goals, actively 
breached the United Nations conventions on sovereignty and international 
law. This principle of sovereignty grants supreme authority within 
territorial borders and is a binding principle in the current international 
political order (Reus-Smit, 2001). However, Kofi Annan (2000) has 
challenged this principle of sovereignty by calling for the recognition of 
sovereignty only in terms of governments that have sustained their 
legitimate authority by serving their people.  
Allegations and cases of human rights violations in Somalia, Rwanda and 
Bosnia, for example, have focused attention on the activities of sovereign 
states within their own territorial borders and the United Nations has been 
called upon to intervene to protect citizens. Such developments raise the 
question of whether the Kosovo case signalled a watershed, in that human 
rights violations within a state’s borders can no longer be ignored in the 
wider global context. They have become intertwined with challenging the 
concept of state sovereignty and legitimacy. As Woodward (2001) points 
out, however, there is a further dimension to be considered: the 
justification for NATO’s intervention on humanitarian grounds. It is the 
application of morality to politics underpinning the NATO action, together 
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with coercive military force, that framed the Kosovo Campaign as 
“humanitarian intervention”.  
Framing the intervention 
For the stakeholders in the NATO Alliance, the predominant worldview 
and the wider socio-cultural processes at work are strongly linked to the 
earlier wars (in Yugoslavia, in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia), which blamed 
the conflicts in Yugoslavia as ethnic hatreds boiling over into internecine 
violence and a struggle for power. 
Statements made by leaders of the NATO Alliance confirmed that, this 
time in Kosovo, the violence could not be ignored because it was occurring 
on “the doorstep of Europe” (Blair, 1999). Some self-interest also informed 
these concerns since there were already clearly identified problems within 
Western European states from unlimited migration of refugees from 
Eastern Europe, and beyond, into the developed countries of the European 
Union. What was at stake for Western Europe was to hold back another 
wave of refugee/migrants from Kosovo. One way of doing this was to shape 
the discourses to provide a response to the internal issues of what 
remained of Yugoslavia and an answer to individual Western European 
nations’ own problems of the likely mass migration of refugees out of 
conflict areas. 
NATO discourses ignore Western Europe’s self-interest to focus on the use 
Chapter 11: Offensive defence 
 
272 
of the more altruistic humanitarian frame in the lead-up to the military 
operations against Yugoslavia and in the daily press briefings during the 
intervention. This chapter illustrates the particular salience of the 
humanitarian frame in communicating the military intervention in Kosovo 
and, in particular, the promotion of the humanitarian frame as the causal 
interpretation and the moral evaluation which, in turn, legitimise the 
intervention.  
These approaches of framing the military intervention as humanitarian not 
only emphasise the humanitarian aspect of the operation, but also 
attribute positive associations, which are associated with values and 
traditions. In this way they align with Hallahan’s (1999) work on the role 
of values and traditions in public relations framing. Human rights 
discourse and humanitarian work are similarly associated with common 
mental models relating to the specific knowledge and opinions that have 
accumulated over time, as well as the socio-cultural knowledge that is part 
of the collective memory (van Dijk, 2001). Humanitarianism is one such 
mental model and is closely associated with altruistic assistance to people 
in need. The social reality thus constructed shaped opinions and 
worldviews about how humanitarian crises can be solved.  
To illustrate the prevalence of the frame, this research tracked references 
to the use of the word “humanitarian” in press releases, press conferences 
and briefings from March 20 – June 10, 1999. It found 480 instances 
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where humanitarian is used as an adjective to describe a particular aspect 
of the situation. These range from humanitarian catastrophe, crisis, 
disaster, suffering and tragedy to humanitarian aid, airlifts, assistance, 
convoys, efforts, missions, operations, relief and support. Some of these 
uses will be examined in more detail below. 
Framing the goals 
NATO’s goals were identified in the days leading up to the initiation of the 
bombing campaign and reiterated in press conferences, press releases and 
all NATO statements. In the following example, the context is a press 
conference at NATO headquarters in Brussels and the audience is the 
collection of defence journalists from global media. During it, in a 
statement made one week after the commencement of the bombing, 
Secretary-General Solana paints a grim picture of the situation in Kosovo 
to highlight the need for immediate action: 
First and foremost, we must stop the killing in Kosovo and the 
brutal destruction of human lives and properties; secondly, we 
must put an end to the appalling humanitarian situation that is 
now unfolding in Kosovo and create the conditions for the 
refugees to be able to return; thirdly, we must create the 
conditions for a political solution to the crisis in Kosovo based 
on the Rambouillet agreement. (Secretary-General Solana, April 
1, 1999) 
Solana does not state categorically that bombing is going to stop the killing 
in Kosovo but frames it within the political goals of NATO. These are 
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general statements that reinforce the humanitarian nature of the conflict. 
The discourse is controlled by maintaining the frame and the credibility of 
the particular worldview. Milošević and the Serbs have no voice in these 
media proceedings and this silence allows NATO to define the reality 
through an uncontested use of “we” who will, although it is not said, use 
violence to “halt the violence and bring an end to the humanitarian 
catastrophe now unfolding in Kosovo” (Solana, Press Release, 040-1999). 
It is the same “we” who will take on the responsibility to “do what is 
necessary to bring stability to the region. … stop an authoritarian regime 
from repressing people in Europe at the end of the 20th century. … The 
responsibility is on our shoulders and we will fulfil it” (Solana, Press 
Release, 040-1999). 
The humanitarian frame is also being extended to the risk of indecision – 
what might happen if no action is taken: “We know the risks of action but 
we have all agreed that inaction brings even greater dangers” (Solana, 
Press Release, 040-1999). This is a classic “framing of choices” (Hallahan, 
1999, p. 225): do nothing and face other (greater) dangers; or “do what is 
necessary”, which remains undefined, thus providing an option to 
recipients of the message who may be risk-averse. By hedging and avoiding 
the use of military terminology and by using the term “do what is 
necessary” the framing motivates people to agree with the proposition or, 
at least, not resist it.  
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Logic, media control and humanitarian altruism 
The logic of these statements is that military actions will “halt the violence” 
and create stability. But, there are further implicit assumptions made 
within this text to control its meaning: The labelling of the government of 
Yugoslavia as “authoritarian” immediately draws on the mental models of 
Western publics thus creating specific meanings about “what is ‘said’ 
against a background of what is ‘unsaid’ but taken as given” (Fairclough, 
2003, p. 40). Further, this resonates with a generation that has either 
personally experienced or at least been aware of, authoritarian regimes in 
Europe. Here, the text implicitly draws on two references: the repression 
under the authoritarian Communist regimes of Eastern Europe and the 
repression of Europeans during World War II.  
By placing these assumptions within the frame of humanitarian 
intervention, “moral duty” and “responsibility” necessarily provide the 
means of drawing the appropriate conclusion. These words act as triggers 
for the value assumptions (Fairclough, 2003) necessarily implied by the 
ideological framework. A further illustration of how assumptions are built 
into the text can be seen in the following example in the positioning of 
intervention as a “moral duty” for NATO forces: “NATO’s men and women 
in uniform, who are carrying out this important mission, are among the 
best in the world” (Solana, Press Release, 041-1999). The fact that they are 
in uniform distinguishes them from other humanitarian workers. The fact 
that they are in uniform and they are among the best in the world 
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suggests that now international humanitarian projects can include armed 
forces using weapons as part of a global coalition of humanitarian aid 
workers:  
“NATO authorities, in conjunction with the United Nations and other 
international agencies are taking all possible measures to avert a 
humanitarian tragedy” (Wilby, Press Conference, April 3, 1999). 
NATO continues to maintain the humanitarian frame by keeping it as the 
focus and the actual bombing as a simple support mechanism for the 
humanitarian organisations. NATO consistently insisted that it was not the 
bombing that caused people to leave: “I’d like to stress again that NATO 
did not create, have not created this terrible humanitarian tragedy. You 
only have to talk to the refugees and ask them who has forced them from 
their homes and I haven't heard one so far who has said, ‘NATO’" (Shea, 
Press Conference, March 31, 1999). NATO framed itself as part of the 
solution rather than a contributor to the refugee problem: “NATO 
countries today are at the forefront of the international community's effort 
to help these people” (Shea, Press Conference, March 31, 1999). 
Self evaluation and the absence of dissent 
In earlier paragraphs of the same press conference, Shea spoke of 150,000 
refugees in Albania and another 5,000 in Macedonia. By suggesting that 
he had not “heard one so far who has said” that NATO was responsible for 
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them leaving their homes, Shea was being quite disingenuous. He also 
invites the question of, “who did you ask?” He is speaking for the Albanian 
refugees but not for the Serbian refugees. Because Shea and NATO had 
substantial control of the means of communication, they could contain the 
discourse and, even to some extent, its factual dimensions, within the 
frame of humanitarianism. This was supported by his evidence that the 
Kosovo Albanian leaders “outside Kosovo” wanted the bombing to 
continue. 
In the following example, the frame accentuates the humanitarian 
attribute of the NATO organisation: “we can give the humanitarian 
organisations information and intelligence which will help them to identify 
the scale of the problem and the location of the refugees” (Shea, Press 
Conference, April 29, 1999). Shea is positioning NATO for a favourable 
evaluation (Hallahan, 1999) as a humanitarian organisation, thus 
encouraging its publics to maintain support for the action in Kosovo. This 
was a central issue for NATO because any wavering of support in any of the 
19 countries of the Alliance was likely to result in the collapse of the 
collective will to continue with the bombing campaign (Shea, 2004).  
By attributing humanitarian characteristics to itself as an organisation, 
NATO is “creating positively valenced associations” (Hallahan, 1999, p. 
225) to comply with the beliefs, values and other cultural artefacts 
cherished by the various publics. Through these positive attributions of 
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NATO as supporting other humanitarian organisations, positioning itself 
alongside these organisations and actively talking about the humanitarian 
work being carried out as part of the bombing campaign, the actual 
bombing takes on a kind of naturalness and can be interpreted as a natural 
way of reacting to a humanitarian crisis. By embedding the humanitarian 
dimension within the ideological framework of the discourses, NATO 
sought to make a military option for humanitarian purposes seem to be the 
logical, if not the most natural, thing to do (Fairclough, 1992). 
This sense of bombing being a natural response to a particular type of 
humanitarian disaster was further reinforced by the use of the earthquake 
metaphor discussed in chapter nine. Earthquakes are disasters that give a 
sense of magnitude along with the enormity of the damage inflicted. The 
metaphor was used by Shea on April 3 when he said: 
The focus of the Alliance this morning is still very, very much on 
the demographic earthquake that we are experiencing in and 
around Kosovo. Yesterday 130,000 refugees were added to the 
list of those leaving Kosovo into neighbouring countries, this 
brings to a total of 765,000 the number of displaced people 
since the current upsurge in fighting in March of last year. 
(Shea, Press Conference, April 3, 1999) 
This section demonstrates that NATO’s use of the humanitarian frame for 
the daily press conferences was used effectively to legitimise its military 
intervention within the internal affairs of Yugoslavia and safeguard its 
collective will to demonstrate military solutions for humanitarian ends. 
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However, there were some challenges and contradictions to this frame.  
Testing frames: Challenges  
Journalists at NATO press conferences did not always take NATO’s 
framing for granted and bombing for democracy as “common sense”. For 
example, at the press conference on April 18, the Reuters representative 
asked for comment on Shea’s previous statement that “this is one of the 
first humanitarian wars of modern times” and the view that “NATO is in a 
sense changing radically and is becoming an enforcer of humanitarian 
values”.  
Shea’s reply allows some reflection before getting back on message: “Is 
NATO a humanitarian organisation? Not in the strict sense of the term, no, 
but we have seen that the military working together with organisations like 
the UNHCR provide a very quick response to these overwhelming 
situations” (Shea, Press Conference, April 18). His distinction is interesting 
in confirming that NATO is not a humanitarian organisation in the sense 
that it is not an aid organisation, but rather that it may be considered as 
one because it provides support for humanitarian work.  
The frame was also challenged in the early days of the campaign as it was 
becoming obvious that refugees were pouring out of Kosovo into Albania 
and Macedonia. On 28 March, the CNN correspondent Christianne 
Amanpour alleged that the humanitarian situation had become worse 
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since the bombing had begun when she asked: “would you at least concede 
that the horrors that are going on there have accelerated, despite your 
insistence that they were pre-planned, would you at least concede it's 
gotten worse, that they've accelerated because of the NATO attacks?” 
This question challenges the common sense aspect of bombing for 
humanitarian ends by asking if it had worsened the situation rather than 
improved it. The response from Shea was convoluted, ranging from the 
idea that the humanitarian situation was mobilising public opinion in the 
19 nations of the Alliance “to see this through” to the need to attack the 
“military machine in Kosovo”. Since this had still not answered the 
question, Amanpour repeated it: “But, Jamie, are you conceding it’s gotten 
worse and has accelerated since the NATO attacks?” This time the 
response ranged over the responsibility of the Belgrade government for the 
humanitarian situation in Kosovo, the International War Crimes Tribunal 
that was set up in the aftermath of the war in Bosnia and that the Yugoslav 
commanders and paramilitaries should be considering their own 
responsibility for the refugee situation in Kosovo. Amanpour again pressed 
the case: “Is that a ‘yes’ Jamie?” to which the reply was: “I would consider 
that to be a ‘yes’ Christianne. Yes, it’s a ‘yes’”. 
In this example, because Amanpour pushes through the NATO position of 
speaking for the refugees in general terms, Shea is finally forced to admit 
that NATO has been responsible for the deterioration in the humanitarian 
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situation. He introduces different arguments to avoid responding directly 
to this claim since it upsets the legitimacy of the humanitarian frame. By 
conceding that the NATO bombing in Kosovo was in fact causing harm, the 
selection of the specific humanitarian frame for communicating a 
“perceived reality and make [it] more salient in the communicating text” 
(Entman, 1993, p. 52) is upset and called into question.  
This example also illustrates Fairclough’s (1992) concept of “exceptional 
disfluencies (p. 230) where, at a moment of crisis, the actual problem of 
the discursive practice is exposed. Up to this point, NATO’s discourse on 
the humanitarian response and speaking for the refugees has been 
naturalised, making it difficult to pinpoint any problems with it. Through 
tenacious questioning, Amanpour has exposed Shea’s hesitation and shift 
in style to force a concession from him. Interestingly, this was not 
sufficient to undermine the effectiveness of the frame, but it attests to the 
complicity of the media in their acceptance of the frame and not pursuing 
it further. 
Testing frames: Contradictions 
When is a war not a war? Another major challenge to the humanitarian 
frame was whether this was a war for humanitarian aims and, if not, what 
was it? Woodward (2001) asks: “In practical terms, how do the standard 
operating procedures and operational decisions by humanitarians mesh 
with the logic of war?” (p. 332). NATO answered this question quite 
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specifically: “NATO is not waging war against Yugoslavia” (Solana, 1999, 
Press Release 040, March 23). By claiming that military operations against 
Yugoslavia did not constitute a war, NATO was claiming that the use of 
force as a tool to achieve humanitarian ends (Weller, 1999) was legitimate. 
The threat of force was a constant accompaniment to negotiations between 
Western (read NATO) diplomats. This was true at Rambouillet, where the 
presence of the parties involved was mandated through the threat of force; 
where agreement to the basic principles of the final agreement was 
ensured through the threat of force; and agreement to an occupying 
military force was also demanded through the threat of force. In effect, the 
use of force as a tool shaped the form and content of negotiation. 
NATO used euphemisms for “war” and “force” to talk about its activities in 
Kosovo: campaign, conflict, crisis, intervention. These words were 
articulated with the word “humanitarian” to differentiate this particular 
action from other military offensive action, and to establish its legitimacy 
in terms of moral values. They also helped to establish the intervention’s 
legitimacy in terms of moral values and the justification for using military 
force in the affairs of a sovereign state. This is a form of dissimulation, or a 
way of controlling the discourse (Chilton & Schäffner, 1997). In setting the 
terms of the discourse through its press conferences, NATO presented 
their actions in Kosovo as being for humanitarian purposes only and thus 
not constituting a war. As part of that strategy, NATO also omitted, blurred 
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and softened the usual referents of war.  
However, it was not always possible to keep the military briefers at the 
press conferences “on message” and maintain consistency in language use: 
Our operations follow a thoroughly planned military rationale; 
we are well on track and it will become harder and harder for 
the FRY forces to continue their aggression against their own 
people, a people with whom we are not at war. Rather, we are at 
war with a regime and apparatus of oppression, terror and 
ethnic cleansing. (Wilby, Press Conference, April 2, 1999) 
Here, Wilby asserts that NATO is not at war with the Yugoslav people but 
slips into battlefield terminology in relation to the FRY forces and the 
repressive regime. He has then to work with these slippy semantics to 
distinguish the Yugoslav people from the different people who are in the 
Yugoslav military. 
In public relations terms, all references made by NATO spokespeople to 
fighting a war undermine the construction of the reality that NATO has 
determined will be the accepted one – that this is a humanitarian 
intervention and not a war.  
Sustaining the message 
The difference becomes visible in how Shea responds to a journalist’s 
reference to “war aims” and emerges through the denial of being at war in 
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any shape or form, which contrasts with the Wilby briefing discussed 
earlier in the last paragraph: 
I would not use your term war aims, if you don't mind me 
raising that, because I have made it clear all along that we are 
not at war with anybody and certainly not with the people of 
Yugoslavia. But our objectives are clear and they are consistent. 
(Shea, Press Conference, April 5) 
The use of the words “campaign” or “crisis” in place of “war” served 
NATO’s purposes. Throughout their discourses the word is used for the 
actions of both sides: their “campaign of repression” is contrasted with our 
“military campaign”, which “is designed to bring about a situation where 
we stop the violence once and for all” (Shea & Wilby, Press Conference, 
April 2, 1999). This suggests equality of power, even though the forces of 
the two sides were disproportionate and, at the same time, it maintains the 
positive association for the military campaign.  
NATO’s communications were designed to influence a series of events and 
the key audiences of NATO. These included not only the people of the 
nations making up the NATO Alliance, but also all members of the United 
Nations and indeed, the people of Yugoslavia as well. NATO insists, 
despite lapses such as Wilby’s above, that the intervention is not a war. 
NATO’s discourse presupposes that the bombing of Yugoslavia will deliver 
the political objectives as stated and that they will prevent further human 
suffering. Furthermore, through the premise that this is not a war, NATO 
is using a legitimising strategy – legitimation by mythopoesis, 
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(building up a picture of Serbian atrocities by associating them with 
images of World War II, as identified in chapter eight) or, legitimation 
conveyed through narrative (Fairclough, 2003; van Leeuwen, 2007) by 
relating the valuable humanitarian contribution of NATO.  
There are many examples of the denial that this conflict is a war scattered 
throughout the press conferences. By carefully omitting the use of “war”, 
with its connotations of death and destruction, Shea is able to maintain the 
frame: “We have chosen the most effective modus operandi in line with 
our values which are not to be at war with the Serb people” (Shea, Press 
Conference, April 14, 1999). However, he does talk about winning – and 
that is associated with a war, but not with a humanitarian intervention or a 
crisis. In this way, NATO is constructing the discourse to reflect the reality 
of a war while simultaneously contending that it is mainly or merely 
solving a humanitarian crisis.  
So, why is NATO so concerned about not using the word “war”? If they had 
a legitimate cause for war, a just war, then the word could have been used. 
Beyond perception management, NATO had to deal with the fact that 
because it was illegal in terms of the UN Charter, and not authorised by the 
United Nations Security Council, the word had to be avoided at all costs. 
NATO was unable to legitimise its bombing campaign through the 
authority of tradition, custom, law, or people in whom authority is vested 
(namely the United Nations). Instead, it appointed itself as the legitimate 
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authority and therefore sought to downplay legal infringement and 
foreground moral legitimacy.  
Further challenges to the legitimising frame used by NATO were the daily 
military updates, bomb damage assessments and claims of success in 
degrading, disrupting and destroying the “Serb military machine”. These 
updates formed the military discourse which, when articulated with the 
humanitarian discourse, produced the new discourse domain. This 
articulation (Hall, 1986; Slack, 1996) of war with humanitarianism 
signalled a new development in international relations and finds support 
in the title of the first book published about the war: The new military 
humanism: Lessons from Kosovo (Chomsky, 1999b). Many other articles 
and books, both supportive and critical of this development followed (see, 
for example, Bring, 1999; Chandler, 2002; Daalder & O'Hanlon, 1999; 
Falk, 2001; Holzgrefe & Keohane, 2003; Ikenberry, 2000; Johnstone, 
2000a; Lloyd, 1999; Luttwak, 1999; Roberts, 1999; Schnabel & Thakur, 
2000; Schoenberger-Orgad, 2002; Solana, 1999a, 1999d; Thussu, 2000; 
Wheeler, 2000, 2001; Whitman, 2001; Woodward, 2001). Even though 
many of these articles are critical of the intervention, nevertheless they 
employ the discourse of military humanism. Thus, the coining of the words 
in the discourse remains unchallenged. This suggests that the articulation 
has received acceptance as a new discourse domain (Fairclough, 1992).  
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CHAPTER 12 
Collateral damage, crises and criticism 
Throughout the campaign of Operation Allied Force, NATO had to 
constantly justify and legitimise its unilateral actions in the face of 
criticism concerning its contravention of international law and the lack of a 
United Nations mandate. This was particularly evident when the air strikes 
caused the death and injuries of civilians in a number of highly 
controversial circumstances. In these cases, NATO was forced to manage 
the crisis while, at the same time, justifying the continuation of the 
bombing campaign. It was essential for the organisation to maintain its 
legitimacy by maintaining positive public opinion that would allow the 
bombing to continue uninterrupted as well as maintaining the 
organisation’s reputation and image (Heath & Millar, 2004). 
In any crisis, the stock position of good public relations practice demands 
that the primary actors must provide accurate information as quickly as 
possible (Allen & Caillouet, 1994; Benoit, 1995, 1997; Seeger et al., 2001). 
As a result of this position, various strategies for crisis response have been 
developed to provide messages to publics that can be used to shape 
perceptions both of the crisis itself and the organisation involved and so 
mitigate the effects of the crisis. According to Coombs (1995), an 
organisation may use distance strategies that weaken the association 
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between the organisation and the crisis without denying the crisis itself. 
The objective is to make the crisis acceptable while “minimal negative 
feelings are transferred to the organization” (p. 451). 
The need to explain unfortunate accidents during wartime presents a 
particular challenge to any spokesperson. NATO primarily used distance 
strategies including the use of excuses and justification to deflect blame for 
the organisation’s role in the crisis. When civilian death, even when 
euphemised as collateral damage is the outcome of these accidents, the 
challenge is all the greater.  
Collateral damage 
One of the most notable challenges of NATO’s public relations campaign 
was the issue of collateral damage. Collateral damage is a euphemism for 
military mistakes that have unintended consequences. New military 
terminology had come to prominence during the Gulf War in 1991, when 
phrases such as “collateral damage”, “smart bombs”, “surgical strikes” and 
“precision bombing” were used extensively in reference to the air strikes 
against Iraq. Much of the discourse surrounding the air war in Iraq was 
concerned with the new types of weapons used and, in particular, the 
accuracy of new missiles. The term “smart bombs” suggested that 
weaponry could think intelligently, and “surgical strikes” that bombs could 
fall on targets with pin-point accuracy. “Collateral damage” is connected 
with these targeted strikes as an explanation for any unintended 
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consequences, or failures, of such precision-guided weapons. This same 
terminology came to the fore again during the Kosovo Campaign. 
Vocabulary with military and war connotations are subject to constant 
change. In many cases, they provide a means of softening the harsh 
realities of war even in such cruel situations as “friendly fire” when armed 
forces kill their own airmen, soldiers, or sailors. They are a means of 
providing a comforting distance from the horrors of certain physical 
realities. 
Despite such semantic assistance, civilian spokespeople still face 
difficulties. These are often magnified when spokespeople are dependent 
on information coming from military headquarters, and appropriate 
information is not forthcoming. This was the case in Kosovo when NATO’s 
precision weapons went astray and collateral damage occurred. Notable 
cases of collateral damage during the campaign included the bombing of a 
civilian train on a railroad bridge near Grdelića in Southern Serbia, the 
bombing of a refugee convoy near the town of Djakovića and of civilians in 
Koriša in Kosovo, the destruction of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, and 
the attack on the hospital for tuberculosis and pulmonary diseases in 
Surdulića in Serbia.  
Two incidents in particular impacted on NATO’s public information 
campaign. They occurred on April 12 and April 14, 1999 and changed the 
whole nature of the communication that had, up until this time, been more 
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or less successful in providing appropriate information for news-hungry 
correspondents. Since President Milošević had made it almost impossible 
for foreign news journalists to operate within Yugoslavia, NATO was 
forced to generate other coverage. It had managed to maintain its public 
information campaign through the televising of NATO news conferences, 
providing “talking heads” and archive footage. These, together with rather 
limited news pictures from the Yugoslav capital in Belgrade, and pictures 
of warplanes taking off and landing at Aviano airbase in Italy had been the 
main stories about the Kosovo Campaign. Its relative success could be 
judged by the fact that the NATO Alliance had held together and 
maintained unity for three weeks. This was tested as incidents of collateral 
damage claimed the headlines. 
Grdelića railroad bridge 
The first incident of collateral damage occurred on April 12 when a railway 
bridge was attacked resulting in the killing of ten civilians and the 
wounding of many more. This apparent mistake in targeting was covered 
in a news conference on April 13 at which General Clark gave the military 
part of the briefing. In his memoirs, Clark showed that he was well aware 
of the public’s right to know and the importance of releasing honest and 
accurate information: 
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In democracies, the public has a right to know as much about 
the ongoing actions as can be safely provided without 
endangering the operation or the forces themselves. We would 
have to release information, but we knew we’d have to navigate 
carefully. It was better to start with a restrictive information 
release policy and then gradually open up than to give too much 
initially and try to clamp down later. (Clark, 2001, p. 200) 
In the press conference of April 13, Clark reviewed the situation to date, 
including the political discussions that had been held prior to the 
commencement of the bombing campaign He then mentioned the 
bombing of the railroad bridge and the fact that civilians had been killed. 
He set the scene by revisiting the lead-up to the NATO decision to bomb 
Yugoslavia and by providing information on the size and deployment of 
the Yugoslav forces in and around Kosovo. He tried to establish that NATO 
was acting carefully and with a rational plan: “This is the situation today, 
April 13, and you can see some 23 battalion sized units are deployed in 
Kosovo today. So this is a clear pre-planned pattern of activity”. 
Clark then reviewed the outcome and provided corroborating details to 
support his account: 
What was the result? Here are the destruction of Kosovar 
villages that we have reliable evidence on and we have had a lot 
of cloud cover, we don’t have full coverage of this area and of 
course no-one is on the ground to verify this for us, so this is 
what we are quite confident in, based on reliable evidence. 
(Clark, Press Conference, April 13, 1999) 
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In this quotation, Clark is preparing to provide aerial photographic 
evidence of his claims for military activity within the Kosovo region. He is 
also hedging by providing some distance between the actual information 
and the manner in which it was collected. By outlining these limitations, 
Clark is navigating carefully (Clark, 2001) so as not to be caught out by the 
press on exaggeration or inaccuracy. He goes on to discuss the 
humanitarian efforts of NATO. He then returns to the objectives of the air 
campaign: to destroy, isolate and interdict the Serb forces, as well as to 
bomb the more strategic assets of command and communication. Clark 
reiterates the NATO message that the campaign is against President 
Milošević and not the Yugoslav/Serb people, a central theme throughout 
the press conferences. This differentiation works as a means of separating 
NATO from the responsibility of causing civilian hardship and casualties. 
He claims that NATO “has worked hard in this campaign. It is not a 
campaign against the Serb people” but it is “directed specifically to cause 
President Milošević to change his mind” and to do this, “we are using 
precision weaponry. This campaign has the highest proportion of precision 
weaponry that has ever been used in any air operation anywhere” (Clark, 
Press Conference, April 13, 1999). 
Clark’s suggests that the weapons are so precise that they are being used to 
change Milošević’s mind. It also sets up the context for the first case of 
collateral damage. He continues: “We are going after militarily significant 
targets and we are avoiding, taking all possible measures to avoid civilian 
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damage”. Clark is using transcendence (Coombs, 1995) by contextualising 
the incident in a more beneficial way – that the campaign is against 
President Milošević and all the targets are military ones. This encourages 
the listeners to consider the content from a more positive angle. By 
prefacing the story of the train at Grdelića with the ongoing hard work of 
the Alliance and its use of precision weaponry to avoid collateral damage, 
there is more likelihood of the acceptance of the explanation.  
Clark goes on to describe the pilot’s mission, which had been to destroy the 
railroad bridge, and how the pilot fired the weapon from many miles away, 
without being able to see the target or be aware of the train on the bridge: 
He launched his missile from his aircraft that was many miles 
away, he was not able to put his eyes on the bridge, it was a 
remotely directed attack. And as he stared intently at the 
desired target point on the bridge, … as the pilot stared intently 
at the desired aim point on the bridge and worked it, and 
worked it, and worked it, and all of a sudden, at the very last 
instant with less than a second to go he caught a flash of 
movement that came into the screen and it was the train coming 
in. Unfortunately he couldn’t dump the bomb at that point, it 
was locked, it was going into the target and it was an 
unfortunate incident which he, and the crew, and all of us very 
much regret. We certainly don’t want to do collateral damage. 
Clark, Press Conference, April 13, 1999) 
There are obvious contradictions in this quote. Clark’s explanation was the 
pilot was many miles away, he couldn’t see the target and that it was a 
“remotely directed attack”. Yet, in the following sentence Clark states that 
the pilot could see the target and that he had checked it by staring 
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intently – “he had worked it, and worked it, and worked it, and all of a 
sudden…he caught a flash of movement”. Even then, according to Clark, 
the pilot believed that he had to complete his mission and destroy the 
bridge with another bomb. Accordingly, the pilot made a seemingly 
rational decision to aim at the opposite end of the bridge: 
He put his aim point on the other end of the bridge from where 
the train had come, but by the time the bomb got close the 
bridge was covered with smoke and clouds and at the last 
minute again in an uncanny accident, the train had slid forward 
from the original impact and parts of the train had moved 
across the bridge, and so that by striking the other end of the 
bridge he actually caused additional damage to the train. … it is 
one of those regrettable things that happen in a campaign like 
this and we are all very sorry for it, but we are doing the 
absolute best we can to avoid collateral damage. I can assure 
you of that. (Clark, Press Conference, April 13, 1999) 
Clark’s explanation was very full and detailed, though somewhat 
confusing. He could claim it as accurate and that it informed the public’s 
right to know. He had fronted up to the press, in the best public relations 
practice for handling crisis management. He was the Commander of Allied 
Forces in Europe and it was his job to provide this information. The 
placement of the information within the briefing was carefully designed in 
that Clark had covered several other issues prior to discussing the incident. 
He was in fact providing a kind of “normalising account” (Massey, 2004, p. 
239) of the incident, in a manner designed to prevent any perception of 
illegitimate organisational behaviour. 
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Clark’s presence at the briefing could be further interpreted as a discursive 
strategy in legitimation when analysed in terms of the strategic 
construction of the text. Not only was Clark there to provide a military 
perspective on the operation, but he was available to provide the 
journalists with video tape and a suitable explanation for an incident likely 
to generate negative publicity for the deaths of innocent civilians. 
In effect, NATO’s strategy had acknowledged its pilot’s role in causing the 
deaths, but offered a defence that put it down to understandable individual 
error in a way that distanced the organisation from the results. What 
public relations crisis literature calls the distance strategy (Coombs, 1995) 
served in classic fashion to weaken the connection between the incident 
and the organisation. In this particular case, a justification strategy is used 
whereby the situation is really not so bad but is simply “one of those 
regrettable things that happen in a campaign like this” (Clark, Press 
Conference, April 13, 1999). 
When Jamie Shea had introduced Clark at the beginning of the conference, 
he stated that he had invited SACEUR to brief the press on how NATO had 
performed over the previous three weeks. Clark’s opening lines were that 
he had wanted to come because it had been three weeks since he had 
spoken to the journalists and he “wanted to be able to put the operation in 
perspective, to provide some details and to ensure that the results are 
understood and it is clear where we are going” (Clark, Press Conference, 
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April 13, 1999). 
There was no indication that Clark’s briefing would include the first 
incidence of collateral damage, - let alone one that had the potential to 
damage the credibility of the organisation and open up a discussion on the 
issue of harming civilians through collateral damage. The downgrading of 
the event to part of a three week review, and the distancing and the use of 
seemingly detailed information, combined into an effective strategy. 
Evidence for its success could be found in the fact that there were no 
questions in the subsequent Q & A session between the journalists present 
and Clark. Clark also provided a video of the event which, some months 
later, was reported to have been shown at three times the actual speed, 
“giving the impression to viewers that the civilian train was moving 
extremely fast” (Amnesty, 2000, p. 28). Indeed, there was an admission 
from the NATO press office that most of the video tapes reviewed at the 
press office were speeded up and, due to an error, the film was not slowed 
to its actual speed before the screening at the press conference.  
In this case, NATO succeeded in burying the inaccuracy of its report, 
possibly verifying that this was a workable strategy for other 
uncomfortable issues. None of the journalists actually picked up the 
discrepancies in Clark’s explanation, nor did they notice the speed of the 
train in the video.  
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Attack on refugee convoys near Djakovića 
In this case, NATO aircraft, operating in daytime between the hours of 
11am to 1 pm on April 14, mistakenly targeted two civilian convoys of 
tractors and trailers within Kosovo. The first news items concerning the 
incident came from Serbian television, operating out of Belgrade. Shea was 
informed by a phone call from a journalist in Belgrade whilst General 
Clark first heard of the incident on CNN (Stourton, 1999). Before Clark’s 
first interview with an American radio some hours later, he had received a 
transcript of a Serb radio transmission on the incident. It was on this basis 
that Clark then publicly blamed the Serbs for the incident, stating that it 
was they who had opened fire on the refugees. 
According to Stourton (1999), who extensively researched the incident for 
a BBC documentary (BBC, 1999), Clark was not only ill-informed but lying:  
NATO had a significant fund of goodwill to draw on; most of the 
correspondents trusted Jamie Shea. But, in the days that 
followed, the Alliance ran through that trust like a spendthrift. 
Clark’s blunder was a bad start; the following day’s briefing 
made things worse. (Stourton, 1999)  
This attempt to deceive the public by putting the blame on the Serbs 
recalls Cornford’s perception of propaganda quoted at the beginning of 
chapter ten. Clark’s intention was to persuade the public to think (Taylor, 
2003) that the Serbs were, among other things, also capable of bombing 
refugees. Furthermore, all the imagery presented by NATO prior to this 
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incident was one of Serbs engaging in atrocities. The apparent blunders in 
communicating the crisis suggest that NATO was engaging in the same 
type of “propaganda” that they attributed to Milošević (i.e. lying and using 
fiction instead of fact).  
The press conference on April 15 opened with Jamie Shea expressing 
regret for the loss of civilian life. For both his own, and NATO’s credibility, 
it was important to face up to the challenge of explaining the bombing of 
the refugee column and not be accused of lying or propaganda. He made 
several general statements of regret and reiterated the purpose of NATO’s 
operations: “We have taken every possible precaution to avoid causing 
harm to civilians. Our Operation Allied Force was launched to save civilian 
lives, not to expend them” (Shea, Press Conference, April 15, 1999). 
The first sentence provides the cognitive model for understanding the 
actual situation in which “every possible precaution” is taken. NATO is 
taking care of the civilians who have been displaced but believes that 
bombing an area in which there are civilians is still a viable way of 
achieving the goal of the campaign. The word precaution does not 
necessarily fit well with the idea of high altitude bombing but, in this case, 
it refers to the precision-guided weapons systems being used by NATO, 
indicating its intention of avoiding harm to civilians in the area. 
The next section of the press conference described the scene from NATO’s 
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perspective and provides the context in which the incident took place: 
Yesterday a NATO pilot was operating over western Kosovo. He 
saw many villages being burned. This is an area where the 
Yugoslav Special Police Forces, the MUP, have been conducting 
ethnic cleansing operations in recent days. The 5,000 refugees 
that have arrived in Albania in the last 48 hours testify to that 
fact. The road between Prizren and Djakovića is an important 
resupply and reinforcement route for the Yugoslav Army and 
the Special Police. (Shea, Press Conference, April 15, 1999) 
In this quote, Shea begins with two very short sentences – the location and 
the evidence of what was happening there. They provide a factual 
foundation that provides the context for further facts to follow. He then 
moves on to more general information about the area that justifies this 
area as an appropriate place to bomb. By talking about 5,000 refugees, 
ethnic cleansing, special police, resupply and reinforcement, Shea is 
interdiscursively (across humanitarian, military and political domains) 
invoking a particular mental model for the listeners (van Dijk, 2001). 
These words are chosen carefully to reinforce the NATO position, to justify 
the attack morally, and to soften the impact of the actual incident. 
 Shea also attempts to persuade publics to understand the feelings and 
motivations of the pilot, as one of themselves belonging to a Western 
liberal democracy for whom killing innocent people was anathema: 
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The pilot attacked what he believed to be military vehicles in a 
convoy. He was convinced he had the right target. He dropped 
his bomb in good faith, as you would expect a trained pilot from 
a democratic NATO country to do. The pilot reported at the 
time that he was attacking a military convoy. The NATO bomb 
destroyed the lead vehicle which we now believe to have been a 
civilian vehicle. (Shea, Press Conference, April 15, 1999) 
This is the first account of the incident given to the waiting journalists. 
Shea provides the conditions in which the action occurred, what actually 
happened and a justification for the incident. It is now a matter of 
interpretation, and the emotion and feelings about the incident “acquire 
greater legitimacy” (O'Shaughnessy, 2004, p. 54).  
Shea’s construction of a particular way of viewing this accident is 
indicative of the way he handled many other incidents that were 
questionable in terms of civilian casualties and damage to property. He 
removes blame both from the pilot and from the organisation, by standard 
excuse strategies: denial of intention and denial of volition (Coombs, 
1995). The pilot did his duty and checked his target in order to be 
convinced that the target was genuine. Then he “dropped his bomb in good 
faith”. The juxtaposition of these two concepts – dropping a bomb and 
good faith – work by articulating the actual act of dropping bombs with the 
good intentions of the bomber. The aim is to imply that, whatever the 
consequences, the intentions were good and that, furthermore, such 
intentions are clearly in line with what people in democratic NATO nations 
would expect. Furthermore, articulating NATO with “good faith” is a 
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means of legitimising NATO’s actions while, at the same time, 
delegitimising (Chilton & Schäffner, 1997) Milošević and his countrymen, 
who are not from a democracy and who, by extension, would not act in 
good faith. This is, again, an example of a deliberate “us” and “them” 
dichotomy. 
Shea went on to insist that “one tragic incident cannot and will not 
undermine our conviction that our cause is a just one to end human 
suffering and to save lives”. Then, as if to put an end to the matter, Shea 
completed his part of the briefing with the following sentence: “So let us 
not allow one accident, no matter how tragic, to obscure the real stakes in 
this crisis, which is that sometimes one has to risk the lives of the few in 
order to save the lives of the many” (Shea, Press Conference, April 15, 
1999). 
In this excerpt Shea differentiates a seemingly aberrant incident from the 
overall justness of the NATO cause, then attempts to normalise it as 
acceptable in the context of having to “risk the lives of the few in order to 
save the lives of the many”. In this phrase, Shea’s words resonate with 
Winston Churchill’s famous wartime speech, praising the heroism of 
British pilots: “Never in the field of conflict was so much owed by so many 
to so few” (Speech, House of Commons, June 18, 1940). However, in the 
reversal of actual power, Shea turns the numerical advantage on its head 
because NATO’s air power vastly exceeded that of Serbia to an extent way 
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beyond Nazi Germany’s advantage over Britain. The juxtapositioning of 
“the few” and “the many” creates an intertextual link with a speech from 
the past that listeners are likely to know and therefore use as a cue to 
interpreting the incident. Furthermore, Shea is intent on keeping his 
audience with him by referring to the overall context and objectives of the 
air campaign by transcending (Hearit, 1997) the actual incident and 
claiming the moral rightness of the overall context. These are the “real 
stakes”, which should not be “obscured” by one incident.  
The following day, Shea only briefly referred to the incident again as part 
of the formal part of the briefing. When one takes into account that there 
was no specific interest on the part of the journalists present at the press 
conference during the previous incident of collateral damage in the 
destruction of the Grdelića railroad bridge, Shea may have thought that 
this too would pass under the radar: 
Yesterday I expressed NATO’s regret for the tragic accident that 
occurred on Wednesday, but NATO puts its set-backs behind it 
and this is what we have done and are going to continue to do. 
We are not going to be blown off course. (Shea, Press 
Conference, April 16, 1999) 
By using the past tense in the first part of the statement, Shea is 
attempting to deflect any further questions about the Djakovića incident. 
Set-backs are not an issue on which NATO intends to dwell, learn from or 
consider – they are put behind it. The wind metaphor then comes through 
with the statement that NATO will not be blown off course. NATO, in 
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this case, is a ship sailing a steady course, but struggling against the 
elements. This suggests that the organisation is moving forwards to a 
defined goal and even if there are negative events, they do not have enough 
weight to alter the chosen direction.  
Unfortunately for Shea, however, the journalists at this question time were 
prepared and were clearly unhappy with the lack of information. For the 
first time, those journalists who had congregated in Brussels were in the 
invidious position of being unable to provide the information demanded 
by their editors. No one at NATO would provide it for them. Pictures were 
coming out of Belgrade and the few foreign journalists who had been 
allowed to remain there were invited to travel under escort to Kosovo to 
view the damage caused by the NATO bombs. Serb television had the 
advantage of broadcasting the first pictures of the disaster, while NATO 
was caught on the back foot, providing no information other than a 
message of general regret.  
NATO’s explanations over the next five days were many and varied. The 
prevarication of the spokespeople and their attempts at fudging the issue 
became more and more pronounced. The rules of crisis communication 
(Hiebert, 1991; Seeger et al., 2001) were not followed in this case. In the 
beginning, General Clark had attributed the attacks to Serb forces, then 
Kenneth Bacon, the State Department briefer in Washington said that 
Yugoslav aircraft had attacked the convoy. In Brussels, Shea and General 
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Marani from SHAPE continued to provide information concerning the 
ongoing NATO operations in Kosovo, citing notable campaign successes, 
including intensified air attacks on radar installations, tanks and artillery.  
On April 15, the press conference included a video tape of an American 
pilot’s debriefing at Aviano air base. Those at the briefing assumed that 
they were listening to the actual pilot who had bombed the convoy, but 
three days later, this turned out not to be the case. This caused uproar and 
outrage amongst the journalists present, and only added to the impression 
of deliberate deception by NATO. Following further requests for 
clarification on the incident, Shea stated: 
We have no information whatever on the extent of civilian 
casualties, it is very difficult to do that when you are trying to 
find out what is going on in a very unfree place, without 
international observers on the scene, and we have no other 
information really on that incident to share with you at the 
present time. (Shea, Press Conference, April 16, 1999) 
There is now a glaring contradiction. NATO has been giving detailed 
information on its successes, even to the degree of the numbers of tanks, 
artillery pieces and radar installations it has destroyed. With the convoy 
incident, the information stream has dried up. These attempts at 
ingratiation – by accentuating the positive outcomes of NATO’s actions 
and bolstering the organisation for the listening journalists – are 
considered useful strategies in crisis communication (Coombs, 1995) and 
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they were not the only ones deployed by NATO.  
By April 17, further crisis strategies were employed, in attempts to shift the 
blame. Allen and Caillouet (1994) state that when the organisation can no 
longer control an event, or a developing crisis, it is expedient to put the 
responsibility for the wider context onto a third party. NATO could claim 
that they had little control over the events occurring on the ground since a 
third party (President Milošević and the Serbs) are responsible for the 
wider context: 
It is clear that there is mounting evidence of detentions, 
summary executions and mass graves. Refugees have reported 
incidents in at least 50 towns and villages throughout Kosovo in 
recent days regarding summary executions, these of course will 
have to be investigated, as you know … In fact some refugees 
have even reported that Kosovar Albanians have been forced to 
dig these mass graves and put the bodies in. (Shea, Press 
Conference, April 17, 1999) 
Moving beyond the crisis that NATO had still failed to explain to its 
audience, and reporting atrocities that were not fact but hearsay, Shea is 
using the overall context, and the justification for the campaign, to remind 
the audience of the reasons why NATO began the air campaign. By using 
intertextuality with imagery and text from the Holocaust, Shea weaves 
these images into the current situation as a lateral way of satisfying 
demands for explanations that reflect well on NATO. This is picked up a 
little later in the press conference when a journalist asks whether NATO 
was concerned about public opinion. Shea’s reply is worth citing at 
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length as he handles the contradictions embedded in the death of innocent 
civilians by a moral military force: 
Public opinion is obviously uneasy whenever there is an 
incidence in which NATO is responsible for harm to civilians. 
Let’s face it, we are the people in this operation who are there to 
save lives, to help, that’s why we got involved in the first place, 
that’s where there’s been this enormous mobilisation not for 
strategic purposes, not for sort of classical interests but for 
humanitarian purposes. This is perhaps one of the very few 
genuine humanitarian conflicts in modern times so of course it’s 
embarrassing for us if harm is inflicted on civilians. (Shea, Press 
Conference, April 17, 1999) 
This text reaffirms NATO’s position – “we” are the good people, involved 
for the right reasons and as such, there is a very genuine level of 
discomfort in this crisis. This is a mortification strategy (Coombs, 1995) 
where there is an attempt to seek forgiveness for an unfortunate situation 
and find a level of acceptance for it.  
Jamie Shea summed up the situation in a reflective article he wrote one 
year later: 
if you can’t provide a picture, there is no story, even though you 
are describing the fundamental reality of what is going on. But if 
TV can provide a picture of a tractor, which has been 
accidentally struck by NATO aircraft, that becomes the reality of 
the war. The individual incident is played up and the general 
trend is played down. Context suffers. (Shea, 2000a) 
Shea clearly identifies the problem that he faced in the explanation of 
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Djakovića. His audience demanded an explanation of what they were 
seeing on television screens and his words could not compete with these 
realistic visuals. However, in the overall context of the bombing campaign, 
which was ostensibly was aimed at degrading the Yugoslav military 
machine in Kosovo, Shea claims that he was hampered by the fact that the 
other side had the pictures and he had no explanation. A recurrence of this 
problem was prevented ten days later with NATO bombing RTS Serbian 
Television, the station that had provided the pictures to Western television 
broadcasters of the carnage at Djakovića.  
The crisis finally came to a conclusion on April 19 when NATO admitted 
that its planes had indeed bombed a civilian refugee convoy. This was a 
turning point in the media operation. There was clear evidence that Shea 
and his military associates were unable to provide appropriate information 
at the required time and, as a result, lost credibility with their most 
important audience. It took five days for NATO to provide a coherent 
explanation and an admission that NATO planes had indeed attacked a 
civilian convoy. This time lag planted the suspicion amongst the 
journalists that not only was NATO not prepared to admit to its mistakes 
but was even prepared to lie about it (Stourton, 1999). This was the first 
indication that NATO was beginning to suffer from a legitimacy gap, and it 
was apparent that reality was not aligned with the communication of it 
(Roper, 2001). 
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Civilian deaths at Koriša 
Just one month later, a marked contrast to the response to the Djakovića 
incident can be illustrated by the example of the NATO bombing of 
civilians in the village of Koriša in southern Kosovo on 13 May. NATO 
aircraft bombed the village causing the deaths of a significant number of 
displaced Kosovar Albanians who were sheltering there. According to the 
Yugoslav news agency, Tanjug, 87 people were killed and 78 wounded and 
Human Rights Watch reported that at least 48 were killed (Amnesty, 
2000). On the following day, the press conference was given by Jamie 
Shea plus two representatives from SHAPE – Major-General Walter Jertz 
and Commander Fabrizio Maltini. 
The information counter-attack began with General Jertz opening the 
briefing with a quick overview, which included slides of the military targets 
attacked the previous day. Jamie Shea then began his part of the 
conference with the media counter-attack: 
Ladies and Gentlemen, in the last 52 days of Operation Allied 
Force, we have spent a lot of time, as you know, telling you and 
showing you what we, NATO, are doing. President Milošević is 
just as keen to ensure that you do not see what he is doing 
inside Kosovo, and today I would like to show you a rapid 
selection of photographs, some old, but many new, which I will 
call Milošević's battle damage assessment. What are you going 
to see? Well first and foremost, not military targets. (Shea, Press 
Conference, May 14, 1999) 
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What followed was a detailed commentary of pictures of destroyed homes 
in Kosovo, mass graves and stories of refugees. 
This is evidence of part of the newly developed media strategy that 
included more pictures, more information, and more briefing notes. As 
Shea (2000a) himself remarked later: “Pictures are believed, even if they 
are untypical or distorting; words are distrusted even if they are true” and 
he recalled “urging the Pentagon and other Allied countries that had 
satellite photography to give me a picture of a mass grave, or of villages 
that were burning, or of internally displaced persons inside Kosovo to 
show at my daily briefing”. Shea saw this as a crucial element of the 
communication strategy for, otherwise, in his own words “nobody would 
believe me. I could even be accused of propaganda”.  
As well as retaining long term credibility and avoiding associations with 
propaganda, Shea is extremely aware of the issues that faced him daily. He 
must keep on convincing his audience that NATO was doing the right 
thing, that the bombing is just and that the entire operation is important to 
all key audiences. His awareness of the stigma associated with propaganda 
is also indicative that his own reputation as a credible spokesperson was 
on the line, and that such an accusation would indeed threaten to destroy 
the authority and credibility of NATO as an organisation. This is in line 
with similar issues discussed by L’Etang (2006a) in terms of the problems 
and anxieties that public relations practitioners have with propaganda.  
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Following the introductory picture-showing, the first question put to Shea 
was: “Can you tell us any more about the reports of the NATO attack on 
the village of Koriša?” The answer was that there was still no detailed 
information on the event, in contrast to the daily listing of NATO’s 
bombing successes. In this case, Shea is choosing a tactic of “no 
information”, which was successful in moving the press conference on to 
other questions. The following day, the press conference opened on the 
Koriša attack. Before handing the press conference over to General Jertz, 
Peter Daniel (Shea’s deputy) provided a larger context for the attack that 
simultaneously tries to discredit the opposition:  
I know there is a great deal of speculation about how many, and 
why, Kosovar Albanians were at that location at the time of the 
attack. We understand why you have those questions, but we 
can only tell you what we know to be true. Just as we are aware 
of Serb claims regarding casualties, we are aware of continued 
reports that the Milošević regime uses human shields. We are 
not there on the ground, and you are not there on the ground. 
Serb media has a history of misrepresentation, to say the least. 
So that while we cannot vouch for the completeness, nor the 
credibility of the television footage that has been broadcast, 
NATO deeply regrets any accidental civilian casualties that may 
have resulted from this attack.  
Here, Daniel is trying to contextualise another obvious case of collateral 
damage. Using distance strategies (Coombs, 1995) by acknowledging the 
crisis, he is also attempting to remove the responsibility for the crisis from 
NATO. The “truth” features in the early stages of explanation in that NATO 
will only give information when it is true. This is in contrast to his 
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statement that the other side “has a history of misrepresentation” thus 
suggesting that there is an element of untruth about the reports, once 
again delegitimising the Serbian authorities.  
Daniel also uses distancing strategies in dealing with the situation when he 
states: “Just as we are aware of Serb claims regarding casualties, we are 
aware of continued reports that the Milošević regime uses human shields.” 
In this sentence, Daniel links the casualties with the atrocity of deploying 
innocent civilians as human shields. This offers a different moral balance 
to the incident. The term “human shields” is also an example of 
intertextuality, drawing on the text of the first Gulf War in which it was 
alleged that Saddam Hussein used civilians as human shields at strategic 
military installations. Daniel also mobilises the same distancing strategy 
by refusing to validate the television footage but nevertheless provides the 
appropriate apology regretting any incidence of civilian casualties.  
General Jertz picked up the conference following this introduction. He 
gave a very exact account of NATO’s information regarding the attack, 
including the description of the target, the verification process and the 
number of bombs dropped on the target. He completed this section by 
stating: “We have no way of confirming the casualty information being 
reported by the Serbian authorities”. The success of the strategy is 
suggested by the fact that very little questioning followed these statements. 
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Retrospectively, NATO can be seen as fortunate to escape more detailed 
scrutiny. Amnesty International’s report on collateral damage during the 
Kosovo Campaign (Amnesty, 2000) collected extensive information on 
this particular incident. After interviewing journalists, who had arrived in 
Koriša the day following the bombing, as well as Kosovar Albanians who 
lived in the area, they concluded that “it remains unclear whether or not 
FRY forces or military installations were actually present in Koriša at the 
time of the bombing” (Amnesty, 2000, p. 54). Despite this, NATO 
managed to maintain its message that Koriša was a legitimate military 
target and that any civilians there were probably part of the Serb practice 
of placing civilians around military targets as human shields. 
 
These three incidents of collateral damage demonstrate how NATO used 
traditional public relations methods for crisis communication. In almost 
textbook fashion, NATO as the organisation facing crisis: took control of 
the situation; presented itself as forthright and candid; and apart from 
selective use of specialists, deployed one authoritative spokesperson in the 
interests of preventing ambiguity. In each of the incidents analysed above, 
the crisis was contained within predetermined organisational narratives. 
These maintain the position that NATO is only interested in the overall 
aim of the campaign, that the campaign is for the ethnic Albanian people, 
and that in any conflict situation, accidents should be expected but NATO 
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is doing its utmost to prevent them. Crises were consistently framed as 
inadvertence error (Goffman, 1974) in which it is claimed that the 
organisation had no intention of causing such damage, instead of a likely 
consequence of the policy that sanctioned bombing in areas occupied by 
civilians. 
These incidents could be viewed as crises that disrupt the dominant 
narrative (Tyler, 2005) of NATO, which call for a suppression or 
discrediting of competing narratives from other organisations or media 
reports. In the first incident (Grdelića), NATO was following a military 
strategy concerning the restrictive release of information (Clark, 2001) in 
the hope that it would be sufficient for the media following the events. In 
the Grdelića incident, that action proved successful, which may have been 
assisted by the absence of competing narratives at that time (Tyler, 2005; 
Venette, Sellnow, & Lang, 2003). In the second incident at Djakovića, 
NATO was not the only provider of information on the incident and had to 
compete to maintain its dominant voice. This was a new experience for the 
organisation. As a result, perhaps, it took a relatively long time to get the 
appropriate information out to the media. It also led to attempts to 
discredit or neutralise the information and pictures coming from the 
Serbian side. It seemed to take about five days for the organisation to 
realise the importance of maintaining its reputation and organisational 
image in the face of what was becoming strident criticism on behalf of the 
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journalists. 
The end result was an expression of regret for causing civilian deaths but 
NATO was very much aware that this particular crisis had caused a crisis 
in confidence in the media. NATO lost control of the crisis when it had to 
compete with other forms of narrative that were appearing in the media 
from Belgrade, as well as on major television news networks around the 
world. What Djakovića also showed was a crisis in the confidence of the 
journalists in Brussels in NATO’s credibility. NATO was unable to control 
the way the story was disseminated and it was forced to accept that there 
were other narratives being told as well as waiting to be told (Holtzhausen, 
2000).  
From a public relations perspective, the crisis over the Djakovića incident 
indicated that NATO needed to rethink its media operation. The 
relationship between the civilian information office and SHAPE was 
deteriorating. That failing relationship endangered one of the main aims of 
the information campaign: the maintenance of unity and sustaining the 
allegiance of Alliance nations. This crisis put this in doubt. As such, it 
could be viewed as a threat to the survival of the organisation (Coombs, 
2002). NATO could not afford to let its response to this crisis be seen as 
indicative of the way it was likely to handle other crises. Since the 
campaign was intensifying there were likely to be more unpredictable 
events of this type.  
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In the third incident, there were significant changes in the way the crisis 
was brought to the media. This was a result of the reorganisation of the 
media operations at NATO headquarters that took place after the 
Djakovića incident. Following a conversation between Prime Minister Blair 
and President Clinton (Stourton, 1999), it was decided that the political 
consequences of another failure to explain could be disastrous for the 
overall campaign. Experts were co-opted into the media operation, 
including Tony Blair’s communications advisor, Alistair Campbell, and 
Jonathan Prince, the White House speech writer who, according to veteran 
journalist Martin Walker of the Guardian, “is the civilian equivalent of the 
Pentagon sending in the elite 101st Airborne division” (Walker, 1999a). 
Campbell developed a new media campaign strategy that included the use 
of more pictures, more press briefings and more TV footage. As Campbell 
(1999) himself noted, one of the keys was to increase the infrastructure 
support: 
When I saw what the NATO press service was, I was amazed 
that Jamie was still alive. He was doing his own scripts, fixing 
his own interviews, attending key meetings, handling every 
enquiry that came his way, large and small. He was the front 
man for the whole campaign, yet was expected to do the job 
without adequate support. (p. 32) 
In response, the new media operations centre (MOC) went into action 
providing clear organisational charts and responsibilities. In an interview 
for the BBC documentary How the war was spun – Kosovo, 1999 (BBC, 
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1999) and written up by the director in an article for The Sunday 
Telegraph (Stourton, 1999), MOC covered the following: 
Rebuttal – identifying and responding to misinformation put 
out by the Yugoslav news agency, Tanjug. 
Lines – drafting catchy phrases for Jamie Shea, General 
Wesley Clark and other NATO spokesmen to use in press 
conferences. 
Talking heads – monitoring the views of armchair generals 
and other pundits in television interviews. 
Article factory – writing pieces to appear under the bylines of 
NATO leaders on the comment pages of national newspapers. 
The Grid – twice-daily conference calls between Brussels and 
the key national capitals to co-ordinate the diaries and 
“message” of NATO’s national leaders to ensure maximum 
media support. 
By expanding the press office and providing clear lines of communication 
to the press, a new NATO public relations offensive began in earnest. The 
evidence of an enhanced media operation became evident following the 
Washington Summit briefings. Shea spent a lot more time on the 
introductory section of the briefing before handing over to the SHAPE 
spokesman for the military update. He used this time not only to provide 
information of what was happening at NATO headquarters – visits, 
meetings, decisions, etc - but also his perspective on aspects of the air 
strikes, what was happening in Belgrade, and the humanitarian situation 
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in Kosovo and surrounding countries.  
When new crises arose, the MOC went into a counter-offensive until it 
could provide more information on the actual event. There were no denials 
and requests for information were met with a standard response that the 
incident would be fully investigated and details given to the press as soon 
as they were available. Walker (1999b) adds that: 
The results have been striking, with far more use of pictures, 
more explicit briefings on Serb military units and targets 
attacked, with tape cassettes of briefings and TV footage 
instantly available. There are now morning briefings as well as 
the 3pm briefing, and other news-points to take account of a 24-
hour news cycle. 
This fits well with the MOC’s “keeping on message” and, as Campbell 
(1999) identified, the most important aspect of this for NATO was to have 
the story and coordinate the process with the correct people in the NATO 
capitals: “We demanded the facts from the military, got them and stuck to 
them, while the politicians began to repair the diplomatic damage” (p. 33). 
In this way it was now possible to eliminate the element of crisis by 
nonexistence strategies (Coombs, 1995), in particular, clarifying that there 
was no crisis since NATO’s targets are military targets.  
It is evident from the incidents discussed that NATO was extremely 
concerned about its organisational image and how it might be viewed in 
the light of civilian casualties. Overall, the organisation conformed to 
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the crisis management guidelines (Seeger et al., 2001) that make up an 
important part of public relations practice. NATO was able to maintain 
control (Heath & Millar, 2004) and, in fact, did set up a special 
organisation to deal with the issues as they arose (Coombs, 1999).  
They fell short of a more postmodern approach to crisis communication. 
That would demand that the organisation places its emphasis on 
alleviating the suffering of the stakeholders likely to suffer most from the 
situation as a more ethical response to the crisis (Tyler, 2005). The most 
prominent publics in NATO’s campaign were the ethnic Albanians in 
Kosovo and, as such, were the recipients of NATO’s care and humanitarian 
aid.  
The individuals caught up in the cases of “collateral damage” were 
casualties of war, but NATO was able to maintain its dominant narrative of 
the events by “making sure that their narrative is one of the versions 
competing for public attention. Continuing to tell their narrative remains 
important because organisational narratives can and do influence public 
perceptions, even well after the initial publicity surrounding a crisis” 
(Tyler, 2005, p. 570).  
By recognising that a crisis can not only threaten an organisation’s 
credibility, but also its survival, the swift action in setting up a media 
operations centre undoubtedly eased the pressure on explaining cases of 
collateral damage. It was also a means of reinforcing the message for 
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journalists that NATO was concerned with getting the story out to its 
publics and provided them with more resources and information to use. 
From this perspective, NATO’s information operation could recover from 
the fallout caused by the Djakovića incident and once again build up its 
credibility for the remainder of the campaign.  
These three incidents demonstrate NATO’s different strategies in coping 
with crisis communication. The first case illustrated that, in certain 
circumstances, it is possible to bury an incident in a deluge of other 
information and escape the scrutiny of zealous journalists. The second 
incident showed that this is not possible when there are competing 
narratives. From the outset of NATO’s Kosovo Campaign, Jamie Shea had 
been determined to “occupy the media space” (BBC, 1999) but in the 
Djakovića case, the collateral damage proved to be too great to bury the 
story. This could have been the tipping point of NATO’s information 
campaign, not only because Shea struggled to get the correct information, 
but also because he was unable to provide the pictures. However, because 
of NATO’s “significant fund of goodwill” (Stourton, 1999) and with the 50th 
anniversary Summit meeting about to take place in Washington, NATO 
was able to deflect criticism for its actions. By being proactive and setting 
up the Media Operations Centre immediately following this case, NATO 
managed to successfully deal with all further instances and accusations of 
collateral damage. 
Afterword 
 
320 
Afterword: Conclusions and new directions  
By taking a case study approach, this study has afforded both a micro and 
macro view of the Kosovo Campaign in terms of the transformation of 
NATO’s organisational identity. The case study itself was of enormous 
significance as a “hinge” in history: as an event at a critical period 
politically, and as a process by which NATO reshaped, and then legitimised 
itself as a relevant and viable military organisation for the 21st century. 
While there have been many other studies of the Kosovo campaign, from 
media and from military perspectives, none has focused on the campaign 
as a public relations case study. The micro and the macro views have each 
contributed to the expansion of public relations theory and, therefore, the 
understanding of practice. 
At the micro level, critical discourse analysis and critical theory have 
served to elucidate how an organisation can use public relations not only 
to manage its identity and legitimacy, but also to enhance this legitimacy 
when it is considered to be endangered. The art of public relations is 
couched in language and discursive practice, though it is an art seldom 
subjected to close critical analysis. Scrutiny of NATO’s Kosovo texts 
revealed the strategies and intricacies of discursive construction with the 
intent to effect social change. The singularly powerful construction, 
through the technique of articulation, of the discourse of humanitarian 
intervention, well illustrates the point. Without the communicative 
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resources, including expertise and power, to not only construct the new 
discourse but to have it remain virtually unchallenged in the public arena, 
NATO could not have established itself as the military power it remains 
today.  
Micro level analysis of the Kosovo campaign as a case study of military as 
well as discursive conflict has provided new insight to the current debate in 
public relations on the demarcation between propaganda and public 
relations. The work in this thesis adapted Moloney’s (2006) categorisation 
of “PR-as-weak-propaganda” from a peaceful context to a military one.  
The public relations/propaganda demarcation remains as fuzzy as 
Moloney’s characterisation suggests. This thesis also finds support for 
Moloney’s conception of public relations and propaganda as part of 
struggles for communicative advantage. Of particular relevance are 
Moloney’s (2006) concerns for “communicative equality” (p. 12), especially 
given the massively unequal dissemination abilities and resources of the 
two sides in the conflict. Indeed, the case has shown just how a large 
supranational organisation is able to mobilise its information resources to 
advance its own organisational interests.  
The success of the Kosovo public relations/communication campaign has 
been shown to lie in its success in framing the event in ways beneficial to 
the information disseminator. Thus the centrality of framing in public 
relations has become evident. The research closely examined strategic 
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public relations messages by identifying specific frames in the discourse. 
The salience of the humanitarian frame, in particular, demonstrated how 
framing enabled those with communicative power to convert that to 
ideological power through winning the consent of publics. 
The imbalance of NATO’s power to frame was further strengthened by the 
professionalisation of military communication, which was taken beyond 
the military by the involvement of civilian public relations professionals, or 
discourse technologists. Crisis communication management, in particular, 
was handled by experienced political communication professionals such as 
Jamie Shea and Alastair Campbell. The thesis showed how they worked to 
maintain control of the narratives and to keep messages consistent, and to 
make good use of conventional crisis communication strategies. 
The thesis drew from other organisational theory to argue how, by showing 
its caring, humanitarian face, NATO created a “unique self”. The analysis 
showed that through issues management, the organisation was able to 
adapt itself to the changing environment of a post-Cold War world. Its 
findings suggest that the Kosovo conflict is more accurately a part of 
NATO’s identity reshaping rather than as a means of punishing Yugoslavia 
for human rights abuses, or altruistic rescuing of refugees. Through 
analysing the discourses of key participants, it concluded that NATO’s self-
serving presentation of the Kosovo Campaign should be reframed as a 
conscious public relations/propaganda struggle. 
Afterword 
 
323 
At the macro level the Kosovo case allows extrapolation of its findings to 
other supranational organisations involved in international relations. Such 
extrapolation is enhanced by the attention paid in this thesis to context. 
The research findings have implications in terms of international relations, 
the role of supranational organisations in a globalised world and, in 
particular, the role of the United States as the one remaining superpower. 
It shows how NATO, led by the wealthiest nations in the world, could 
transform itself into the military arm of the powerful and act as a proactive 
enforcement agency for the spread of particular ideologies. In 
contextualising Kosovo in this way, the thesis provides a critical approach 
for future research into supranational organisations and how they 
legitimise their activities. 
The rise and power of supranational organisations remains little studied in 
the field. This research suggests that such international organisations 
merit scrutiny not only of the organisation in relation to other, often 
weaker entities, but also in relation to democratic and moral values. Since 
most supranational organisations have not been democratically elected, 
their assurances of working in the public interest must be monitored. 
Further research might scrutinise how moral legitimacy is used as a 
process for obtaining cognitive legitimacy elsewhere. Since the conflict in 
Kosovo, similar issues have arisen around operations in Afghanistan and 
Iraq – both of which also drew on the discourse of humanitarian 
intervention. The Taliban, Saddam Hussein and the governments of North 
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Korea and Sudan have all been accused of perpetrating human rights 
abuses on their own people in press and television coverage in similar 
fashion to the portrayal of President Milošević.  
The thesis contributed to recent public relations historical and context-
specific research by placing the Kosovo conflict within the overall historical 
context of the Balkans and the more recent events that led up to the NATO 
intervention. It stressed the importance of examining public relations 
practices in terms of the context in which they occur and mobilised other 
discourses to extend the field of public relations enquiry and the range of 
intellectual inputs. By placing NATO’s Kosovo Campaign alongside the 
discipline of international relations, it identified Kosovo as the means 
whereby a supranational organisation responded militarily to a particular 
situation without a mandate from the recognised international community 
of the United Nations. In addition, it took the campaign as a vehicle to 
demonstrate how one organisation used strategic communication to good 
effect outside more conventional corporate and government arenas.  
In aiming to provide a view of the role of public relations in international 
issues, this thesis highlighted power relations in action in an important 
supranational organisation. As representatives of the wealthiest and most 
powerful nations, supranational organisations can claim legitimacy in 
terms of working in the public interest, particularly in relation to 
democratic and moral values. This analysis suggested how one attempted 
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to ensure “mass loyalty” (Habermas, 1975, p. 36) in a specific context. 
However, what will happen when new discourses challenge the legitimacy 
of the organisation? How, for example, will NATO maintain its 
reconstructed identity in the face of proven accusations of torture in Iraq, 
which tarnished the image of the US? Ongoing torture enquiries threaten 
to cast doubt on the moral legitimacy of any organisation that claims to be 
humanitarian. Yet, for now, NATO has achieved organisational legitimacy 
by transforming its identity from a purely defensive organisation to a 
global military organisation. It is an accepted supranational military 
organisation, working in the interests of the (still undefined) international 
community. It is now seen to be a viable and necessary organisation 
attracting requests for membership from as far away as Japan and the 
Middle East. On the strength of its reforged identity during the Kosovo 
Campaign, NATO looks set to go on playing a central role in this century’s 
global war on terror.  
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